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The Eidgenössisches Schützenfest:
A Traditional Shooting Festival
by Stephen P. Halbrook1

The Eidgenössisches Schützenfest (Swiss federal shooting

competition), the largest rifle shooting match in the world, is held
every five years in a different region of Switzerland. I have participated in five of the matches at Thun in 1995, Bière in 2000, Frauenfeld
in 2005, Aarau in 2010, and Raron (Visp) in 2015.2 The Luzern 2020
matches have been rescheduled to 2021 due to the coronavirus.3
The Schützenfest is as old as the Swiss Confederation. Luzern’s
shooting club dates to 1354. But Napoleon’s invasion of 1798 created
a satellite state under the French heel. That ended with the Treaty of
Paris in 1815. The post-Helvetic republic witnessed a regeneration of
Swiss independence protected by armed neutrality. That required the
self-arming and participation of every male in the militia army. Since
military regulations provided for Scharfschützen (sharpshooters),
shooting matches became a federal sport.
Stephen P. Halbrook holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and
a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Florida State University. He is author of Target Switzerland:
Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II and The Swiss and the Nazis: How the Alpine
Republic Survived in the Shadow of the Third Reich. These books were also published
in German, French, and Polish editions. See http://stephenhalbrook.com/.
2
I wrote about the Thun matches in “The World’s Largest Rifle Shooting Match:
Switzerland 1995,” The 1996 Precision Shooting Annual 91 (Manchester, Conn.: Precision Shooting, Inc., 1996). Portions of this article on the Aarau matches appeared in
“A Swiss Schuetzenfest: The World’s Largest Rifle Match,” Shooting Sports USA, Oct.
9, 2019. https://www.ssusa.org/articles/2019/10/9/a-swiss-schuetzenfest-the-world-slargest-rifle-match/.
3
For information, see https://www.lu2020.ch/.
1

1
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In 1824, the Schweizerischen Schützenvereins (SSV, or Swiss
Rifle Association) was founded, and it organized the first Eidgenössisches Freischiessen (Federal Free Shooting) matches in Aarau that
year. The Sonderbund War of 1848 further united the emerging federal
state. Gottfried Keller in Das Fähnlein der sieben Aufrechten depicted
the Schützenfest of 1849 in Aarau as embodying the virtues of direct
democracy and federalism.4
From thence the shooting sports thrived. Under the Federal
Constitution of 1874, Article 18, every Swiss male was required to
perform military service, and he was given his arms free of charge.
Before the Great War, the U.S. Army was so impressed with the Swiss
marksmanship culture that it sent Captain T.B. Mott to Switzerland to
investigate. He reported that “Shooting clubs in Switzerland take the
place of our baseball teams,” and that the shooting festivals made it
possible that “nearly the whole population interests itself in shooting
and can shoot.” 5
It has been said that when the visiting German Kaiser asked
in 1912 what the quarter of a million Swiss militiamen would do if
invaded by a half million German soldiers, a Swiss replied: “Shoot
twice and go home.” As I have articulated in my books on the Swiss
in World War II, the universal arming of the population with marksmanship skills was a factor, along with the Reduit strategy, the Alpine
terrain, and Geistige Landesverteidingung (the philosophy of national
defense), that helped to dissuade a German invasion.
The end of the war allowed the shooting matches to return to
normal. In 1946, over 460,000 shooters—more than 10% of the population—competed in the federal shooting programs. From then through
1996, the shooting federation had over 500,000 members. The end of
the Cold War began a decline.
I gratefully acknowledge being granted access to portions of the forthcoming
book on the history of the SSV by Jürg Stüssi-Lauterburg, Einer für alle, alle für einen:
200 Jahre Schweizer Schiesssportverband (Lenzburg: Merker).
5
Quoted in Halbrook, “Citizens in Arms: The Swiss Experience,” Texas Review
of Law & Politics, vol. 8, Issue 1, 142, 161 (Fall 2003). http://www.stephenhalbrook.
com/law_review_articles/citizens-in-arms.pdf.
4
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Initiatives to abolish the army and to ban firearms have been
defeated, but in 2019 the Schengen Accord forced Switzerland into
line with European Union restrictions on firearms that discourage firearm ownership and the shooting sports. While the SSV has been renamed the Schweizer Schiesssportverband, former SSV president David Glatz, who I had the pleasure of knowing, stated: “Le tir est plus un
advantage qu’un sport” (shooting is more than a sport).
That brings us back to Aarau where the Eidgenössisches Schützenfest returned in 2010. Aarau is the capital of the Canton of Aargau
in the Swiss Mittelland, located on the River Aare. In four weeks during the summer, 43,000 competitors—37,000 in rifle and 6,000 in pistol—participated at several shooting ranges near Aarau. Some 3.5 million cartridges were shot. Our club—the Swiss Rifles of Washington,
D.C.—participated during July 1-4, 2010. The following records some
of my experiences.
Two boys bike uphill on the town’s main street with .22 caliber
bolt action rifles strapped across their shoulders wearing blue shirts
and old-fashioned gray hats. Starving after an all-night flight from the

Officers and founders of the Swiss Rifles of Washington, D.C., with SSV
President Dora Andres. Raron 2015.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10
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U.S., I am sitting outside a deli in Lenzburg. Kids on bikes with rifles?
This is so typical Switzerland!
Youth Shooting Day, which took place before we arrived, featured 1,800 youngsters competing—mostly with the current Swiss
military service rifle, the Strumgewehr 90 (Stgw 90, or assault rifle
model 1990). It shoots the low-recoil 5.6 mm Swiss cartridge, which
is almost identical to the 5.56 mm NATO round used by the American
military, and is perfect for the two youth age categories: under 16 and
under 20. This sport trains them for citizenship.

July 1: Competition day for the Swiss Militia Army, and our

first day to shoot. Switzerland has no standing army, but instead has a
militia force consisting of all able-bodied males from the time they turn
20 (and females who volunteer). Traditionally they have been issued a
service rifle to keep at home, which allows for instant mobilization.
Headed for the range in a van, we see camo clad militiamen
(and women) with Stgw 90 rifles on the train—the guy sitting in front
of us read a book with his left hand and held his rifle upright with his
right hand. It’s quite normal to see Swiss on the way to matches with
rifles carried openly on their shoulders or in a backpack, stock folded
and barrel peeking out, rather than in gun cases. You see them on motorcycles, buses, at train stations, and sidewalks.
Henri Guisan, Switzerland’s highest general in World War II,
explained the country’s unique marksmanship culture as follows:
While traversing Switzerland on Sundays, everywhere
one hears gunfire, but a peaceful gunfire: this is the Swiss
practicing their favorite sport, their national sport. They are
doing their obligatory shooting, or practicing for the regional, Cantonal or federal shooting festivals, as their ancestors
did it with the musket, the arquebus or the crossbow. Everywhere, one meets urbanites and country people, rifle to the
shoulder, causing foreigners to exclaim: “You are having a
revolution!” 6
6

Henri Guisan, Notre Peuple et son Armée 26 (Zürich: Ed. polyg., 1939).
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That is as true today as when he wrote it in 1938. Imagine what
today’s many tourists from Asia, where guns are largely banned, think
when gunfire echoes down Alpine valleys.
We arrive at the Rupperswil Shooting Center, an enormous
range with countless 300 meter rifle targets and Polytronic electronic
target systems under covered shooting positions. There are two types
of targets: an 18” wide human torso image and a 22” diameter bullseye. They look like tiny dots at that 300 meters.
While this is Militia Day, there is room for plenty of others: a
young couple armed with a Stgw 90 rifle and a baby in a stroller, a middle
aged woman with designer-painted Stgw 90, and a white-haired couple, the
man with a K31 bolt action rifle and the woman with a Stgw 90. The K31
refers to the 7.5 mm Karabiner (carbine) model of 1931, the service rifle issued beginning in that year. Reflecting when he did service, a middle-aged
guy walks by with a Strumgewehr 57 (7.5 mm assault rifle model 1957).
Almost all Swiss rifle matches use the above three military rifle
models. When a militiaman ends service, he or she has the option of
keeping the rifle. Active duty persons keep their rifles at home. They all
bring their rifles to the matches. There are also some events in which
precision sport rifles are used.
Each member of our Swiss Rifles team is issued a Stgw 90
service rifle and, for those of us shooting pistol, a SIG 210 9mm pistol,
the most accurate service pistol in the world. Each firearm is inspected
and approved. We are also issued 5.6 mm RUAG rifle ammunition and
9 mm pistol ammunition.
Huge tents house all manner of booths, most prominent of
which is the display of prizes for top shooters, from precision bolt
action rifles and designer-painted PE90 rifles (the civilian version of
the Stgw 90) to Smart Cars and bicycles to art and carved furniture.
Leading gunsmith Waffen Pauli is selling not only shooting supplies,
but also my new book Schweizer Widerstand gegen Nazi-Deutschland
(German translation of The Swiss and the Nazis).
ProTell, the association that protects the rights of gun owners,
has a booth giving out information against the Anti-Gun Initiative, to
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10
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be voted on by the Swiss people. It would have virtually closed down
the shooting sports by banning most firearms and imposing stringent
licensing requirements. It would also have collected the service rifles
kept at home by those on active duty and stored them in arsenals, thus
ending the ability to order rapid mobilization. In 2011, the initiative
would be defeated by a vote of 56% to 44%.
Switzerland is one of the safest countries in the world. Most
crimes involving armed violence are committed by foreigners with
illegal weapons.
Today our team members shoot at a small range at the village
of Buchs. Firing stops when a hirsch, a small deer, meanders across
the 300 meter rifle range without harm—they say it appears every day
at about the same time!
I shot pistol that morning, beginning with two events at 25
meters. In the Duell, a light flashes on, you raise the pistol and shoot
once within 3 seconds; pause and repeat for five shots; then shoot the
same string again. In the Series, you shoot five rounds in 30 seconds,
then repeat.

A Stgw 90 service rifle points downrange at 300 meters. Firing stopped
when a hirsch wandered across the range. Aarau 2010.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020
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Rifle shooting in prone position at the firing line. Note the youngsters
behind them keeping score for tips. Aarau 2010.
Another two pistol events at 50 meters: the Military, 4 slow
fire, then 4 shots in 60 seconds; and the Veteran (born in or before
1950)—5 slow fire.
Traveling to a foreign country, being issued a firearm the
sights of which are not set for my eyes, and shooting for score after a
half dozen practice shots is, to say the least, challenging. With my pistol, I had to aim about a foot low (!) at 5:00 and it still shot high almost
every time. Despite all I won a medal in 50 meter Veteran.
A hearty lunch in a tent with shooting club banners donning tables and rifles strewn promiscuously around. Afterwards, time to shoot
the Stgw 90 rifle.
The Swiss standard is to shoot just a few rounds precisely,
maybe 6 or 10, not to spray and pray many rounds. That reflects the
military tradition expressed by what the above militiaman told the
German Kaiser: “Shoot twice and go home.”
Consistent with such accuracy, almost all events are in prone
position, and all are at 300 meters. This does not offer the versatility
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10
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of our American National Matches in which Hi Power rifle are shot
off-hand (standing), sitting, and prone positions at 200, 300, and 600
yards, but few shooters are trained to do so. Focus on the prone position allows far larger segments of the population to participate in rifle
shooting.
The electronic targets have a screen to your right showing exactly where you hit the target with each shot, except in Series events
which shows the hits only when finished with all shots. In an hour, I
shot four events—the Verein: 6 single fire, 4 series, every shot low
(even the ten!); the Kunst: 5 single fire, every shot low; the Militaer: 4
slow fire, every shot low; and the Veteran: 5 slow fire, 2 shots to left
(at least they weren’t low!), 3 shots to lower left.
All this time, I am shooting for score, but my sights are set way
too low and are being adjusted upwards ever so conservatively. Had to
aim so high and cover the bullseye with the front sight that it is hard to
see the center! It’s taking forever to adjust the sights to go higher.

Rifles and pistols issued to the Swiss Rifles of Washington, D.C. Aarau
2010.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020
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I finally got the sights adjusted correctly to shoot the Meisterschaft (Championship), the only event with lots of shots— 60 to be
precise. Half are in prone, and half in kneeling position. I shoot prone
in three strings in twenty minutes: 10 shots good (averaged 8 or 9 of
10 possible); 10 shots great (four 10s—the ultimate excitement!, five
9s, and—what the hey!—a 6; and 10 shots just OK (7s through 10s).
I took no breaks between strings. Lesson: take a break after second
string.
As you can see, we shooting nerds keep copious records.

July 2. Each day has been hot, hotter, and now hottest! This

part of Switzerland is definitely not in the Alps, where one can wander
around glaciers and stay cool.
This morning is kneeling position in the Meisterschaft event,
consisting of three strings of ten shots each. I shot two strings in ten
minutes, took a 20 minute break, then the third string. Scores drop
dramatically from prone, but kneeling isn’t the most stable position.
Sink into relaxation and don’t let that muzzle dance the jitterbug! Total
score: 474, winning the Distinction Medal!
That afternoon, I shot as an honorary member of the shooting
club of Laufenburg, a medieval town on the Rhine bordering Germany. Six single shots, 4 series shots. Score 81: missed a medal by one
point!

July 3. This is Auslandertag, Swiss Living Abroad Day, num-

bering 250 competitors representing 23 clubs, including our own Swiss
Rifles of Washington, D.C. (the largest group with 24 competitors),
together with clubs from Vancouver, Cape Town (which came in first),
Amsterdam, Los Angeles, and others. This competition was at a small
range at Suhr, one of the countless ranges typically found in every village. I long ago lost count of how many shooting ranges I have seen
in Switzerland just from a train or automobile since my first visit in
1991, but I’ve only seen one golf course—and it was next to a shooting
range!
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10
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Trees shield us from the sweltering sun as we shoot though
triangular tunnels designed to suppress noise—alleviating complaints
from some neighbors who prefer just to hear cow bells (I prefer the
melody of bells and rifle fire together). The program: 5 practice, 6 slow,
and 4 series shots.
At lunch, we hear from SSV President Dora Andres, who focused
on the need to defeat the “Initiative Against Weapon Misuse”—code words
for banning ordinary firearms possessed by law-abiding citizens and the
militia. As noted, the initiative would be voted on and defeated—Swiss
democracy often includes voting directly on laws, not just candidates.

July 4. What a great day to celebrate freedom with Ameri-

ca’s “Sister Republic”—a term used by a Swiss political leader in a
1778 letter to Benjamin Franklin, noting that the Swiss had 13 Cantons
and the Americans had 13 States.7 Thousands converge on the town of
See James H. Hutson, The Sister Republics: Switzerland and the United States
from 1776 to the Present, 9 (1991).
6

Swiss Federal President Doris Leuthard wishes: “Gut Schuss” (good
shooting)! Aarau 2010.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020
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Young shooters parade with rifles. Note the young lady with two medals
pinned on her jeans that she won in the competition. Frauenfeld 2005.
Aarau where shots from 19th century artillery announce the opening of
the festivities. The highlight of the speeches by SSV leaders and various politicians was the closing words uttered by Swiss Federal President Doris Leuthard: “Gut Schuss” (good shooting)!
Speeches ended, and we walk toward the starting point of the
parade. We pass Aarau’s impressive monument to marksmen, a memorial showing one man with a percussion Schützen rifle shaking hands
with another with a Schmidt-Ruben model 1911 military bolt-action
rifle. The monument was erected in 1924 to commemorate the first
Federal Schützenfest in 1824. The logo for our Schützenfest in 2010
reflects societal progress: a woman with a precision sport rifle shaking
hands with a man with a Stgw 90.
The grand parade that afternoon featured seven centuries of
Swiss history with thousands of marchers, all in period dress, including
William Tell with crossbow and his son and military units of all ages—
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10

14

et al.: Full Issue
12

November 2020 SAHS Review

The girls and boys of the Lenzburg Cadets march with their .22 rifles.
Aarau 2010.
from Roman and medieval to Sonderbund War and World War II—and
farmers, vintners, politicians, and every manner of shooting teams of
today. Our Swiss Rifles club marched behind an American WWII jeep
with a 5-year old boy in a general’s hat!
My favorite: the girls and boys of the Lenzburg Cadets—the
same ones I saw riding bikes with their rifles a few days before!
The parade was shown on Swiss TV. The major Swiss newspapers covered the events. Even the ubiquitous McDonald’s advertising signs pictured three targets with the bullseyes being the silhouettes
of a burger, a drink, and an ice cream, along with the words: “Now just
a shot at the yummy target.”
Illustrative of the wide public acceptance of the shooting sports,
the Schiessbuch (shooting book) issued to every competitor consists
of 195 pages of events, shooting programs, and advertisements—
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020
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supermarkets, beer, wireless, banks, lottery, automobiles, and numerous other businesses. It begins with a welcome from Ueli Mauer, head
of the Swiss Department of Defense who also shot in the matches, paying homage to the role of the shooting tradition in maintaining a free
society.
The month-long Schützenfest ended with the competition for
top shooters. It is said that there has never been a king in Switzerland with one exception: the Schützenkoenig (shooting king), the grand
champion.
Numerous other shooting festivals take place in Switzerland
every year. I have shot in a number of them and have written about
some, such as the shoot from the medieval Mesocco castle ruins in
Ticino8 and the annual Feldschiessen (which takes place all over the
country).9 I covered (but was too old to shoot in!) the Zürcher Knabenschiessen, the centuries-old teen matches in which, when I attended, a
girl beat all of the boys.10 I also attended a rainy Rütli Schiessen. The
Morgarten Schiessen (site of 1315 defeat of the Hapsburgs) is on my
bucket list.
Hopefully, Switzerland will continue to be a democratic
beacon, to America, Europe, and the world, where from the Alpine
republic echoes: “Gut Schuss”!

8
“Swiss Schuetzenfest,” American Rifleman, 46 (May 1993). https://www.nraila.
org/articles/20010611/an-armed-society.
9
“Switzerland’s Feldschiessen,” Gun Digest 20 (1996).
10
“Girl Beats Guys: A Swiss Teen Rifle Festival,” Schiessen Schweiz, Nov. 25,
2004, 18. http://www.stephenhalbrook.com/articles/swiss_teen_rifle_festival.html.
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Where are the Sons of Tell?
A Brief History of the Formative Years
of Swiss Biathlon, 1957-1964
by Robert Sherwood
Despite the lack of international success in biathlon,
the sport has a long history
in the Swiss Confederation.
Biathlon, which combines
the long-distance endurance
of Nordic skiing and the precision marksmanship of rifle
shooting, would seem a perfect match for the Swiss.1 In
the 2010s, the Gasparin sisters (Elisa, Aita and Selina),
along with Benjamin Weger,
have helped Switzerland
start to realize its potential
Aita Gasparin at the 2013 Swiss
as a player in the world of
Biathlon Championships. Source:
biathlon. But in the early
Wikimedia Commons.
years of the sport, the Swiss
were not at the top of the list for strong biathlon nations. The reasons
for this lack of success are puzzling. In the 1950s and 1960s, the interThe term Nordic Skiing and cross-country skiing refer to the same event and
will be used interchangeably in this article.
1

14
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national biathlon competitions were dominated by those with military
backgrounds. Switzerland had all the elements available for a nation
who would succeed in biathlon. These included a mandatory military
requirement for Swiss men, abundant snowfall, a tradition of Nordic
skiing, and a culture of rifle shooting. With all elements of a strong
biathlon nation present, the manner in which Switzerland did not become an important player in the world of biathlon raises further questions about its history in the country.
The first mention of biathlon in a Swiss newspaper appeared
on November 26, 1957. This brief article, highlighting the inaugural
World Championships of Biathlon scheduled for March 2, 1958, at
Saalfelden, Austria, took the time to explain to the readers what the
sport entailed. Biathlon combines two diametrically opposed disciplines: Nordic Skiing coupled with rifle marksmanship. Nordic Skiing
requires a very high level of cardiovascular activity. Precision marksmanship at targets as far away as 250 meters requires intense concentration. The two disciplines, added together, create a sport that few
can master. This combination heightens the excitement of the event
due to the unpredictability of the shooting. Five months prior to the
first World Biathlon Championships, ten nations had committed to attend. These included Italy, the USSR, the USA, and “the Scandinavian
countries.”2 No Swiss biathletes participated in this event and Swiss
newspapers appeared to have reported on it for novelty reasons more
than anything else.3 It would not be until 1960 that the Swiss entered
the sport and hosted their own biathlon event.
Despite the lack of perceived interest in biathlon in the very
early years, Switzerland did have a strong skiing and shooting tradition. A former Winter Olympic event, the “Military Patrol,” had existed
for decades. It consisted of cross-country skiing and shooting with a
team of four; an officer, a non-commissioned officer, and two enlisted
“Les championnats du monde,” Journal et feuille d’avis du Valais (Sion, Switzerland), Nov. 26, 1957.
3
“Championnat du monde de biathlon à Courmaueur,” Le Monde des Sports, Feb.
23, 1959.
2

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10

18

et al.: Full Issue

November 2020 SAHS Review

16

soldiers. The Swiss won the gold medal in 1924 at the Chamonix Winter Olympic Games, the bronze in 1928 at St. Moritz, and the gold in
1948 at St. Moritz which was the first Olympic Games after the Second World War.4 In the post-World War II era, the Olympic Movement
tried to move away from sports that appeared overtly militaristic. The
Military Patrol, with its name, restriction on only military personnel
participating, and usage of military firearms, no longer met with the
same enthusiasm as in previous years.
The 1960 Winter Olympics in Squaw Valley, California, would
be the site of the first Olympic Biathlon. A year prior to the Olympic
Games, the United States held a “test event” for multiple sports in the
new Olympic venues. The concept of a test event is sometimes called
a “soft opening.” It allows the organizers and race officials to see the
course in race conditions and assists them in learning what needs to
be worked on to ensure a smooth contest. It also allows the athletes
a chance to compete at the venue prior to the actual event. Biathletes
from a handful of nations participated in the test event to determine the
viability of the proposed course. Multiple Swiss newspapers covered
the events, despite the fact that the Swiss did not compete in the biathlon race.5
The 1960 Winter Olympics provided a unique opportunity for
biathlon as sports that are often overlooked in the media receive additional attention in Olympic years. Biathlon, not bobsled as many
nations desired, had been added to the 1960 Olympic Winter Games,
thus many people around the world were introduced to the sport for
the first time. Today biathlon is a massively popular spectator sport
and is the most viewed winter sport on television in Europe. In 1960,
it was a relatively new sport—difficult to understand and almost impossible to watch. Spectators were not allowed on the course; all they
Christian Manzoni, “Biathlon in Switzerland: Doldrums for Decades,” in 50
Years of Biathlon 1958 to 2008, A Success Story, ed. Ivor Lehotan et. al. (Salzburg,
Austria: Herausgeber), 211.
5
“Biathlon-Wettkampf in Squaw Valley,” Freiburger Nachrichten (Freiburg,
Switzerland), Mar. 6, 1959.
4
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could see was the start and the finish. Times have changed as now over
100,000 watch in person at some of the current biathlon competitions.
Biathlon in the 1960 Squaw Valley Winter Olympic Games
consisted of one event, the 20-kilometer individual race. This race, now
simply known as the Individual, consisted of 20 km of cross country
skiing and four shooting stages of 250 meters, 200 meters, 150 meters,
and 100 meters in that order. Shooting was done at paper targets and
missed targets resulted in added penalty minutes. The rules during the
formative years of the sport saw each miss add two additional minutes
to the overall time. There were two other unique aspects of biathlon at
these Olympic Games. One rule, created to test the true marksmanship
of the biathletes, prohibited the athletes from both skiing and shooting
on the actual course during training. These elements added another
level of difficulty to the event. The shooting results were unknown by
the competitors until the end of the race. Biathletes had no idea how
their shooting results would affect their overall time until the paper
targets were collected, analyzed, and penalty time awarded.6
The organizers of the first biathlon race in Switzerland anticipated a bump in interest due to the Olympic Games. On Friday, March
17, 1960, less than a month after the Winter Olympics, the inaugural
biathlon in Switzerland occurred at Sorenberg, Canton Luzern contested over a 24 km course. The international standard distance of 20
km was largely ignored in the formative years of biathlon. Multiple
reasons caused this variation, but the most prevalent ones were the
available land to ski on, space for the four different shooting ranges,
and the topography of the area. The 24 km race in Sorenberg had four
shooting bouts, each bout consisting of five shots. Each missed shot
added two minutes to the overall time of the race. The competition,
hosted by the 17th Mountain Infantry Regiment, prevented non-military
“Avant les Jeux de Squaw Valley,” Journal et feuille d’avis du Valais (Sion,
Switzerland), Nov. 3, 1959. The inaugural rules also included a provision for four entrants per country with one alternative. This was not an issue as only nine nations sent
biathletes with a total of 30 entrants. The most surprising was Hungary who sent one
competitor.
6
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personnel from participating. Corporal Alfred Sullinger won the race
with a time of 2:23.23. Sullinger’s time included 16 minutes of penalty
time for eight missed shots.
The top five also included:
1. Cpl. Alfred Sullinger 2:23.23 (16’)
2. Fus. Hans Reider, 2:22.08 (24’)
3. Cpl. Fritz Holzer, 2:22.11 (22’)
4. Sgt. William Walter Loetscher, 2:23.22 (28’)
5. Can. Oskar Schlid 2:26.01 (28’)7

Of the 30 entrants, 20 served in the Bernese Oberland regiments and they were joined by 10 other “interested parties” in the competition.8 Although rather minor in scope and ability, this event started
the Swiss on a journey at times like Odysseus, seeming to close in on
success, but never being able to achieve it.
The race in Sorenberg hosted representatives from multiple
government agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations, who
observed the race with “great interest” to see how improvements could
be made for future competitions. They also ascertained if biathlon
might be a valid training tool to better prepare the Swiss soldiers in defending the Confederation from invasion. It is important to remember
the international setting of this first biathlon hosted by the Swiss. This
was the middle of the Cold War, and high tensions between nations
existed. Switzerland, although neutral, had some geographic vulnerabilities. Could biathlon better prepare Switzerland to defend itself?
Some thought yes, others simply saw it as a diversion.9 “It is not up
to the interested associations to follow the further development of the
7
“Biathlon Loetscher toujours là,” La Nouvelliste (Sion, Switzerland) Mar. 26,
1960. Also “Versuch mit dem Biathlon,” Oberländer Tagblatt (Thun, Switzerland),
Mar. 2, 1960.
8
“Berner Oberländer Skipatrouillenlauf in Sörenberg,” Oberländer Tagblatt
(Thun, Switzerland), Mar. 22, 1960.
9
“Biathlon Preimer in der Schweiz,” Oberländer Tagblatt (Thun, Switzerland),
Apr. 4, 1960.
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biathlon attentively after the idea of the Scandinavian “ski shooting”
has taken root in our country through the initiative of Col A. Kaech.”10
Kaech, the Regimental Commander of the 17th Oberland Regiment,
organized the event and was the catalyst for the event itself.
Other lessons that were learned included how the layout of the
track impacted the race, where the shooting ranges should ideally be
located, and the proper number, location, and difficulty of the hills in
the race. The organizers realized that a climb just prior to the shooting
ranges made the difficult challenge of hitting a target almost impossible. The direction of the shooting range also needed to be considered to ensure the visibility of the targets based on the location of the
sun. It became clear to those observing and participating in the race
that shooting would also be a major part of the sport. The average
competitor that day hit seven of 20 targets. The winner Sullinger only
hit eight. The challenge of hitting targets, at various distances, on a
range unfamiliar to the biathletes, increased the difficulty as well. An
overly simplistic idea for improvement was expressed as “the shooting results can be greatly improved through intensive training.” This
simple suggestion has been repeated by coaches since the start of the
sport and continues today. In addition, another larger championship
would be held at Andermatt the following year with a series of training
races beforehand. The CISM, or International Military Sports Council,
promised to look into adding the sport to its winter calendar. The race
finished to great success and optimism reigned. “The biathlon . . . is
likely to find numerous fans in Switzerland thanks to its interesting
combination of skiing and shooting.”11
The biathlon season, like most winter sports, started in late fall,
usually December, and lasted until mid to late March. Despite the short
season, the sport demanded year-round training in order for athletes
to be competitive. As the 1960-1961 winter season started, a series
of races were planned in Switzerland. On December 22, 1960, Hans
10
“Biathlon Preimer in der Schweiz,” Oberländer Tagblatt (Thun, Switzerland),
Apr. 4, 1960.
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Andermatt, Switzerland, in winter looking west towards Hospental and
Realp. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
Schweizer of Bowil, Aaragau, won a 15 km race hosted at Rigi. His
winning time of 1:27.17 (6’) and hit rate of 17 of his 20 shots showed
marked improvement from the event the previous year. Unlike today’s
flat, standardized shooting ranges, early biathlon courses had ranges
located on all sorts of terrain.12 Corporal Ernest Frei was the fastest
skier, finishing the 15 km race in 1:09.29, but he missed 11 shots of
the 20, was penalized 22’, and finished in 5th place. The best shot for
the day was Max Stehli, who finished in 3rd place with 18 of 20 shots
hit, with a total time of 1:30.50. The event, limited to members of the
military, drew a “record crowds of 259” who witnessed the biathlon
12
“Militärischer Rigi-Lauf,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland), Dec. 19, 1960. Second place went to Füs. Robert Ifanger (Escholzmatt) 1:28.00 (10’) shot 15 out of 20.
Third place went to Gren. Hansruedi Elsässer (Gontenschwil) 1:30.36 (14’) shot 13 of
20. Fourth place went to Füs. Max Stehli (Adliswil) 1:30.50 (4’) shot 18 of 20. Fifth
place went to Fw. Robert Haller (Dietikon) 1:31.14 (20’) shot 10 of 20. Sixth place went
to Cpl. Ernst Frei (Escholzmatt) 1:31.29 (4’) shot 18 of 20.
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competition as best they could.13 Even in these early races, marksmanship held the key to success. The two-minute penalty could, and did,
radically change those in the lead, and greatly affected who won the
race. Teams from Sweden and Finland had planned to attend the race,
but there is no record that they participated.14
The next biathlon race in Switzerland occurred as part of CISM
Winter Championships hosted in Andermatt which included alpine,
Nordic and ski jumping events, in addition to the biathlon on February 18, 1961.15 The planned course had 20 km of skiing with 400 total
meters of downhill and 500 meters of uphill during the race. At five
km and seven km, there would be shots of 150 m distance. Around the
12 km mark the shooting would be 100 m, followed by the 50 m shots
at the 15 km distance. The first two shooting bouts were in the prone
position, followed by one kneeling, and the final one in the standing
position.16 The distances for the shooting were considerably shorter
than those of the 1960 Olympics, or the 1961 World Biathlon Championships. Those started at 250 m, and went to 200 m, 150 m and the final
shot at 100m. The first three were in any method a biathlete wanted,
most shot from the prone as it was more stable, while the last shooting
had to be from the standing position. An open call went through the
Swiss Military ranks for participants. “The officers, non-commissioned
officers, and soldiers who desire to participate in this biathlon trial are
asked to announce as early as possible to the alpine sport officer of
their army unit.”17 It does not appear that there were any qualifications
other than a desire to participate and membership in the military.
“Premier Epreuve Suisse de Biathlon ay Righi,” Gazette de Lausanne (Lausanne, Switzerland), Dec. 22, 1960.
14
“Rien de spécial dans le domaine de la competition,” Le Nouvelliste (Sion,
Switzerland), Nov. 28, 1961.
15
“Haute-Nendaz organise les championnats d’hiver de la Br. mont. 10,” Le Confédéré (Martigny, Switzerland), Nov. 7, 1960.
16
“Militär-Skiwettkämpfe in Anderinatt,” Neue Zürcher Nachrichten (Zurich,
Switzerland), Jan. 17, 1961.
17
“Championnats d’hiver de l’Armee et councours internationaux militarire,” La
Nouvelliste (Sion, Switzerland), Jan. 18, 1961.
13
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Due to factors beyond the control of the organizers, the race,
which doubled as the first Swiss National Biathlon Championship, had
some slight modifications to the initial course. The shooting ranges
were altered slightly to the following distances in the race: 4.6 km,
10.5 km, 17 km, and 19 km. The last two were a major advantage to
those who shot well. The longer the race, the more fatigue set in, thus
making the marksmanship even more difficult. The racers who could
center themselves and shoot well would have a major advantage over
those who focused more on the skiing. Placing the final two shooting ranges in the last three km of the race elevated the shooting to an
unprecedented role in the race. In addition, Andermatt is over 1400 m
(4700 ft) in elevation. At that elevation, breathing would have been
more difficult in daily life, and much more when competing in the
biathlon. The actual location of the race was in Userental, a commune
adjacent to Andermatt. Armin Mueller of nearby Hospental had the
fastest ski time, but with penalties had a final time of 1:43.20.18 Josef
Brunner of Einsiedeln skied fast enough and shot well enough to win
the first Swiss Biathlon National Championships.19
The 1961 World Championships held later in February 1961
in Umea, Sweden, were the 4th of its kind, and the first that the Swiss
attended.20 Compared to the Olympic Games, an increased number of
nations sent athletes to the World Championship. The increased exposure that the Olympics provided the sport helped to raise participation.
The second reason for increased participation was simple, budgets. A
trip from Europe to Sweden cost much less than to California. The
Schweizerische Interessengemeinschaft für militärischen Mehrkampf,
or SIMM, a group that had influence over Swiss Military athletics, but
not part of the official military structure, sent Max Stehli, Ernst Frei
“Biathlon,” Gazette de Lausanne (Lausanne, Switzerland), Feb. 21, 1961.
“Winter-Armeemeisterschaften in Andermatt,” Walliser Bote (Sion, Switzerland), Feb. 22, 1961. According to contemporary newspapers, Brunner’s winning time
was 1:44.28, a time that would appear to be slower than Mueller’s 1:43.20, but each
newspaper account listed him as the winner. So one of the times is incorrect.
20
“Février,” Journal et feuille d’avis du Valais (Sion, Switzerland), Jan. 2, 1961.
18
19
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and Ludwig Hobi to the 1961 World Championships. Selection for the
event came from previous success in related events. Their rationale for
each biathlete was as follows: Stehli of Adliswil won the “military obstacle course” race, Hobi of Walenstadt won what the newspaper called
Waffenläufe, or gun races, in the previous two years. Frei’s selection
focused on his participation in and positive result at the biathlon race at
Rigi on December 22, 1960, and he also won a 24 km race in Engelberg
earlier that helped convince the group to select him.21
The three arrived in the coastal city of Umea, Sweden, situated
just over halfway up the west coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, full of excitement, nervousness, and a sense of unknown. The Swiss had not been
tested on an international scale yet and previous to the 1961 World Championships there really was not a way to see how good, or bad, the Swiss
biathletes were. Their debut had the potential for the three, and Switzerland in general, to take stock of the progress of the team since its inception. The winner of the race and World Champion, Kalevi Huuskonen of
Finland finished with a time of 1:32.11 with two penalty minutes. He only
missed one shot out of 20, which came on the third shooting range.
In the top ten finishers of the race, three biathletes missed more
than five shots, but they were able to ski fast enough to make up for
their misses. The Swiss found out quickly that being from a land of
snow did not automatically make them world class biathletes. Ludwig
Hobi finished 34th with a time of 2:02.40, Max Stehli finished 39th with
a time of 2:09.40, and Ernst Frei finished 41st with a time of 2:14.31. It
is not possible to know if Frei finished in last place, the only indication
of the amount of biathletes in the race was that there were more than
40 competitors in the race. Full results are not available as the official
results currently available online only list the top 30 athletes.23 The in“Schweizer Delegation für Biathlon-WM,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland), Feb.
13, 1961. Some of the results of races, let alone information about early races, have
proved very difficult to obtain. Nothing else about the 24 km race that Frei won, to put
him on the team, has been found.
22
“Finnischer Doppelerfolg in Biathlon,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland), Feb. 27, 1961.
23
“Umea: Men 20km Individual,” International Biathlon Union, accessed Sept.
17, 2020. www.biathlonresults.com
21
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augural foray into the World Championship competition by the Swiss
did not dazzle anyone in Switzerland nor abroad. When the best, Hobi,
finished over 30 min behind the winner, it was obvious that a large gap
existed between the Swiss and other nations.
The remainder of the 1960-1961 season is unknown as results
for the events have not been found. So many of the early competitions
were not recorded in newspapers. Without a published schedule, it is
not possible to verify whether there might have been more races.
The biathlon opening race for the 1961-1962 season was held
in Rigi. It provided an opportunity to gauge athlete’s progression. The
biathlon race that weekend was part of a larger Nordic and alpine competition for the military. One caveat existed, that the race would be held
“if the snow conditions permit.”24 The caveat had to be used and the
race was postponed until January 7, 1962 due to poor snow conditions.25
Unlike the December attempt, lack of snow did not cause any
issues on January 7, 1962. Snow fell before, during, and after the race.
For the organizers of the race, the challenge of the day was fog; it blanked
the firing range to such a degree that it forced a relocation of the shooting ranges. According to reports, there were around 80 entries into the
race. Josef Marti won the 15 km race, which saw a first in Switzerland,
a Swiss biathlete hitting 20 out of 20 targets or “shooting clean.” Marti’s
perfect shooting made up for his slower skiing and moved him to the
top of the race standings. Robert Haller of Dietikon skied the fastest, but
lost 24 min due to 12 missed shots which dropped him to 13th place.
The results were as follows:
1. Wm. Josef Marti (Kloten) 1:25.34 (0’)
2. Sgt. Josef Christen (Grafenort) 1:26.45 (8’)
3. Fus. Max Stehli (Adliswil) 1:28.02 (8’)
4. Gfr. Martin Christen (Grafenort) 1:32.18 (12’)
5. Cpl. Ernst Frei (Escholzmatt) 1:32.25 (16’)
“Sport AM Wochenende,” Friburger Nachrichten (Freiburg, Switzerland),
Dec. 16, 1961.
25
“Wehrsport,” Neue Zürcher Nachrichten (Zurich, Switzerland), Dec. 19, 1961.
24
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6. Pol. Werner Graf (Zürich) 1:32.56 (10’)
7. Fus. Hans Zimmermann (Schwendi/GL) 1:33.12 (14’)
8. Gren. Hansruedi Elsässer (Gontenschwil) 1:34.08 (12’)
9. Sap. Paul Wüthrich (Luzern) 1:36.46 (6’)
10. Gren. Peter Luchsinger (Schwanden) 1:37.12 (4’)26

Overall, the shooting in the race greatly improved from past attempts. The shooting element is highly unpredictable in biathlon. A gust
of wind at the wrong moment, a pulse rate too high, or simply a change
in lighting due to a cloud moving over the sun are all small things that
can cause poor results while shooting. The successful shooting results
in this specific event could be attributed to good shooting conditions, an
overall improvement in competitors’ shooting, or simply pure luck. But
within the top ten, there were only two who hit less than 15 shots. This
improved shooting caused pre-race favorite and defending champion
Hans Schweizer to be unable to defend his title. In his first ten shots,
Schweizer hit nine of them, and seemed in line to repeat as winner due
to his good shooting and strong ski speed. However, at the third shooting range, he missed each of his five shots. Those misses, which equaled
10 minutes of penalties, were too much for him to overcome.27
Stehli and Frei, two of the three who competed in the World
Championships, shot and skied well. Their relative high placing in
this event showed the low level of competition in the Swiss event as
compared to the World Championship. There appear to be no further
biathlons that the Swiss participated in during the 1961-1962 season.
Records indicate that no Swiss biathletes were sent to the 1962 World
Championships in Hameenlinna, Finland.
In preparation for the important 1962-1963 season, a preOlympic year, the Swiss Interest Group for Military All-Around Combat of SIMM laid out the upcoming biathlon schedule for the season.
“Treffermaximum beim Rigi-Biathlon,” Neue Zürcher Nachrichten (Zurich,
Switzerland), Jan. 8, 1962.
27
“Wehrsport auf Rigi-Klösterli,” Neue Zürcher Nachrichten (Zuri Neue Zürcher
Nachrichten (Zurich, Switzerland), Jan. 13, 1962.
26
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The group determined that four biathletes would participate in the preOlympic World Championship at Seefeld, Austria, a test event for the
1964 Winter Olympics.
The committee released the planned domestic and international
racing calendar as follows:
• Jan. 6 at Rigi-Lauf
• Jan. 20 at Schwarzsee—the Swiss Regional Championships
• February 1-3 at Schwellbrunn—the Swiss Biathlon Championships
• March 3 at Seefeld, Austria—World Championships
• March 16-17 at Arosa, Italy—CISM events28

The first race of the season was held at Rigi on January 6,
1963, where weather created challenges for the biathletes.29 There
were 60 biathletes who entered the race, which was contested over
19 km, 300 m. Like all events to date, there were four shooting bouts.
As normal, weather played a deciding factor in this outdoor sporting competition—the foehn winds caused havoc on the race tracks
as well as the shooting ranges. Hans Ammann, the fastest on his skis
with 1:33.32 was one of the worst shots. He hit only 4 of his 20 shots
and ended up in 9th place for the day. Fritz Zimmermann from Glarus
won the event. Ammann is a classic example that the winner needs to
be both a good skier and a good shot.30
On January 20, 1963, Schwellbrunn, canton Appenzell Ausserrhoden, hosted the first true National Championship, unlike the quasi-event in 1961.31 This race, located on the calendar just prior to the
team selection for the World Championships in Seefeld, Austria, held
great importance in the selection for the World Championship team.32
“Wehrsport-Terminkalender und Beschlüsse der SIMM,” Neue Zürcher
Nchrichten (Zurich, Switzerland), Nov. 28, 1962.
29
“Sports militaires,” Journal et feuille d’avis du Valais (Sion, Switzerland), Nov.
27, 1962.
30
“Le biathlon de Rigi,” Journal de Genève (Geneva, Switzerland), Jan. 7, 1963.
31
“Les sports DIVERS,” La Liberté (Fribourg, Switzerland), Jan. 19, 1963.
32
“Ausschreibung der Biathlon-Meisterschaft,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland),
Jan. 5, 1963.
28
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An aerial view of Schwellbrunn. Note the rolling hills, ideal for a biathlon race. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
Despite plentiful and fast snow, the weather did not cooperate at all. The
first shooting range had its results nullified as the conditions changed
so drastically during the race to make the results unusable. The fourth
shooting stop was simply cancelled due to heavy fog and the inability
to see the targets. The race, originally a 20 km with four shooting stops,
turned into a 20 km with two shooting stops. The reduced number of
potential penalty minutes increased the importance of ski speed and
decreased the importance of shooting. Similar to the first race of the
season at Rigi, out of the 50 entries, the fastest time belonged to Hans
Ammann of Alt-St. Johann. However, he did not finish near the top due
to his poor shooting as he missed every shot! Peter Gerig of Göschen
won the race with a 1:38.54, but only hit five targets.
The results were:
1. Peter Gerig (Göschen) 1:38.54 (10’)
2. Hansrüdi Mettler (Schwellbrunn) 1:41.17 (10’)
3. Marcel Vogel (Weinfeldern) 1:47.01 (8’)
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10
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4. Hans Ammann (Alt-St. Johann) 1:47.02 (20’)
5. Max Stehli (Adliswil) 1:50.35 (10’)
6. Othmar Suter (Basel) 1:52.21 (14’)
7. Josef Schnider (Sihlbrugg) 1:52.59 (16’)
8. Andreas Vetsöh (Giufplan) 1:53.35 (16’)
9. Jakob Etzensperger (Unter Schlaft) 1:54.14 (16’)
10. Fritz Zimmerman (Glarus) 1:54.19 (18’)33

The shooting results emphasize how difficult the conditions were for
shooting that day.
The Biathlon World Championships on March 3, 1963, held in
Seefeld, Austria, were notable in a few ways. With the Winter Olympics
the following year, these World Championships acted as a preview of
sorts. There were 13 teams in attendance.34 This was the only time when
the host for the Biathlon World Championships also hosted the Winter
Olympic Games the following year. In recent years it is traditional that
the Olympic venue will host an event on the IBU World Cup circuit a year
prior to the games to allow athletes and organizers to test the venue.35
As anticipated, the Swiss team did poorly in the competition. The
20 km race, won by Vladimir Melanie of the USSR with a time of 1:32.06
(4’), was a full 30 minutes faster than the best placed Swiss biathlete.
The Swiss finished as follows:
42. Peter Gehrig 2:07.57 (20’)
43. Max Stehli 2:09.10 (16’)
46. Fritz Zimmerman 2:12.46 (24’)
47. Willy Bar 2:15.18 (16’).
“Späher Peter Gerig erster Bathlon-Meister,” Neue Zürcher Nchrichten
(Zurich, Switzerland), Jan. 21, 1963.
34
“La saison en Autriche,” Journal et feuille d’avis du Valais (Sion, Switzerland),
Jan. 12, 1963. The teams at the World Championships were East Germany, West Germany, Austria, Finland, Great Britain, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United States, and the USSR.
35
https://biathlonresults.com/ This is the official website of the International Biathlon Union [hereafter IBU]. Past results are found on this website for multiple levels, IBU
World Cup, IBU Cup, and Youth/Junior Events as well as some other events sanctioned by
the IBU. A look into the specific seasons prior to Olympic Games will show a test event,
but not the World Championships at the same venue as the Winter Olympic Games.
33
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Out of the athletes who completed the race, the Swiss biathletes all finished in the final six. The only two biathletes not Swiss in
the final six were Edgar Schubert of West Germany, and John Moore of
the United Kingdom. Schubert had 36 minutes of penalties and Moore
32 minutes of penalties, and they still managed to beat Zimmerman and
Bar!36 One account of the Swiss competitors simply stated, “The Swiss
were grossly inferior in this field, both technically and in terms of
shooting.”37 No rationale for the team selection has come to light. Zimmerman, who had won the Rigi race in early January, fared poorly at
the National Championships, so a marginal result at the World Championships had been expected. Gehrig had won the National Championships, and more had been expected of him.
The national rankings, based on the combined times of their
four racers, shows an even larger gap between the Swiss and the other
nations in the competition. The USSR biathletes were each in the top
seven and won with a composite time of 4:45.56. Finland was relatively close behind with 4:46.02. The Swiss were in 12th place with a time
of 6:29.53!38 The second foray of the Swiss into the larger international
biathlon scene was met with another whimper. It was obvious from
the race that the Swiss had a long way to go to be competitive on the
international scene.
After the World Championships, a rather lengthy editorial
about biathlon found its way into Die Tat, a daily newspaper from
Zurich, in late February 1963. The author, Harry F. Gehm, is unknown
except for this editorial. In it, he espoused the idea that biathlon did not
belong in the Olympics due to the requirement for a large bore rifle, as
these were only found in the military. He stated:

36
https://biathlonresults.com/ Schubert missed 18 of his shots and Moore missed
16 of his shots.
37
“Vladimir Melanin wieder Biathlon-Weltmeister,” Neue Zürcher Nchrichten
(Zurich, Switzerland), Feb. 4, 1963.
38
“Championnat du Monde—Biathlon,” Gazette de Lausanne (Lausanne, Switzerland), Feb. 4, 1963.
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This competition has no Olympic legitimacy because
the purely military half of the test, the shooting, is rated far
too high in relation to the sporty skiing. Fighting continues
under unequal conditions. Since every runner has to bring
his rifle with him, a Swiss might have to lug around a huge
“cannon” that dangles around his back and legs with every
step.39

Although the hyperbole is evident, his point is well made.
Gehm advocated that “a uniform rifle and a uniform support frame had
to be prescribed.” With frustration in his tone, he stated that “the old
military patrol run, which was finally banned from the Olympic winter
sports program, is now celebrating a happy birth.” The Swiss had been
good at the Military Patrol and were obviously not doing well at biathlon. He continued that according to those who supported biathlon, the
sport “symbolizes the performance of the Nordic hunter, who follows
the game on skis and shoots it down.” Not true, said our dear Harry
Gehm, “They must be strange hunters, though, with the army rifles
shooting at bears and moose from a distance of 250 meters.”40
The argument for a more standardized rifle, one that made
sense then and now, led to a change. In the 1978-1979 season, the .22
long rifle replaced the large bore rifle which was previously standard
for the biathlon. This change and the accompanying reduction to a
50 m shooting range greatly increased the accessibility and popularity of the sport. Gehm longed for the day when the Military Patrol
resulted in Swiss glory. This is a recurring theme in the few editorials
that exist about the sport. There is an underlying tone in these editorials
that as a sport with military influence, failure on the ski tracks and in
the shooting range could lead to decreased prestige in the world. This
could in turn lead to an increased chance of invasion due to perceived
military weakness.
Gehm, Harry F., “Biathlon gehört nicht in das Olympia-Programm,” Die Tat
(Zurich, Switzerland), Feb. 21, 1963.
40
Ibid.
39
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The Gold Medal winning 1924 Swiss Military Patrol team. Source:

Wikimedia Commons.

With the failure of the 1963 World Championships in their rearview mirror, the Swiss turned towards the 1964 Winter Olympics as
the next major target in their anticipated ascendancy into international
biathlon respectability. The optimism of the SIMM was amazing. Each
time that the Swiss had been involved in international competition, the
results had been very poor. Despite this, the Olympic Games were the
next target, and all efforts were made for a successful showing. The
first national summer biathlon training camp set in July 1963, saw the
initial step in this concerted effort. These training camps are commonplace in today’s hypercompetitive international biathlon environment,
but this camp was a first for Switzerland. Led by Captain Weber of
Bern, 25 aspiring soldiers were selected to train and prepare for the
Olympic Games. The first training session focused on shooting. Ski
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technique as well as other elements of the biathlon were prioritized in
later training sessions. The culmination of these sessions was a “biathlon on foot” held at Weinfelden, canton Thurgau in August 1963.
Bremgarten, canton Aargau, Macolin, canton Bern near Biel/Bienne,
and canton Glarus hosted subsequent training events. An ambitious series of biathlon competitions in the winter would determine who would
represent the Swiss. Andermatt, Tamis (canton Graubünden outside of
Chur), Zugerberg (canton Zug), Schwanden (canton Glarus), Rigi, and
Gonten (canton Appenzell Innerrhoden) were scheduled to host the series of races.
One of the interesting aspects of the team was the Swiss-German vs Swiss-Romand split. One newspaper article made a point to
have as its headline “Only five Romands” were among the 25 competing for training slots. Further discussions about the locations for the
planned races brought up questions of favoritism to the Swiss-German
side of the Confederation.41 It appeared that the long standing tensions
between Swiss linguistic regions emerged in this realm as well. The
perceived slights between French and German speaking Swiss citizens
are a long-standing part of the Swiss Confederation. Another development in the selection process was to actively use Swiss Nordic team
members in biathlon. The aforementioned physical tests in Macolin,
held in September, contained 11 biathletes who were also listed on the
Swiss Nordic “B” team.42
Credit must be given to the SIMM for their efforts to lay the
groundwork for a successful season, team and program. The growth in
the frequency, intensity and focus of summer training, as well as the
increased number of competitions that determined the Olympic team
are in line with current practices. The major issue with the team was
twofold. The first was simple, the Swiss were simply not fast enough,
and did not shoot well enough. The second was a little more complex.
”Sports Militaires—5 Romands seulement,” Journal et feuille d’avis du Valais
(Sion, Switzerland), July 18, 1963.
42
“Les Sports,” La Liberté (Fribourg, Switzerland), Sept. 4, 1963.
41
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Biathlon is a sport that takes a long time to master. Most biathletes
reach their peak in their late 20s and early 30s. The need for prolonged
success started with a decade-long training program, where the focus
on core conditioning in the summer time resulted in a strong training
base for the winter season.
The Weinfelden Summer Biathlon held on August 27, 1963, a
14 km run and shooting race, played a considerable role in the start of
the Olympic season. The rules were the same, four rounds of shooting,
plus running instead of skiing between. Each shot missed led to a twominute penalty, exactly the same as in winter biathlon.
The results were as follows:
1. Albert Läubli (Märstetten) 1:40.10
2. Max Stehli (Adliswil) 1:44.38
3. Marcel Vogel (Weinfelden) 1:47.22
4. Waller Neff (Appenzell) 1:50.13
5. Erich Schönbächler (Einsiedeln) 1:56.50
6. Josef Marti (Kloten) 1:58.1143

This event is one of the first recorded events of an intentional
summer biathlon in the world. A previous Swiss event became a run
and shoot biathlon due to the weather, but this event was different as it
was intentional. In the United States, a series in the 1980s and 1990s
expanded to around 50 events in the summer. The International Biathlon Union eventually created a Summer Biathlon Championship, but
with rollerskis, not running. Although good for cardiovascular health
and training for shooting, the running and skiing do not always lead
to the same winner. This is keenly evidenced with first-place winner
Albert Läubli, as this is the only evidence of his participation in any
biathlon event. He assuredly did participate in other events, but no record of his further results have been uncovered to date.
In early December 1963, the Swiss Olympic Committee announced that they would send 70 total athletes to the Innsbruck games
43

“Weinfelder Sommer-Biathlon,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland), Aug. 27, 1963.
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the following year. Among the 70, they committed to sending five
biathletes. This decision, combined with the intensive training and
competition schedule about to start, showed the real desire for the
Swiss biathletes to perform well and elevate the national prestige that
comes with success at the Olympic Games.44
The first of the selection races, scheduled for December 9,
1963, at Andermatt, started with great enthusiasm and hope for a strong
showing for a Swiss team at the Olympics. The course, located near the
Oberalp Pass, was 14 km in length with 300 meters of “denivelation.” According to accounts of the race, the skiing was adequate, but the shooting
“left much to be desired.”
The top eight places were as follows:
1. Fus. Willy Junod (Dombresson) 1:24.37 (14’)
2. Sgt. Erich Schönbächler (Einsieldeln) 1:27.40 (6’)
3. Cpl. Marcel Vogel (Weinfelden) 1:32.56 (18’)
4. Sgt. Norbert Schmid (Disentis) 1:33’ (16’)
5. Sgt. Peter Gehrig (Goeschenen) 1:33.32 (19’)
6. Cpl. Josef Haas (Marbach) 1:33.44 (20’)45
7. Gren. Fritz Zimmermann (Schwendi) 1:36.48 (16’)
8. Lt. Gregor Furrer (Riederalp) 1:36.57 (24’)46

The lack of skilled shooting is evident when looking at the
penalty times. Willy Junod skied the course in 1:10.37, but due to
seven misses out of 20 he almost lost the race to Eric Schönbächler
who skied much slower at 1:21.40. He only had three misses for a total
time of 1:37.40.
The subsequent weeks saw scheduled races around the country.
A few alterations needed to be made to the schedule as the December 15 race at Reichenau-Tamins was rescheduled until January 12,
“Le COS a siege a Berne; 70 Sportifs Suisse presents a Innsbruck,” Gazette de
Lausanne (Lausanne, Switzerland), Dec. 3, 1963.
45
“Premiere epreuve de selection,” Journal de Genève (Genevam Switzerland),
Dec. 10, 1963.
46
“Biathlon in Andermatt,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland), Dec. 9, 1963.
44
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1964, due to lack of snow.47 The third event on the schedule, the race
at Zugerberg, changed format from skiing to running due to lack of
snow. This change favored the strong runner over the strong skier. As
a result of the change, Willy Junod, who seemed to be the strongest
biathlete in the nation, did not even compete. The Olympic selection
committee eventually decided not to use the results of the Zugerberg
race for Olympic team selection. The race at Zugerberg, a 14 km race,
had about 24 competitors in it. The first range was only 1.5 km into the
race. Both Bär and Rüesch missed four targets and effectively eliminated themselves from race competition. Thick fog on the 2nd range at
8 km cancelled the shooting. Gehrig hit four times and Stehli hit three
times on the 3rd range. Marti hit five of five on the third to move into
the lead. On the last shooting of 100 m, all hit four of five, but Gehrig
ran the best over the last section to take the win. Marti placed 2nd, and
Stehli finished in 3rd.
The top five placings were as follows:
1. Peter Gehrig (Göschenen) 1:13.53 (8’)
2. Josef Marti (Kloten) 1:14.38 (4’)
3. Max Stehli (Adliswil) 1:15.01 (8’)
4. Ernst Hartmann (Ebnat-Kappel) 1:28:40 (14’)
5. Manfred Rüesch (Rheineck) 1:29.04 (16’)48

The scheduled race at Schwanden took on even greater importance as the Zugerberg race results were ignored for Olympic qualification.49
The lack of snow continued to plague the great organization efforts. The race, originally scheduled for Schwanden, was relocated due
to “lack of acceptable ski conditions” to Urnerboden. This race permit47
“Sports Militares,” Journal et feuille d’avis du Valais (Sion, Switzerland), Dec.
14, 1963.
48
“Biathlon auf dem Zugerberg ohne Ski,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland), Dec.
23, 1963.
49
“Sport Am Wochenende,” Friburger Nachrichten (Friburg, Switzerland), Dec.
28, 1963.
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ted one final attempt prior to the Swiss National Biathlon Championships scheduled for Rigi-Kaltbaa on January 5, to improve athletes’
positions for selection on the Olympic Team.50 The race was held over
20 km with 500 m of denivelation, with 45 contestants. Cpl. Marcel
Vogel of Rheinfelden won the race.51
Vogel was the clear victor in the race, his time of 1:57.10 (6’)
was eight minutes clear of Sgt-Maj. Fredy Vogel of Kriens. The fastest
skier was Fus. Franz Oetiker who finished the race in 1:44.48 but had
22 minutes of penalties. Sgt. Josef Marty of Kloten had the best shot
of the competition with only three missed shots.
The top ten places were as follows:
1. Cpl. Marcel Vogel (Rheinfelden) 1:57.10 (6’)
2. Sgt-Maj. Fredy Vogel (Kriens) 2:05.10 (16’)
3. Sgt. Erich Schönbächler (Einsieldeln) 2:05.56 (12’)
4. Sgt. Peter Gerig (Goeschenen) 2:06.04 (20’)
5. Lt. Gregor Furrer (Riederalp) 2:06.14 (18’)
6. Fus. Jean-Michel Aeby (La Chaux-de-Fonds) 2:06.48 (18’)
6 (tie). Fus. Franz Oetiker (Einsieldeln) 2:06.48 (22’)
8. Lt. Ruedi Etter (Schwanden) 2:10.57 (14’)
9. App. Willy Junod (Dombresson) 2:10.58 (24’)
10. Fus. Max Stehli (Adliswil) 2:11.03 (10’)52

The course had to be altered some, and instead of skiing over
20 km of fresh, new trails, the course at Urnerboden used the same 10
km loop twice, which meant as well that the ranges were used twice at
3 km, 5 km, 13 km, and 15 km. The course started out reasonably flat,
then turned east as it left the Klausenstrasse and climbed towards the
valley wall near the cantonal border. The last portion of the course was
uphill and in a westward direction to return to the start. Vogel’s win,
added to his 3rd place finish in Andermatt, put him in a strong position
“Biathlon auf Urnerboden,” Friburger Nachrichten (Friburg, Switzerland),
Dec. 30, 1963.
51
“Sports blanc,” La Liberté, Dec. 30, 1963.
52
“Les specialistes du biathlon a l’entrainement,” Journal de Genève (Geneva,
Switzerland), Dec. 30, 1963.
50

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

39

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 56 [2020], No. 3, Art. 10
Where are the Sons of Tell?

37

to make the Olympic Team. Schönbächler fell during the race and had
to spend some time repairing his rifle. This may have resulted in the six
misses, but he did well enough to finish in 3rd place. With one race left,
the team looked to be shaping up as Vogel, Schönbächler, Aeby, Junod
and Gerig.53
The final race moved from Rigi to Hospenthal only 24 hours
prior to the start time due to an inadequate amount of snow. The organization lacked a few elements, but most were grateful for the “great
lengths” taken by the race organizers to save the championship/qualifier.54 Another reason for the move was the calendar. Those selected for
the Olympic team needed to be registered by January 6, 1964. A postponement of the race in Rigi would not be possible. This race doubled
as the 2nd National Championship, as well as the last Olympic qualifying
race. The course, laid out only a few days prior to the event due to the
race relocation, started near the northern part of the valley. It followed
the Furkareuss towards the village of Realp. The first of the shooting
ranges was situated near Realp. Another range was near Zumbach. Reports had the snow powdery and consistent through the entire race.
Of the 52 entries in the race, some major storylines emerged
around Vogel, Schönbächler, Junod, Gerig and Furrer as the leaders
in qualifying. Not all of them could qualify and the question of who
would succeed added an additional edge to the event. The second major story line was the question of whether Peter Gerig would defend his
1963 National Title at Schwellbrunn. When the results were tabulated,
Norbert Schmed was the best shot and won the day. Furrer was the big
loser on the day with 17 misses; he finished in 13th place and missed a
spot on the Olympic team.55
The race started at a frozen -14 degrees Celsius and was contested over 23 km with 550 m of denivelation. Mot. Georges Dubois of
“Biathlon auf dem Urnerboden,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland), Dec. 30, 1963.
“Biathlon-Schweizer-Meisterschaften in Hospenthal,” Neue Zürcher Nchrichten (Zurich, Switzerland), Jan. 7, 1964.
55
“Die Biathlonmeisterschaft in Hospenthal,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland), Jan.
6, 1964.
53
54
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La Chaux de Fonds had the fastest time on the course, but did not shoot
well, and missed 11 shots for 22 minutes of penalty time. Sgt. Peter
Gehrig, the defending champion, also shot poorly and had 10 missed
shots with 20 minutes of penalty time to finish 13 minutes behind the
winner in 5th place. Sgt. Norbert Schmed of Disentis, canton Graubünden, won the race to become the Swiss National Champion. His performance on skis was adequate, but Schmed missed only one shot and
won by almost four minutes over App. Willy Junod who missed eight
shots, but skied much faster.
The top 13 places were as follows:
1. Sgt. Norbert Schmed (Disentis) 1:52.48 (2’)
2. App. Willy Junod (Dombresson) 1:56.14 (16’)
3. Mot. Georges Dubois (La Chaux de Fonds) 1:59.03 (22’)
4. Lt. Rudolf Etter (Schwanen) 2:01.35 (10’)
5. Sgt. Peter Gehrig (Goschenen) 2:05.40 (20’)
6. Cpl. Marcel Vogel (Weinfelden) 2:08.36 (16’)
7. Fus. Max Stehli (Addiswil) 2:09.53 (6’)
8. Cpl. Josef Haas (Marbach) 2:10.22 (24’)
9. App. Michel Aeby (La Chaux de Fonds) 2:10.22 (24’)
10. Sgt. Erich Schönbächler (Einsiedeln) 2:12.24 (24’)
11. Gren. Peter Lochsinger (Schwanden) 2:15.46 (14’)
12. Gren. Fitz Zimmerman (Schwendi) 2:16.43 (24’)
13. Lt. Gregor Furrer (Rideralp) 2:17.42 (34’)56

The Swiss Olympic team announced the members of the Winter Olympic squad a week after the National Championships. The selected members of the team were: Sgt. Norbert Schmed (Disentis), Fus.
Willy Junod (Dombresson), Sgt. Peter Gehrig (Goeschenen), Cpl. Marcel Vogel (Weinfelden), Sgt. Eric Schönbächler (Einsiedeln) and the
Head of the delegation would be Captain A. Webber (Zurich).57 These

“Norbert Schmed enleve le titre de Champion Suisse de Biathlon,” Gazette de
Lausanne, Jan. 6, 1964.
57
“La représentation suisse a Innsbruck,” Journal et feuille d’avis du Valais, Jan.
14, 1964.
56
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five Swiss, with Schönbächler as the alternate, joined 13 other nations
for the Olympic race.58
Training and racing for those who were not selected did not
stop. A 17 km race held in Gonten, Appenzell, permitted those not in
the Olympics to continue training. About 80 entries for the race started
in bright sunshine in the shadow of two mountains—the Kronberg and
the Hundwiler Höhi. The course ran along the railway line in an eastwardly direction towards the hamlet of Gantenbad. In the initial part of
the race, the course was generally flat, but the latter portions had steep
climbs and descents. The course passed Jangen Bahn and Jakobsbad
before returning to Gonten. The course was well frozen and consistent
throughout the valley.
The results were as follows:
1. Wm. Josef Marti (Kloten) 1:50.14 (16’)
2. Max Stehli (Aldiswil) 1:51.41 (12’)
3. Mandred Rüsch (Rheineck) 1:53.21 (22’)
4. Albert Nett (Appenzell) 1:56.44 (28’)
5. Hans Alder (Gais) 1:57.36 (30’)
6. Ernst Hartmann (Ebnat) 2:00.37 (18’)
7. Hansruedi Hug (Schwellbrunn) 2:07.24 (38’)
8. Max Kam (Gais) 2:07.56 (30’)59

The six months of intense training, followed by the two-month
long qualification process, ended with the selection of five biathletes
who were to represent Switzerland. There was a final tune-up race
held in Brassus prior to the start of the Olympic games. In preparation, Switzerland had two different competitions, a three-person relay where teams from multiple nations participated as well as a USSR
versus Switzerland 20 km race. In the relay, the top two teams were
USSR I and USSR II, the best Swiss team finished in 8th place—over
58
“La Suisse à toutes,” Le Nouvelliste, Dec. 6, 1963. The 13 other nations were
the USSR, Norway, Romania, Poland, Finland, Sweden, the United States, Japan, Unified Team of Germany, Austria, France, Great Britain, and Mongolia.
59
“Biathlon in Gonten,” Die Tat (Zurich), Jan. 24, 1964.
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five minutes behind the Soviet teams. This result did show improvement
from the previous year’s World Championships, but there were different
specifications. This race had only three competitors, not four, and the race
covered a shorter distance which reduced the time between the teams.
There was less chance to fall behind on the skiing, and fewer opportunities for penalty minutes on the range as only three shot instead of four. A
three-person team also did not require the same depth as a four-man team.
The Relay results were as follows:
1. USSR I (Guizatolin, Koltschine, Vaganov) 1:30.50
2. USSR II (Tarakanov, Utrobine, Worontikchine) 1:30.52
3. West Germany (Weiss, Buhl, Demel) 1:33.44
4. France (Arbez, Pires, Mathieu) 1:34.20
5. Italy (Piler, Bacher, Grenuim)
6. Czechoslovakia (Hruby, Cillik, Fusek) 1:36.45
7. USSR III (Lubimov, Gubine, Anikine) 1:34.45
8. Switzerland I (Amann, Hischier, Kaelin) 1:35.31
9. US 1:37.39
10. Japan 1:37.53
11. France III 1:37.55
12. Switzerland III (Bebi, Haas, Oberer) 1:38.09
13. Switzerland II (Baume, Rey, Dubois) 1:38.28
14. France II
15. Germany II 1:39.44
16. US II 1:40.24
DNS Italy II

Although the Swiss legs for the relay were improved from previous events, there were still some troubling signs. The fastest leg was
by A. Kaelin and he had not been selected to attend the Olympics in
Innsbruck. Despite him being the fastest Swiss leg, he was only the 11th
fastest for the day.60 The following day, a Swiss-USSR 22 km race fur60
“Tres Bon Resultat D’Herbert Schmid,” Gazette de Lausanne (Lausanne, Switzerland), Jan. 20, 1964. Times for the individual legs of the relay by Swiss biathletes
were as follows: A Kaelin 31’37”, Amann and K Hirschier 31’57”, Oberer 32’26”, Haas
32’42”, and Dubois 33’18”.
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Sixten Jernberg, a Swedish Nordic Skier at the 1964 Innsbruck,
Austria, Olympic Games. The Nordic Ski events used many of the same
trails as the biathlon event. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
ther showed the gap between the world power and the infantile Swiss
team. Valentin Pschenitchine won the race with a time of 1:16.31 (2’).
In fact, the first four spots were Soviet biathletes. Willy Junod, with a
time of 1:31.05 (10’), finished in 5th place, almost eight minutes behind
the slowest Soviet Biathlete. Despite being almost 15 minutes behind
the winner, he was the fastest individual Swiss.61 The race at Brassus
had shown the Swiss that although improvements had been achieved,
61
Results are as follows for the Individual race:
1. Valentin Pschenitchine (USSR) 1:16.31 (2’) 2. Nikolai Pusanov (USSR) 1:18.04 (6’)
3. Alexandre Privalov (USSR) 1:19.08 (2’)
4. Vladimir Melanchine (USSR) 1:23.33 (10’)
5. Willy Junod (CH) 1:31.05 (10’)		
6. Erich Schönbächler (CH) 1:33.31 (12’)
6. (tie) Marcel Vogel (CH) 1:35.31 (12’)
7. Peter Gerig (CH) 1:36.17 (12’)
8. Norbert Schmed (CH) 1:39.40 (16’)		
9. Rudolf Etter (CH) 1:44.56 (20’)
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they were still behind the major competitors in biathlon. With a little
trepidation, the team departed across the Alps to Innsbruck.62
One Olympic preview in the newspaper gave this stark impression of the Swiss biathletes’ chances. “We have no chance of a good
placing in the biathlon. The Swiss are unlikely to get beyond the last
places. After all, what our brave fighters should learn with this competition, is to understand what they have learned for themselves and do
better the next time.”63 The usage of the phrase “brave fighters” in this
article contains a certain amount of disdain and an air of hopelessness
present.
As the athletes attended the Olympic opening ceremonies, they
were understandably excited. The 20 km biathlon competition held in
Seefeld was scheduled from 8:30 am—11:00 am on February 4. The
rules stated that each of the 51 biathletes would depart at 30-second
intervals. Most races up to this point had two minutes between starters. The course had four shooting ranges in nearby villages along the
course: at six km (Wildmoosalm)—the 250 m range, at 10.4 km (Hasenwinkel), the 200 m range, at 11.8 km (Lottensee), the 150 m range, and
then at 17.1 km (Seewald), the 100 m range. One of the unique elements of biathlon at this time was that there was no standard length
between shooting bouts. The three initial bouts were in the prone, or
laying down position, the final was done while standing.64 The course
high point was 1356 meters with a total climb of 729 meters.65
All of the training, organization and support by the Swiss government and Swiss military came to a head, and the results were not
impressive. For the Swiss, the highest placed was Marcel Vogel in
45th place. He was followed by Eric Schönbächler (46th), Willy Junod
(47th), and Peter Gehrig (48th) respectively. It needs to be clarified that
62
“Tres Bon Resultat D’Herbert Schmid,” Gazette de Laus anne (Lausanne, Switzerland), Jan. 20, 1964.
63
“Skandinavier im nordischen Bereich,” Thuner Tagblatt (Thun, Switzerland),
Jan. 25, 1964.
64
“Le Dioramme,” Le Nouvelliste (Sion, Switzerland), Jan. 22, 1964.
65
“Bergisel-Schanze und Seefeld,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland), Jan. 14, 1964.
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in modern competition, a top 50 result would be respectable. But in
1964, there were only 51 registered for the race. Of those 51 entered,
one did not start the race, and another did not finish. Forty-nine athletes
finished the race and the Swiss took four of the last five places. One
Swiss newspaper described it this way: “They were, in all simplicity,
a catastrophe in the shooting.” The best Swiss biathlete, Marcel Vogel,
hit only eight out of 20 targets. In other words, 24 penalty minutes were
added to the best Swiss biathletes race time, and he finished a full 33
minutes behind the winner!66
The Journal et Feuille d’avis du Valais had this to say about
the biathletes, as well as some of the other lesser known sports including bobsled and speed skating:
The Swiss representatives are really amateurs this way
and their preparation is imbued with a kind of amateurism,
with an undeniable idealist side but with disastrous effective results. It is thus that in biathlon, para-military specialty
with its shooting test, the Swiss were even beaten by the
Mongols in the fight to avoid the last places.67

To be fair, the Swiss did defeat one Mongolian, Narangtungalag Danzan, who finished in 49th place, but they were defeated by three
others who finished in 38th, 42nd, and 44th.68 However one looks at it, the
cost of training did not match up with the results in the race.
Another opinion piece, this one from La Confédéré, a French
language newspaper from Fribourg, rife with much Helvitica-centrism,
lambasted the results:
In this biathlon, which is above all a military test, our
country suffered a real affront: on class competitors, the first
66
“Désastre complet chez les participants suisses,” Journal et feuille d’avis du
Valais (Sion, Switzerland), Feb. 5, 1964.
67
“Petites Nouvelles du camp Olympique Suisse,” Journal et feuille d’avis du
Valais, Feb. 5, 1964.
68
“Innsbruck 1964 Biathlon 20 km men,” International Olympic Committee,
accessed July 7, 2020, https://www.olympic.org/innsbruck-1964/biathlon/20km-men.
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Traditional Swiss shooting competition. Note the cross-bows. Source:
Wikimedia Commons.

Swiss is 46th, the second 47th and the third 48th. Only one
country has been beaten by our men, that is Mongolia!
However, during this test, our competitors broke a record. That of the shooting penalties.
From sports defeat, this failure becomes a real disaster.
Really, we are far, far from the great victories won by our
patrols only a few years ago.69

The writer was referencing the Military Patrol event. The only
time this event was an official medal sport, 1924, the Swiss were vic69

1964.

“Un veritable desastre Suisse,” La Confédéré (Fribourg, Switzerland), Feb. 5,
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torious, with a team that included Lieutenant Denis Vaucher, brothers
Anton Julen and Alfons Julen, as well as Alfred Aufdenblatten.70 So in
recent memory, the author of the article was hearkening back to a time
when the Swiss were successful. From first to almost last is quite a
shock to the system of a proud ski loving, military focused nation.
The negative press did not end soon after the race, the Journal de Genève simply asked “Ou sont les fils du Tell?” or in English
“Where are the Sons of [William] Tell?”71 The Zurich daily paper Die
Tat played up the Tell reference as well in their criticism. “The same
can be said of our Swiss in biathlon, with whom William Tell in particular could not be satisfied because of the poor shooting results.”72 The
Neue Zürcher Nchrichten, a Zurich daily paper, also utilized William
Tell imagery in their comments, with another subtle dig at the results.
“Word got around that the Swiss delegate in the international professional association for military sports had submitted the application to
complete the biathlon with a crossbow in the future.”73
The Gazette de Lausanne added to the criticism: “As for the
Swiss, they did not honor their reputation as shooters. They did so
badly that we find them at the bottom of the ranking, or they just managed to beat a North Korean . . . ”74 Although the writer mistook the
Mongolians for North Koreans, the idea is pretty clear. Another criticism of the team:
One exception, however: the participants in the biathlon
event. Switzerland was represented at this time by four famous strangers who only preceded the final classification by
“Switzerland Land Military Patrol Gold,” International Olympic Committee,
accessed July 7, 2020, https://www.olympic.org/news/switzerland-land-military-patrolgold.
71
“Vladimir Melanine remporte le biathlon,” Journal de Genève (Geneva, Switzerland), Feb. 5, 1964.
72
“Schwendens Skikönig Sixten Jernberg gewann den 50-km -Lauf,” Die Tat
(Zurich, Switzerland), Feb. 5, 1964.
73
“In Innsbruck erlauscht, notiert und kommentiert,” Neue Zürcher Nchrichten
(Zurich, Switzerland), Feb. 8, 1964.
74
“Les heros du biathlon,” Gazette de Lausanne (Lausanne, Switzerland), Feb. 5,
1964.
70
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one other competitor: a Mongol! The event included a longdistance ski and carabiner shots. Terrible shooting! After that
we just have to challenge Zanzibar!75

The normally reserved Swiss media, most who could not have
identified any of the participants, did not stop their derision of the four
Swiss competitors. Almost one week after the race, at a time when
most Swiss coverage of biathlon was a few short paragraphs at best, or
ignored at worst, there were still articles lamenting the performance.
Once again, we see national pride at stake here:
Where we must speak of disaster, on the other hand, it is
in biathlon. The shooting of William Tell’s sons was dismal.
We will not be told in this regard that the opportunities to
train in shooting do not exist in Switzerland! Here, we can
say that participating, for us Swiss, is not enough. We have
a reputation to defend, a rank to maintain. If our biathletes
were very slow in the race but had made excellent shots, we
would have nothing to say. But the results as they stand are
heartbreaking and call for serious explanation.76

A final article in La Nouvelliste appeared a week and a half
after the race, but the tone was similar.
But if there are any who deserve, more than the others,
to receive a memorable caning, it is indeed the federation
leaders who selected our biathletes for the Games. We have
the right, in this case, to report a real scandal, because the
elected officials in question are not only covered with ridicule, but they have caused enormous damage to the Swiss
Society of Carabineers and to our shooters, which are do not
carry any of the blame. So much so that for many people,
the descendants of William Tell are not the Hollensteins,
the Müllers, the Vogts or the Spillmanns who covered them-

1964.

75

Et si l’on parlait sport!” La Patrie valaisanne (Sion, Switzerland), Feb. 7,

76

“La Suisse Bredoulle!” La Confédéré (Fribourg, Switzerland), Feb. 10, 1964.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

49

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 56 [2020], No. 3, Art. 10
Where are the Sons of Tell?

47

selves in glory last summer in Stockholm, but rather these
lamentable “clocks” subsidized by the Swiss Olympic Committee.77

All of these criticisms hearkened back to the failure of the
Swiss in a shooting event, and the way that this damaged Swiss internal
and external pride. There is even an insinuation in one of the articles
that due to their poor showing, they might be seen as vulnerable for
invasion. This failure needs to be remembered within the Cold War
context, and the precarious middle ground that Switzerland occupied.
The training plans for the various teams were examined. The Swiss
plan matched up reasonably well in many areas to that of the more successful nations. The one where they lacked most was in shooting. In the
entire year of training from the summer camps and summer biathlon
to the Olympics, the Swiss competitors did not even fire 1000 rounds.
The Soviets, who placed all four of their biathletes in the top
st
10—1 , 2nd, 7th and 10th—each shot over 30,000 rounds in that same
time.78 In a sport that penalizes the competitor with two minutes for
each missed shot, and each miss greatly affects the placing at the end
of the race, the Swiss were at a great disadvantage.
The question then turned to why the results ended up this
way, and what to do with funding. The disparity in training was simply a question of finances. More is not always better, but the disparity in shots fired in training was so egregious, it is impossible
to overlook this portion of the training. Why the Swiss shot so few
rounds in training is unknown, it could have been the cost, or other
factors. But whatever the reason, it placed the Swiss biathletes at a
major disadvantage.
The public outcry towards the poor performance in biathlon
reached the Federal Council. The question of where the funds had
come from to train the biathletes and where it would come from in the
“Jouons le Jeu! Reglements de Comptes!” Le Nouvelliste (Sion, Switzerland),
Feb. 15, 1964.
78
“Die Sport Laterne,” Die Tat (Zurich, Switzerland), Feb. 21, 1964.
77
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future was raised. According to the Federal Council, “the biathlon is
not a military discipline; it does not interest more than 100 people total
in Switzerland.”79 The Federal Council added that due to these small
numbers, “It is therefore understandable that the Swiss representatives,
despite their appreciable personal commitment in terms of time and
resources, did so badly in Innsbruck that the question can be raised as
to whether their participation made sense.”
Despite the obvious tie to the military, heightened by the mandated use of the large bore rifles, a practiced used until 1978, one of
the newspaper articles specifically mentions how the sport was not a
“military sport.” Although biathlon was by definition not associated
with the military, the majority of Swiss newspapers placed biathlon
news and its results in the “Military Sport” section of the newspaper.
One of the Federal Counselors on the chamber floor in Bern, a
Dr. Erich Weisskopf, announced that the results of the biathlon shooting had caused “a certain emotion.” The commentator continued with
a sarcastic remark “a ‘certain emotion’, without a doubt!”80
Weisskopf engaged the Federal Council in a debate over funding for biathlon. He asked “whether the necessary financial aid should
not be made more widely available” for the Swiss biathletes? He also
wanted “the selection [of the team] and preparation to be carried out
carefully, purposefully and comprehensively by Swiss delegations in
military competitions with foreign participation?”81 The Federal Council replied that “biathlon is not a military sport. It is a cross-country ski
race, combined with a shooting competition. This competition takes
place—not in uniform but in sports attire and the shots are not fired
with a weapon of war.”
In essence, since the biathletes, all who were in the Swiss military, were not in uniform, and not firing a “weapon of war,” there was
“Apres Innsbruck Responses du Counseil Federal,” Gazette de Lausanne
(Lausanne, Switzerland), Feb. 14/15, 1964.
80
“Un Certain Emoi…,” Le Confédéré (Fribourg, Switzerland), Mar. 4, 1964.
81
“Biathlon heißt nicht Armeewettkampg,” Walliser Bote (Naters), Mar. 18,
1964.
79
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not federal funding available for them. The Council continued that “the
preparation of the Swiss biathlon competitors and their delegation to
Innsbruck were the sole responsibility of the Association which deals
with this sport and of the Swiss Olympic Committee.”82 To be fair, the
Swiss Confederation had not previously assisted in subsidizing any of
the athletes at the Innsbruck games, biathlon or otherwise. In summation from the Federal Council:
Biathlon is a very popular sport in the Nordic countries
and in Russia. It has less than a hundred followers with us
and has only been practiced regularly for a short time. It is
therefore only surprising that the Swiss representatives, despite the personal sacrifices of time and money that should
be recognized, have obtained results such that one wonders
if their competition was justified. Without ignoring the value
of this sport, we believe that giving it special support would
lead to a dispersion of our efforts in the field of non-service
activity. It is more appropriate for us to support above all the
military ski patrols. This sport is based on an ancient tradition. It has already given us international success. Practical
with us by several thousand soldiers, its form of team competition gives it particular value.”83

Although this response seems definite, there are many very important aspects of Swiss society and government that can be inferred
from it. First of all, the implication that if the biathletes had been in
Swiss uniform, and shooting a military rifle, money for training would
have been available. It must be remembered that each of the biathletes were actually in the Swiss military, as it was then mandatory for
all Swiss male citizens with few exceptions. Those exceptions were
mostly due to health issues, and a biathlete is not someone who would
have been exempt from the demands of military service.
“Apres Innsbruck: le biathlon n’est pas un discipline Suisse,” Le Nouvelliste
(Sion, Switzerland), Mar. 14, 1964.
83
Ibid.
82
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The second major point to gain from this is the conservative
way the Swiss government was looking at the sport of biathlon. Their
desire to put the funding behind Military Patrol, a sport that had not
been in the Olympic program for decades and was not showing any
hope of returning, seems to be curious. After the initial Olympic Biathlon in 1960, biathlon was almost eliminated as a sport that was “too
military.” If biathlon was considered too military, how would military
patrol have made it back into the Olympic Games or even on a larger
scale? It is possible that Military Patrol could have been important
in the 1940s, but as warfare became more mechanized in the 1960s,
this type of fighting seemed to have passed into the dust heap. For the
Swiss though, this was a major plan of defense. Small units would keep
resisting against a foreign power as long as possible.
One additional point made by a columnist is simple. “The military patrol is valuable as a team competition.” If we look at the purpose
of sport, to the Swiss in the mid-1960s, the win at all cost mentality
did not exist on a large scale. The writer continued with a very highminded opinion of sport in general. He stated, “the Swiss view of the
true nature of sport as a competition that should not become a nationalized question of prestige. In general, it cannot be overlooked that
the Olympic Games,” despite the intentions of their founders, “has
turned into a propaganda event of the powers.” The author continued,
“in such a race, Switzerland can certainly not win any laurels, and it
would be absurd if we gradually wanted to move on to state funding
for sport in this ‘sense, beyond military training’.” He finished, “Switzerland’s reputation in the world certainly does not depend on the
medals that its competitors won at the Olympic Games, but on their
internal political and social order and their international treaty loyalty
and reliability.”84
If we look at the lasting effects of this debacle, they are quite
long reaching. After the poor showing in 1964, the Swiss did not com-

84

“Sport und Staat,” Thuner Tagblatt (Thun), Mar. 21, 1964.
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pete in 1968 games in Grenoble85 or the 1972 games in Sopporo.86 It
was not until 1976, over a decade later, that the Swiss entered at least
one biathlete in the Olympic competition.87
The final statement on this matter, at least for the time being,
was given in the summer of 1964. Speaking of the roles that various
government organizations played in sport, a small newspaper from
the region around Biel/Bienne published the following article. It contained a wonderful snapshot into many of the contrasting views that
existed in the 1960s about the role of sports, the role of the military,
and the Cold War.
It stated “the Confederation relieves itself of sporting responsibilities in the cantons. She only kept one or two because, in the end, she
sees sport as nothing more than a method of military preparation.”88
Military strength, preparedness, and the ability to defend the Swiss
Confederation from foreigners was foremost in the thoughts of government officials. The geopolitical turmoil of the late 1960s included: the
growing threat of increased activity in Vietnam, the armistice in Korea,
the formal creation of the two Germanys, and the solidifying ideological conflict between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations. With all
of these issues, it is understandable for a country to prioritize some activities over others. Why spend money on something that would really
not protect the nation?
The article continued:
It’s the Federal Military Department that has the upper hand over the entire Swiss sports machine. This explains
why this sport is conditioned, directed, guided in a direction
sometimes very different from its natural aspirations. Be“Grenoble 1968 Biathlon 20 km men,” International Olympic Committee, accessed July 23, 2020, https://www.olympic.org/grenoble-1968/biathlon/20km-men.
86
“Sopporo 1972 Biathlon 20 km men,” International Olympic Committee, accessed July 23, 2020, https://www.olympic.org/sapporo-1972/biathlon/20km-men
87
“Innsbruck 1976 Biathlon 20 km men,” International Olympic Committee, accessed July 23, 2020, https://www.olympic.org/innsbruck-1976/biathlon/20km-men
88
“Macolin,” Constuire, May 6, 1964.
85
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cause, as long as sport is considered only in terms of a military interest, it cannot flourish freely in its most just ways.
Everything being subordinated (despite appearances that we
are trying to save) to a military organization, the hierarchy of
sports leaders is, often also, modeled on that of the army. As
a result, certain sports, more historically or more technically
dear to army chiefs, obtain favors over others which the latter cannot seek or obtain in the same way. 89

Once again, the military component of sports is emphasized.
Yet, within this section of the article, there is a subtle comment of an
idea that persists to this day. The activity, book, movie, sport, political
party or religion that is favored by the leadership, will see more relevancy within the organization.
Here we start to understand the Swiss organizational structure
of sports.
It is also significant that the apex body of Swiss sport, the
ANEP, is a heterogeneous assemblage of genuinely sporting
federations and others which are only made up of soldiers.
Sometimes this is good, but it is rare: the army is therefore
moved by the pitiful results obtained by Swiss biathlonists
at the Innsbruck Olympics. Had these biathlonists been nothing more than simple skiers, the thing would not have had a
profound consequence. But the biathlon also requires these
skiers to shoot rifles, and the shots of these men not having
honored our traditions, the army frowned.90

The old adage, “If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and
talks like a duck” applies here. Because of the long tradition of shooting in the nation, biathlon looked like a sport that the Swiss military
should care about. The failure of the 1964 Swiss biathlon team caused
the Swiss Army to notice and forced them to act.

89
90

Ibid.
Ibid.
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The federal military machine has taken a closer look at
the case of our competitive athletes. It had most likely never
happened to him. And in doing so, it heard grievances other
than those simply from companies interested in the biathlon
business. Suddenly, we seem to have noticed something that
has been shouting in the country for a long time: the Swiss
representative sports suite is going under the radar because
sports leaders are above all dedicated to attracting the greatest number of followers at the expense of the best quality.

What is better for the nation, a large crowd of decent shooters,
or a few select biathletes? The answer seemed obvious, in this case,
and as observed by these leaders, quantity supplanted quality.
But all good writers also propose a solution to problems they
identify. The solution is described poetically as the article continues:
One of the solutions found to improve the situation
has a name that is already known: Macolin. On these rustic
heights rises the darling child of Mother Helvétia Sporting:
the Federal School of Gymnastics and Sport. Note that in
any country other than Switzerland it simply looks like: the
Macolin Sports School. But the fact of giving, in this title,
a particular place to gymnastics which is, after all, only one
sport among the others, clearly marks the intention that the
character of military preparation be specified in Swiss sporting activity. Macolin is both a school and a symbol, therefore. For many German-speaking Swiss, it is the high place
of a patriotism redistributed in the form of sport: some go
up there as towards a purification, as to wash symbolically
of the spiritual defilements contracted in the cities and in the
plain where circulate the currents of foreign inspiration.91

Sports have moved beyond simple importance in health, but
the health of the nation is key in this entire endeavor.

91

Ibid.
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All foreign visitors envy us for this marvelous place
where sport and the spirit of sport can be fulfilled and flourish in the most harmonious, most effective way. Macolin is
a pledge of the future: the evolution of times and of minds
will eventually make it the temple of this sport of which we
dream, a sport which should bring young men together in
peace.”92

The creation of Macolin permitted Switzerland to have a roadmap moving forward. The errors of the 1964 Olympic Biathlon team,
which seemed to shake the nation to its core were gone.
Who would have thought that an obscure sport, participated by
so few people, in an Olympic Games largely forgotten, would cause
such great consternation among the Swiss leadership? It did, and over
the next decade the Swiss chose to slowly develop biathlon within the
context of Confederation first, international competition much further
behind. The interaction between sport, politics, international affairs
and society is important to understand. In the first decade of Swiss biathlon, multiple lessons were learned; some were quickly implemented
and others would take years for the desired change to occur. Despite
the failures, the first decade laid the groundwork for future decades of
Swiss biathlon.
					~ Robert Sherwood
					 Georgia Military College

92

“Macolin,” Constuire, May 6, 1964.
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The Swiss in the
Swabian War of 1499:
An Analysis of the Swiss Military at the
End of the Fifteenth Century
by Albert Winkler
Introduction
By the end of the fifteenth century, the states of the Swiss Confederation had enjoyed almost complete autonomy from the neighboring feudal powers for generations. During the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, the states of the Swiss Confederation were beset by external
threats to their security, independence, and existence. The largest single menace to Swiss independence was the Habsburg family who often
controlled their lands according to monarchal authority and a social
structure which kept their subject peoples as unfree serfs.
This Swiss self-rule aided an unusual development in social
and political history. In many instances, democracies directed by free
men from the lower classes ruled these states. These common people
enjoyed many personal freedoms such as social mobility, the right to
own property, and the right to bear arms which were very unusual and
highly coveted in the Middle Ages. To a large extent, the Swiss (also
known as Eidgenossen or confederates) owed the creation and maintenance of their democracies and freedoms to their military competence,
which met all external threats.
In these two centuries, the Swiss developed a military system
that became among the most respected in Europe. In the fourteenth
55
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century through the middle of the fifteenth century, the confederates
developed from mountain ambushers, as was the case at the Battle of
Morgarten in 1315,1 to a fine infantry proficient in nearly every tactical
operation of the age as demonstrated by many military actions in the
Burgundian War from 1474 to 1477. The Swiss proved to be among the
first genuine tactical infantries in Europe capable of offensive and defensive maneuvers, strategically retreating, keeping unit cohesiveness
in difficult situations, and in dealing most effectively with heavy feudal
cavalry.2 The increased effectiveness of infantries spelled the doom of
the heavy feudal cavalry on the battlefields of Europe, and the impact
of the first genuine tactical infantry would change the nature of warfare. Heavily armored knights eventually disappeared to be replaced by
more lightly armored cavalries that relied largely on mobility for their
effectiveness, and infantries were well on the road to the development
leading to the modern age.		
After the brilliant victory at the Battle of Murten 1476, the
powers of Europe developed a great interest in the confederates.3 When
the French took a contingent of Swiss mercenaries into Italy in 1495,
the armies of Europe got a closer look at the confederates, and many
other states subsequently began to copy their tactics. The Swabians, in
the areas of the German Empire near the Swiss border, were the first
military to copy the confederates. Anxious to test their nearly identical
military force against their old enemies, the Swabians got their opportunity to fight the Swiss which presented itself in the Swabian War of
1499.
Despite the significance of the Swiss military, the topic needs
more clarification. Although the Swiss chroniclers and contemporary
observers were very prolific in recording the activities and character
Albert Winkler, “The Battle of Morgarten: an Essential Incident in the Founding
of the Swiss State,” Swiss American Historical Society Review, 44: 3 (Nov. 2008): 3-25.
2
Wilhelm Sidler, Die Schlacht am Morgarten (Zürich: Orel Füssli, 1910), 126-9.
3
Albert Winkler, “The Battle of Murten: The Invasion of Charles the Bold and
the Survival of the Swiss States,” Swiss American Historical Society Review 46: 3 (Feb.
2010): 8-34.
1
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of the confederate military, modern researchers have often overlooked
these accounts in favor of foreign records. A close examination of the
Swiss is long overdue.
Among the most noteworthy studies in English are Charles
Oman’s A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages and A History of
the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century.4 Oman’s accounts of battles are
reasonably accurate even though they do not always represent the best
scholarship available. His works cover many highlights of Swiss warfare, but he entirely overlooks the Swabian War, and his analyses are
often mired in the mistakes of other authors. Oman relies heavily on
Machiavelli for insights into the Swiss even though the great Florentine political theorist has long been discredited because his knowledge
of the facts of Swiss warfare was meager.5 Oman further looks to Carl
von Elgger for many details on topics.6 However, Oman fails to accept
Elgger’s conclusions and analyses of the Swiss, and Oman’s works
tend to be superficial. For example, he mistakenly brands the Swiss as
being excessively brutal and cruel without attempting to examine their
conduct more closely.
Hans Delbrück’s extensive four-volume work Geschichte
der Kreigskunst has been recently translated into English. Volume
three, Medieval Warfare, has sections that deal with the Swiss. 7 Delbrück’s study is relatively extensive and addresses a wide range of
topics, but it has been criticized for its anti-Swiss bias including its
obvious distortions of the numbers in the armies to make the confederates appear to have often outnumbered their adversaries when the
Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, vol. 2, 1278-1485
(New York: Franklin, 1924) and A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century
(London: Methuen, 1937).
5
Martin Hobohm, Machiavellis Renaissance der Kriegskunst (Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1913), 190.
6
Carl von Elgger, Kriegswesen und Kriegskunst der Schweizerischen Eidgenossen im XIV., XV. und XVI. Jahrhundert (Lucerne: Militärisches Verlagsbureau, 1873).
7
Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen
Geschichte, vol. 3 (Berlin: Stilke, 1923) and History of the Art of War vol. 3 Medieval
Warfare trans. by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990),
545-656.
4
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reverse was almost always the case. Furthermore, Delbrück perpetuated myths about the Swiss military without adequately exploring
these issues.8
Other works of value in German include Elgger, the best analytical study, which takes in the entire scope of the late Medieval and
Renaissance Swiss military, providing numerous details to support his
arguments. Other important academic studies include works by Eugen
von Frauenholz, Walter Schaufelberger, Albert Sennhauser, and Christian Padrutt.9 Emil Frey’s Die Kriegstaten der Schweizer dem Volk
erzält is the most comprehensive narrative study.10 In this huge volume, Frey describes the entire sweep of the history of the Swiss at war
from antiquity to the twentieth century, including lengthy accounts of
nearly every confederate military action. A more recent narrative study
is Hans Rudolf Kurz’s Schweizerschlachten.11
The Swabian War is a convenient reference point to examine
the Swiss. Their military system was mature at that point. Also, contemporaries and participants carefully recorded the frequent raids and
military operations of that war, which present a sufficient record to
review the confederates in some depth. In this study, the character of
the Swiss military will be discussed, questions such as the infamous
Swiss brutality will be examined, and the confederates will be shown
in action in four major battles. This article will further dispel misunderstandings about the Swiss military and society and bring them out
of the realm of obscurity.

8
Walther Hadron, “Neues zur Laupenschlacht,” Blätter für bernischen Geschichte, Kunst und Altertumskunde 3 Jahrgang 2 Heft (May 1907): 120-5.
9
Eugen fon Frauenholz, Das Heerwesen der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft
(München: Beck, 1936); Walter Schaufelberger, Die alte Schweizer und sein Kreig: Studien zur Kreigführung vornehmlich in 15. Jahrhundert (Zürich: Europa, 1952); Albert
Sennhauser, Hauptmann und Führung in Schweizerkrieg des Mittelalters (Zürich: Fretz
und Wasmuth, 1965); and Christian Patrutt, Staat und Krieg im alten Bünden (Zürich:
Fretz und Wasmuth, 1965).
10
Emil Frey, Die Kriegstaten der Schweizer dem Volk erzält (Neuenburg: F. Bahn,
1904).
11
Hans Rudolf Kurz, Schweizerschlachten (Bern: Francke, 1962).
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Tagsatzung 1481

by Diebold Schilling (Luzern)

THE SWISS MILITARY
The Swiss Government and the Making of Military Rules
The Swiss system of government was highly important in the
making of military policies and rules during the late Middle Ages. The
central governing body of the Swiss Confederation was the Federal
Diet or Tagsatzung (meet for a day). The Federal Diet met at regular intervals, usually three times a year, at one of the major cities in
the Confederation. The usual meeting places rotated between Luzern,
Bern, and Zurich. Each state or canton had one vote in the Diet, and the
voting had to be unanimous for a resolution to pass, but the enacting of
a law by the Tagsatzung meant little by itself because the Diet had no
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10
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power to enforce the measures it passed. Its actual function seems to
have been that of making suggestions, primarily on matters of foreign
affairs. The implementation of the acts passed by the Diet was left to
the individual states where the real seat of power rested.
The cantons were very diverse in the political structures. The
greatest disparity in political ideologies was between the predominantly urban and the rural states. Luzern, Bern, and Zurich were the
chief city-dominated cantons at the close of the fifteenth century, and
Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden (Obwalden and Nidwalden combined),
known collectively as the Forest Cantons, were examples of the rustic
states. Many of the other cantons were various combinations of towns,
farms, and pastoral areas. The governments of the Swiss states varied
from the near aristocratic rule of the city-dominated cantons, most
notably Bern, to the near pure democracies of the Forest Cantons. The
individual states had the power to enact and enforce their own laws,
but the laws carried out in one canton were not necessarily invoked in
others.12
Military rules came primarily from formal legislation or laws
and from traditional practices, while custom appears to have been the
most influential. The cantons and Federal Diet often tried to regulate
military policy and were usually quite successful. Yet the forms that
developed from military necessity over the years, and how problems
were resolved by the leaders and troops in the field, meant that innovation as well as established customs and practices proved to be important in military operations.

Weapons and Armor
By 1499, the Swiss military had proved itself on numerous
battlefields and operations. The confederates had an impressive string
of victories to their credit covering several generations, and they were
12
John Martin Vincent, Switzerland at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century
(Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins Press, 1904), 7-10.
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among the most experienced and successful soldiers of their age. Their
excellent victories in the Burgundian Wars (1474-1477) had proved
their abilities to all of Europe and the Swiss had earned a good deal of
respect and praise. The confederate success and reputation for invincibility came after their adoption and skillful use of the pike and halberd
in tactical formations.13
The Swiss were expected, most frequently, to arm themselves
because they often procured and maintained their own weapons. When
any region or area was added to the Confederation, it was expected
to have the same or similar military requirements as the earlier members of the coalition.14 The men usually kept their weapons in their
residences, and these devices were considered personal property, but
these instruments were subject to controls and periodic checks by government officials.
Strict rules regulated the storage and care of the weapons. At
the risk of destruction or confiscation of personal property, the military person was obligated to see that his equipment was kept in good
condition. This meant keeping all metals free from rust, all edges
sharp, and all wood unbroken and free from rot. Weapons and armor
were to be kept within the state, and their sale or loan outside of the
canton were strictly forbidden.15
The number and type of weapons was graduated according to
the owner’s affluence. The wealthy were expected to have the most
elaborate armor and the most expensive weapons, yet even the poorest
man had to have at least a halberd. If a man were considered well-off,
that is if he had an income of between 20 and 40 Pounds per year, he
was expected to purchase his own armor. If he were considered very
rich, with an income from 60 to 80 Pounds per year, he was expected
to buy enough armor for two men. Some weapons, such as cannons
and surplus weapons and armor, were owned by the state and kept in
Frey, Kriegstaten, 477.
Frey, Kriegstaten, 475.
15
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 81 and Frey, Kriegstaten, 474.
13
14
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arsenals. There were armories in nearly every Swiss city. These were
large public buildings that were subject to yearly inspection and were
conveniently located so the materials in them could be easily retrieved
in an emergency.16
The confederates were considered master weapon-makers, and
their weapons were both well-constructed and effective.17 Typically,
the Swiss trooper carried several weapons, including both a major device for combat and a number of smaller ones. The principal weapons
were the pike, halberd, musket (harquebus), and, infrequently, a large
two handed sword.
Early in the fifteenth century a short pike, ten feet in length, was
brought from Italy to the Swiss states. The device was designed to stop
cavalry charges, but after the battle of Arbedo in 1422, it was clearly
shown that a longer pike would be more effective in dealing with cavalry. The long pike soon became the most important weapon used by
the Swiss in dealing with mounted knights. The device was made of
ash wood and was usually eighteen feet long. The point was made of
steel and the whole weapon resembled a large spear. This weapon was
cumbersome to carry and to wield, but it was well-designed to receive
the shock of attacking cavalry composed of heavily-armored knights.
This was especially true when the Swiss placed the end of the shaft into
the ground, so the force of the onslaught would be directed downward
into the earth.18
The halberd was among the earliest weapons used by the Swiss,
and it was wielded by the mountain peoples long before the formation
of the Swiss Confederation at the traditional founding date of 1291.
The halberd was 5 to 8 feet long and was made of ash wood and steel.
The head of the halberd was shaped like a single-bladed ax with a spear
point at the top. By the fifteenth century, a hook had been placed at the
back of the ax head. The hook was designed to snag riders and to pull
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 82-3, 90-91.
Frey, Kriegstaten, 476.
18
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 91-2; and Oman, Art of War, 2: 263-4.
16
17
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them off their horse, the ax blade was to slash, and the spear point was
used for thrusting.19
The development of the arquebus or harquebus and other forms
of muskets often called Handbüchse (hand cannons) in the late fifteenth century increased the fighting capabilities of infantries in battle.
In many ways, these muskets were an improvement over either the
crossbow or the longbow. The arquebus was not as accurate or as rapid
firing as these stringed weapons, but they often had significant penetration against plate armor, and they required less skill by the user in
comparison to the other weapons. The booming sound of these devices
gave their users greater battlefield presence than the relatively silent
stringed weapons. The use of muskets in volley firing also improved
their effectiveness, and the psychological impact of the fusillade assured the ascendancy of the hand-held gun.20
The hand cannon was the device that superseded the crossbow as
the main Swiss weapon that could engage the enemy at a distance. The
harquebus had a maximum range of about 150 to 200 paces, but was only
accurate at much smaller distances, and it shot a projectile of iron or lead.
By the end of the fifteenth century, the harquebus barrel was fixed in a
wood stock that was pressed against the right shoulder when firing. The
touch hole, where the powder was ignited, had previously been on the top
of the barrel, but it had been moved to the right side to facilitate easier aiming. The weapon was aimed and steadied with the left hand while the right
was free to ignite the powder. The spark was part of a smoldering cord (or
match) that was commonly held in the right hand or placed on a hammer
apparatus known as a matchlock. The spark was either stuck into the touch
hole by hand, or the hammer—with the smoldering cord attached—was
dropped by means of a lever, forcing the spark into the hole to ignite the
powder. When men carrying the harquebuses were on the march, the smoldering cords were usually slung around their shoulders like bandoliers,
and the men took care to make sure the spark remained lit.21
Frey, Kriegstaten, 476.
Oman, Art of War, 2: 268-9.
21
Frey, Kriegstaten, 480; and Elgger, Kriegswesen, 97-8.

19

20
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Swiss Halberds

at the Old Arsenal Museum, Solothurn

After the Burgundian Wars from 1474 to 1477, the 5 to 6 foot
two-handed sword enjoyed some popularity, but the weapon was considered inferior to the halberd because it was too short to stab effectively.
The Federal Diet, meeting in Luzern at the outset of the Swabian war,
forbade the use of the device as a general weapon on March 22, 1499.22
Besides the main weapons, the Swiss usually carried other
smaller devices. A short sword with a rounded tip was carried on the
left side, and a dagger with a sharp point was carried on the right. These
weapons were often used when opposing forces became so closely entwined with the Swiss that the mass of men made it impossible to use
the long pikes or halberds. In such a situation, a short weapon gave its
user a marked advantage.23
22
23

Elgger, Kriegswesen, 94; and Frey, Kriegstaten, 479.
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 94.
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A proper ratio of pikemen to halberdiers was necessary to assure maximum efficiency on the battlefield. Tactics called for a large
number of pikemen and a relatively small number of halberdiers, but
the popularity of the shorter weapon made these ratios difficult to
achieve. The halberd was lighter and less cumbersome, making practicing and marching much easier, and pikemen were also often more
encumbered with armor. As a result, it was necessary to try to induce
more men to use pikes. Pikemen were paid more than the halberdiers,
but when monetary inducements were insufficient, the various cantons
gave orders for men to carry pikes. One such order from Bern in 1515
stated: “Whoever can carry a pike should carry a pike.”24
The actual ratio of weapons in the Swiss forces varied somewhat. In 1490, of 450 men from Wallisau, an area of Luzern, 200 carried pikes, 200 halberds, and 50 muskets. Luzern was an extreme example because it, as well as the other cantons of the central areas of the
Confederation, had relatively large contingents of halberdiers among
its troops. Early in the sixteenth century, the Swiss armies were composed of about one-sixth men with hand cannons and less than oneeighth being halberdiers.25
The Swiss also deployed small detachments of cavalry which
were the wealthiest of all the Swiss military persons. Men who lived
in the cities usually carried harquebuses while the peasants and other
rural people wielded pikes or halberds. In the fifteenth century, even
the priests, who accompanied the men into battle, were expected to
be armed with swords to avoid the scorn from the troops. Of course,
Church law forbade priests from shedding blood, so the weapons were
only for show. In battle, the men often sought weapons and banners as
chief prizes on the field of battle, and the reports of victory in the field
almost always included the careful number and listing of captured enemy artillery pieces and flags.26
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 103-4.
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 56, 105-6.
26
Frey, Kriegstaten, 475; and Elgger, Kriegswesen, 83, 106-7.
24
25
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Swiss hand cannons at the Siege of Burgdorf
by Diebold Schilling (Bern)

How the weapons were wielded at this period of time remains unclear. The available information comes largely from contemporary drawings and from accounts recorded in a later time frame, and many aspects
remain obscure. Yet it may be surmised that the Swiss showed a high
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degree of professionalism and considerable skill in the wielding of their
weapons because of their success in battles and on campaigns. Another
perplexing question remains because little information survives about
how and at what frequency the Swiss practiced the use of their weapons,
but their military prowess clearly demonstrates that they spent much time
mastering their weapons and military formations.27
Most of the Swiss wore no uniforms, preferring to wear simple
everyday clothing, either because of choice or because of the additional expense of buying specific attire. When the confederates wore
uniforms, this clothing was frequently in the colors of the canton where
the wearer originated. The Swiss wore white crosses either on their
stockings, shoulders, or hats to distinguish themselves from their enemies who also often wore no uniforms. The use of armor varied from
none at all to a complete covering consisting of an iron hat or helmet,
a coat of mail, a breastplate, leg guards, and metal gloves or gauntlets.
Pikemen were most often fully armored. The men wielding the hand
cannons had less armor, and the halberdiers were the least protected,
mostly lacking all metal defensive coverings.28
Each trooper was supposed to carry a haversack containing
oatmeal for fourteen days as well as salt, bread, cheese, and butter. The
only spare article of clothing in the haversack was a new pair of shoes.
On marches into enemy territory, the Swiss lived off their plunder, and
foragers often left the column of marching men in search of supplies.
A baggage train with tents and other bulky supplies often accompanied
the confederates, but the men certainly traveled as lightly as possible
to increase their mobility while on the march.29

Artillery
Modern scholars seldom refer to the Swiss as great artillerymen, but in the Swabian War of 1499, cannons played a significant role
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 260-4.
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 91, 116.
29
Frey, Kriegstaten, 485.
27
28
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Field cannon from the Battle of Grandson, 1476
in their martial activities because these heavy weapons aided their war
effort and had a large impact on the outcome of hostilities. In 1499,
the confederates had nearly one thousand pieces of artillery of various
sizes to use on different operations.30
The Swiss had captured many artillery pieces in the Burgundian Wars, especially after the battles of Grandson and Murten, both
in 1476. As a result of such an abundance, the Swiss development in
the making of cannons was slowed because they did not have to manufacture or purchase those devices. The cannons were made of either
bronze or iron, and they shot projectiles of either stone or iron. The
artillery pieces were of various sizes, and different calibers were deployed when used in various circumstances. Large cannons were used
to bombard cities and to besiege castles and towns, but they also fired
on troops when the opportunity arose. Small artillery pieces were used
primarily to fire on armies in the field, but the Swiss often took them
Johannes Häne, “Die Kriegsbereitschaft der alten Eidgnossen,” Schweizer
Kriegsgeschichte 3 (1915): 14.
30
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on raids as well when they could be deployed rapidly to fire on towns
and fortifications.31
Many advances were made in cannon manufacture just preceding and during the Swabian War, marking it as a turning point in the
history of artillery. The Emperor Maximilian of Austria took the first
steps towards a unified caliber and barrel length during the war. In
1497, burning shells were used that could not be put out with water,
and explosive artillery projectiles also found an early use in the conflict. These improvements helped advance the art of war because explosive shells more rapidly reduced fortifications and did greater damage to cavalry or to infantry formations. Burning shells also assured
that a town could easily be set on fire, greatly reducing siege time.32
Better artillery tactics were also being employed. Cannons
were often all aimed at one point greatly increasing their effectiveness,
and firing the devices in a barrage created a solid wall of fire. The impact of those improvements in artillery and in its tactical use are well
demonstrated near the city of Constance in July 1499 when Maximilian marched his army on some Swiss positions nearby. These defensive posts were largely unmanned because the troops were hastening
to Gempen to take part in the battle of Dornach, but eighty cannons
were still in position. The artillery pieces fired to such great effect that
Maximillian’s army was thrown into confusion and withdrew without
pressing its attack further.33
Artillery could be fired with increasing accuracy and over ever
greater distances because of longer barrel lengths and improved powders. When artillery pieces were properly aimed, they could be shot
considerable distances night and day. In one instance in the Swabian
War, a cannon was fired from the fortress at Constance at a group of
three Swiss children playing over a mile away. The shot was right on its
31
E. A. Gessler’s Das schweizerishche Geschützwesen zur Zeit des Schwabenkriegs, 1499 (Zurich: Kommissionsverlag Beer & Co., 1927), 7.
32
Gessler, Geschützwesen, 16 and 47.
33
Heinrich Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2 vols. (Basel: Basel Buch-und Antiquariatshandlung, 1910) 2: 445-7.
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mark, but it passed between the three children hurting none of them.34
There were a great number of cannons of various calibers at Constance,
some of which were large and are believed to have shot as far as three
and a half miles.35 At such distances the cannons no doubt had a high
trajectory, shooting much like modern howitzers.
Most of the Swiss heavy cannons were placed on the border
areas because of the greater need for protection, and also so they would
be available to support raids into enemy territory when sufficiently mobile. Cannons had become so critical that on occasion an operation’s
success or failure depended on the skillful use of artillery. Often Swiss
raiders were able to take towns after only a few cannon rounds had
been fired. But the weapon still had drawbacks including a slow rate
of fire and the difficulty in moving it. Even at the end of the sixteenth
century, under ideal circumstances, a large artillery piece could only be
fired four times in an hour, and movement over the poor roads common
to the age often required much effort and time.36

Tactics and Tactical Formations
In battle and on the march, the Swiss employed tight formations, called the Haufen (heap or crowd). The Haufen was a square
(Viereck) formed by troops lined up in rows, and the term may be best
translated as a pike square.37 The Swiss pike square developed in the
fourteenth century and was probably first used at the battle of Laupen
in 1339. There is no evidence that the Swiss developed this formation from reading classical authors, so the early military leaders of the
Swiss Confederation must get credit for this tactical structure rather
than the contemporary scholars of antiquity.38 Even though the Haufen
Gerold Edlibach, Chronik (Zurich: Meyer und Zeller, 1847), 214.
Gessler, Geschützwesen, 47-8.
36
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 135-6 and 139.
37
Johann Lenz, Der Schwabenkrieg (Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1849), 49. Important
primary source from 1500.
38
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 104-5.
34
35
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Swiss Pike Square

by Evert van Muyden

was a formation similar to the ancient Greek or Macedonian phalanx,
the primary and secondary Swiss sources do not call this formation a
phalanx. The Macedonian phalanx was dissimilar in several ways. It
had a uniformity of weapons and armor while the confederates wore
different armor and wielded different weapons including hand cannons, pikes, or halberds. The Macedonians also carried shields which
gave them parrying abilities and the ability to fight effectively out of
formation, both advantages the Swiss pikemen did not enjoy.
The Swiss pike square was formed out of small tactical units of
either 50, 100, 200, or 300 men depending on the area from which the
troops originated and the conditions of their recruitment.39 The military
traditions in the various cantons and availability of manpower account
for the disparity of sizes. Also, troops designated for special duty, such
a garrisoning a fortress, varied in size depending on the numerous differing factors of that duty. The typical small pike square was 25 men
39

Elgger, Kriegswesen, 14-15.
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wide and 25 men deep, making a total of 625 men. This figure was
considered the ideal, but there were many examples of this formation
being composed of fewer men.
The Swiss standard battle formation consisted of thee pike
squares. Each varied in size, position, and use. The Vorhut (vanguard
or advanced party) was the pike square farthest forward, and it was
usually stationed on the right. The vanguard was the first formation
to engage the enemy, and it was supposed to penetrate and break the
opposing enemy lines if possible. The advanced party was often composed of young, unmarried men who were well armored and were considered to be the very best men available. The largest pike square was
the Gewalthaufen (main or chief formation) where the largest contingent of men was placed and at times comprised many thousands of
men. It advanced in the center and was the heaviest blow the Swiss
could throw, and it was always placed at least the distance of a shot
from a hand cannon from the vanguard. The main formation with its
pikemen and halberdiers holding their weapons vertically has been described as a walking forest. The third or last pike square was the Nachhut (rear guard), which was used as the reserve of the army and was
often used to protect the baggage train. Most commonly, the elderly
men were found in the rear guard, and in times of need, members of the
baggage train, such as cooks, were found in it.40
The pike square consisted of pikemen three or four rows deep
on each side. In the center of he formation were found rows of halberdiers. Men wielding the harquebus were not basic to the formation, but
they were often placed behind the first row of pikes to shoot enemy
cavalry. When there was little to fear from men on horseback, the men
with the hand cannons were placed in a group separate from the main
pike square.41
The Swiss were most often tactically on the offensive, so the
pike squares were mainly used to penetrate enemy formations. The
40
41

Elgger, Kriegswesen, 248, 274, and 276-7.
Kurz, Schweizerschlachten, 144; and Elgger, Kriegswesen, 279.
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pike square would advance at a lively pace to the sound of drums and
fifes which helped the troops maintain the proper steps. It is unclear if
the men marched in step even though such a practice would help the
men maintain good order. When the troops reached their adversary, the
pikemen would level their pikes from the vertical to the horizontal and
thrust forward to force a hole in the enemy lines. Then the halberdiers
would rush past the pikemen with a battle cry and seek to do as much
damage as possible by killing the enemy, breaking their morale, and
cracking their formations.42
Nonetheless, it was often the case that the known terrain and
position and character of the enemy forces made those tactics unlikely
to succeed without some modification. Frequently, the proper ratio of
halberdiers, men with hand cannons, and pikemen needed to carry out
these operations was hard to achieve. As a result, those ideal formations would vary as the Swiss leaders attempted to use their available
forces to the best advantage. Yet whenever possible, a battle plan with
three pike squares as the basic element was used.
The pike square was only effective when order was maintained.
Often, it was that discipline and order that brought the Swiss victory,
and relative disorder brought their enemies defeat. The confederates
had an impressive record for keeping their formations while going over
many challenging obstacles even in the face of heavy fire from enemy
artillery. Iron discipline was necessary to keep the men in good order
under trying circumstances, and the Swiss were obliged to follow their
leaders or face punishment. Any breach of discipline on operations or
in combat was tried through the testimony of eye-witnesses, and the
offenders of serious crimes could be summarily beheaded.43
Executions or the threat of capital punishment must have been
common because men designated as executioners always accompanied
Swiss troops in the field. An example of strict confederate discipline
took place in the winter of 1499. A group of Swiss were fording the
42
43

Elgger, Kriegswesen, 278.
Delbrück, Kriegskunst, 3: 619; and Häne, “Kriegsbereitschaft,” 32.
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Rhine River when a few German knights appeared on the far shore a
short distance away. Suspecting a trap by a large army contingent, the
confederate leader ordered his men to stop and await the possible arrival of more enemy forces. The Swiss stood, in good order, for two
hours in freezing water, that came up to the knees of some of them and
to the shoulders of others, until they were sure no large body of the
enemy approached. Some of the confederates died from exposure, and
others suffered frozen feet and hands, but none of them left the battle
formation.44
The Swiss iron discipline only applied to watch posts and when
the army was either in battle or on the march. When not actually fighting or on the move the confederates were often undisciplined and disobedient. Some of the most notorious examples of misconduct came
following battles or campaigns when the troopers plundered and took
revenge on their enemies.45
Flags and banners often helped the men keep unity and order
within the pike squares. Every district or region had its own banners
and flags which were the pride of the populace. Such items were so
prized that it was considered an honor to carry them on campaigns
and into battle. This privilege typically went to high officers in the
army. To prevent a banner’s capture often as many as one hundred men
were assigned to protect it with their lives if necessary. This practice
helped keep order in the pike squares and give the troops a rallying
point especially during confusing battles. Because the flags and banners were prized booty for an enemy, wild and fierce fights often took
place around them. When a flag was captured by the enemy, the new
one replacing it was marked with a red cross to denote that it and its
army had been shamed. That sign of remorse was only removed after
the flag had been redeemed by enemy blood in battle.46
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 222-3.
Valerius Anshelm, Die Berner-Chronik, 2 vols. (Bern: Wyss, 1886) 2: 140, and
Frey, Kriegstaten, 497.
46
Gessler, Geschützwesen, 76; Elgger, Kriegswesen, 122; and Frey, Kriegstaten,
487-8.
44
45
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Whenever overwhelming numbers attacked a Swiss pike
square, the formation would cease to move, and the troops would
turn their pikes outward to receive attacks from all directions. Everyone in the formation, including the halberdiers, would rush to
defend the sides thus leaving the center hollow. This hollow core
gave the formation flexibility, which allowed it to withstand more
external shock. The most vulnerable points in the pike square under heavy attack were its corners, so the tendency was to round the
corners making the formation appear as a hedgehog or Igel. The
hedgehog was so formidable that it made it possible for the Swiss to
continue fighting under the most difficult circumstances. There are
no examples of a hedgehog being breached in battle after it had been
completely formed.47
During the Swabian War, the Swiss proved to be very mobile giving them great success through the use of surprise. The confederates were accustomed to marching all night to reach objectives
and then to fall on enemy positions. They were so proficient at such
maneuvers that the German mercenaries at Constance feared that the
Swiss would one night attempt to storm that city even though it was
well defended with a large garrison and high walls.48
The Swiss were masters of forced marches, rapid movement, and the surprise attack. Night attacks on castles and fortresses during the war were often attempted and achieved great success.
The castles of Randegg, Küssenberg, and Tüngen were all taken in
night attacks. In each case, the garrison was completely surprised
and offered little resistance. The castle of Tüngen was quite a prize
because a group of German nobles and their families were captured
there. On the night of April 18, 1499, the Swiss marched rapidly to
the castle and overwhelmed the surprised garrison without a fight.
The nobles and their families were captured and marched off into
captivity still clad only in the night shirts as the castle was plun47
48

Elgger, Kriegswesen, 281.
Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 445.
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dered and burned. The Swiss also marched the garrison off into
captivity and took cattle and other provisions from the nearby village before it was burned. 49
One of the best examples of the Swiss effectively using good
mobility and surprise was the fight at Bruderholz on March 22, 1499.
Two days before the engagement a Swiss detachment of eight hundred
men from Solothurn, Luzern, and Lenzburg left the area around the
village of Dornach near Basel to raid in the Sundgau Valley of Alsace.
In their absence, a force of three thousand German infantry and cavalry entered the Birs Valley and began to plunder and burn the villages
in the area. They burned most of the village of Dornach and sent its ten
defenders fleeing to the garrison at the castle of Dorneck commanded
by Benedikt Hugi.
The eight hundred Swiss returned as rapidly as possible upon
receiving word of the German activities. They arrived early in the
morning of March 22, 1499, and spent most of the morning in search
of the enemy force. At last, the confederates got word that the enemy
was withdrawing up the Birs Valley towards the Rhine River. The
Swiss forces assembled themselves in battle order and backed into
the Bruderholz forest while maintaining their formation. Just before
noon, the German force marched past the Swiss who were completely unnoticed in their hiding places. The confederates waited for the
signal to attack the enemy in the rear. The German infantry offered
no resistance, and these men immediately broke formation and fled.
The German cavalry fought a delaying action against the advancing
Swiss, hampering any effective pursuit of the fleeing infantry. The
men on horseback did not long remain behind and soon joined the
foot soldiers in flight. The Swiss suffered only one fatality while their
adversaries lost eighty dead who were buried in one mass grave. The
Germans fled the two miles to the Rhine River and continued their

Peterman Etterlin, Kronica von der loblichen Eidgnoschaft (Basel: Eckenstein,
1752), 240 and Edlibach, Chronik, 216.
49
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Swiss War Council
by Urs Graf

retreat after swimming the river. Some fled to Basel seeking a place of
refuge, but the officials of the city refused to admit them.50
50
Benedikt Hugi an Soloturn March 19 and 22, 1499; and Soloturn an Freiburg
March 22, 1499, in Albert Büchi, ed. Aktensücke zur Geshichte des Schwabenkrieges
nebst einger Freiburger Chronik über die Ereignisse von 1499 (Basel: Basler Buch- und
Antiquariatshandlung, 1901), 97-9; Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 80; Valarius Anshelm, Die
Berner-Chronik (Bern: Wyss, 1886) 2: 153-4; and Rudolf Luginbühl, “Das Gefecht auf
dem Bruderholz,” Basler Jahrbuch (1904), 205.
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Troops and Leaders
The Swiss relied on a council of war from the various states for
military leadership. The war council of each Swiss canton was always
comprised of experienced military men. Wealth and social position
were clearly considerations in the selection of the council’s members,
but a man’s experience and abilities were also carefully scrutinized.
The war council often directed military affairs and oversaw the overall
strategy of the war, but the council frequently chose commanders in the
field who provided leadership during the actual campaigns.51
The Swiss levels of military leadership were far different than
the rank structures in modern armies, and any similarity between Medieval and modern terms designating leadership is coincidental. The
man designated as Hauptmann (best translated as leader or commander) was the highest Swiss officer, and he was considered so important
that a group of men were assigned to protect him. The war council
chose this officer not necessarily for his genius, but for his courage and
the ability to understand the troops and the military system. It was expected, in theory at least, that the military structure, and not the abilities of any one man, was the key to victory. Yet the leaders in the field
enjoyed great leeway in their decisions and often saw fit to vary the
system to meet unpredictable circumstances.52
Several leaders were typically placed beneath the Hauptmann,
including the men assigned to carry the flags and banners. These men
were Pannerherren, as well as Venner and Venliträger. Each of these
men had responsibilities related to carrying one of a number of flags
and banners. They could properly be known as the banner or flag carriers. The Pannerherren usually carried city or regional flags, while the
Venner and Venliträger carried banners of less significance, which represented a smaller number of men. Unlike the Hauptmann, these lower
officers were elected by the troops after the forces had assembled. At
51
52

Elgger, Kriegswesen, 33-4 and 195.
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 204-5.
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that time, all the leaders came together and forgave each other all hate
and injury and swore loyalty one to another. The lower leaders and
troops swore to follow the higher officers and the higher officers swore
to all the men of the army to lead them as well as possible.53
The officers’ most challenging functions were to organize the
pike squares and decide on a course of action or battle plan when such
action was warranted. A pike square was often composed of men who
had never seen each other before, and great care had to be taken to assure that the formation was duly composed of the appropriate ratios of
pikemen and halberdiers in their proper ranks. The leaders often demonstrated considerable skill in organizing the battle squares because
they were rapidly formed in various battles. The battle plan was usually
a product of consultations among the more important leaders of each
contingent which comprised the army at that point. These leaders were
usually Hauptmänner who came together to form the battle council
and to decide jointly on the best course of action. They used the information and reconnaissance available to them, and they also carefully
considered the abilities of their men. No doubt, the battle plan often
came from the ideas and skills of one or more of the most respected and
influential leaders in the battle council.
There were numerous lower officers who had specific authority
over baggage, food, and artillery. Of these men, the Master of Artillery
(Büchsenmeister) was often the most respected. The Master of Artillery was the master cannon-maker who served as artillery officer in the
field. These leaders were highly skilled and provided expert leadership
in directing and the use of cannons on military operations. Between
campaigns, the Master of Artillery also made weapons and powder and
trained persons in their maintenance and use.54
The Swiss troops fell basically into two broad categories, the
Landsturm and the Söldner. The Landsturm was the Swiss Militia, and
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 200-1; and Delbrück, Kriegskunst, 3: 620.
Otto Hess, Die Fremden Büchsenmeister und Söldner in den Diensten: Der
Eidgen-Orte bis 1516 (Dietikon: J. G. Hunndel-Horner, 1919), 1-3.
53
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The Swiss March to Baden with their Banners
by Diebold Schilling (Bern)

it consisted of virtually the entire healthy adult male population. Its
function was to protect the local area. This force was called into service whenever an enemy penetrated the lands of the Confederation,
and it was never used in campaigns outside of the Swiss areas. These
fighters saw a great deal of service in the Swabian War, and it was used
to watch the borders of the Confederation and to resist enemy raids into
the Swiss territories.55
The men in the Militia were called to their assembly areas by
the use of smoke signals, the ringing of bells, or a flag placed in a
55
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stream in the daytime, while fire signals were used at night. Assembly areas were usually at churches which were located in or near the
center of towns or villages. Once the men had gathered, the nature of
the emergency was explained to them, and some leaders were quickly
elected. Anyone failing to appear at the designated area could suffer a
loss of goods, and his home could also be destroyed as a punishment
for this infraction.56
The men in the Militia were responsible for detecting intruders,
and for that purpose, numerous watch posts were placed on any avenue
of approach that the enemy might use. Watch posts were commonly
located on hill tops, in or near mountain passes, or any place that afforded a good view of the surrounding terrain. The person on watch
had to be constantly alert. If anyone fell asleep, laid down his weapon,
or failed to wear his breastplate, he could be put to death. The Swiss
always build some defenses of wood, earth, or stone to prepare their
positions in case of attack, and frequently dogs were used to help watch
for the enemy or chase them if needed. Watch posts often became the
scenes of skirmishes with hostile raiders or with larger enemy units,
and they often formed the first line of defense. The confederates had
an excellent record of ambushing their adversaries while these enemies
were seldom successful in doing the reverse. In part, the credit for this
success must go the Swiss who so carefully manned the watch posts.57
Another category of men in the military was the Söldner
(soldier) or someone paid for his military service. Strictly speaking,
soldiers were only garrison troops guarding city gates and castles and
also acting as municipal police. However, the term often was applied
to any military personnel aside from the Militia. A broad designation
often given to any troops in the field was Knechte (servant or vassal), but more commonly these men were called Freiwillige or volunteers. Those were the men who waged wars outside of the borders of
the Swiss Confederation, and they were often employed on raids into
56
57
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enemy territories. In the classical battle formation, the volunteers took
position within the vanguard or Vorhut of the army. These troops were
usually young, vigorous men interested in fame and wealth. They were
also the men recruited as mercenaries who served in foreign countries.58
The size of all the Swiss forces is unclear. Perhaps as many
as thirty thousand Swiss were on any military operation in the late
Middle Ages at one time on foreign soil. Yet this estimate refers only
to volunteers and does not include the militia. Even though military
service began when boys reached their mid-teens, the total army hardly
consisted of more than one-fourth of the entire population. Taking this
into consideration, the Swiss total forces could never equal more than
one hundred thousand men. In practical terms, a plausible number of
total mobilization ranged between 60,000 and 80,000 men.59
Yet the confederates never fielded their total strength during
the Swabian War. One contemporary foreign observer, Bernardin de
Vegiis, estimated the strength of the Swiss troops deployed from the
various states and their allies near the borders of the Confederation. He
listed 6,000 from Bern; Fribourg at 2,000; Luzern at 3,000; and Zurich
at 4,500. He also listed 800 men from Uri; 600 from Unterwalden;
2,400 from Schwyz; 5,000 from Graubünden; 400 from Zug; 500 from
Glarus; 6,000 from St. Gallen, Appenzell, and the Thurgau; 400 from
Schaffhausen; 1,800 from Solothurn; and 1,000 from Wallis. The total
was 34,400 men.60 An anonymous, yet very thorough report, by another
contemporary estimated the total Swiss strength as 20,800 men at one
time during the war.61 Both of these contemporary estimates are plausible depending, of course, on how many of the men in the militia were
included in these numbers.
Hess, Büchsenmeister und Söldner, 49; and Elgger, Kriegswesen, 49-50.
Häne, “Kriegsbereitschaft,” 24; and Delbrück, Kriegskunst 3: 617.
60
Bernardin de Vegiis an den Herzog von Mailand, April 29, 1499, in Aktenstücke
zur Geschichte des Schwabenkrieges, 167.
61
Bericht eines Ungenannten an den Herzog von Mailand, May 29, 1499, in
Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Schwabenkieges, 539-47.
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Popular Support for Military Service
Swiss men were required to serve in the military from a young
age. In times of emergencies, young males could be enrolled in the
military as early as age fourteen, but most commonly they started to
serve when sixteen. From age sixteen to twenty-five, the men were
considered to be in their prime for military operations and combat.
Older men were often used as well, and only the physically unfit were
exempt from military duty. Otherwise, everyone served regardless of
wealth or station in life, although it was more common to find peasants
in the army, because of their greater numbers than those who lived in
cities. When a man was placed in the military, he had to swear an oath
that he would serve with “goods and blood” when necessary. Training
was often mandatory, but the Swiss rarely considered this duty as a
chore, and they were often happy to practice wielding their weapons
and marching with others.62
Military service was so popular for the young that they often
tried to accompany forces on campaign before they reached the age of
service because they were eager to share the fame, fortune, and adventure of military operations. In such instances, it was often necessary to
forbid them from participation. Although every male was expected to
serve in the military, at times additional men had to be induced when
too few volunteers stepped forward for certain operations. This situation occurred more frequently when mercenary service in foreign lands
drained the Swiss manpower. Sometimes, one of two brothers were
required to serve or either a father or son had to report for duty. At
times, widows of men who had fallen in battle would select those who
were to replace them. It was possible to pay another man to fill one’s
military service requirement, but this practice was forbidden by the
Federal Diet meeting in Zurich on June 16, 1499. The order stated that
everyone had to serve when called. Yet it remains unclear if this order
62
Delbrück, Kriegskunst 3: 615 and 622; Häne, “Kriegsbereitschaft,” 13; and
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 25 and 35.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10

86

et al.: Full Issue

November 2020 SAHS Review

84

was observed, and the wealthy still had the means to pay others to take
their place.63
Taxes on individuals, guilds, and societies supported the military. A tax was levied on the individual regardless of his ability to pay,
and it was collected on a monthly or daily basis. Guilds were often
responsible for the recruitment, pay, and support of the troops they sent
into the field. If the troops were hired as mercenaries, their employers
cared for their need and usually paid them as well. However, the men
often supported themselves from plunder and the taking of booty.64
Military service was a popular means of employment for the
Swiss, especially as foreign mercenaries, since they lived in a poor
country. Military service could also be very profitable, and once-poor
peasants often lived well as elderly men from the gains received from
employment as soldiers. Many of these men also used martial activities as an important means of achieving social mobility. Military men
often found their way onto a seat on a city or cantonal council, and at
times a successful military background seemed mandatory for many
high positions.65 The Swiss often found military activities so profitable
that they grouped together to fight and raid on their own without official sanction by becoming brigands. As such, they risked punishment
and death as outlaws. The Swiss were very proud of their military,
and soldiers were revered and respected people. Songs were composed
praising military victories, and the thirst for success, praise, and fame
helped motivate these troops to fight well and hard.66
The Swiss were very conscientious of their own troops, showing great affection and concern for them. They commonly referred to
the care of the wounded as “Holy Duty.” After the disastrous defeat at
the Battle of Marignano in 1515, the confederates showed such loyalty
for their own wounded that, while they should logically have been flee-

Elgger, Kriegswesen, 61; and Frey, Kriegstaten, 470.
Delbrück, Kriegskunst 3: 616; and Elgger, Kriegswesen, 169.
65
Hobohm, Renaissance der Kriegskunst, 171; and Elgger, Kriegswesen, 227.
66
Frey, Kriegstaten, 472; and Elgger, Kriegswesen, 234-5.
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ing from a possible enemy pursuit, they returned to the field of battle to
carry their injured men more than a mile to a location where they could
be treated.67
The Swiss included officers responsible to care for the wounded on every military expedition. These men were Feldschere or barber
surgeons whose only function was to care for injured men. In battle,
these surgeons or doctors put up a flag where they worked, and these
men and their assistants applied bandages and medications to the men
when needed. After treatment in the field, the wounded were sent home
where they were given good care and monetary compensation during
their convalescence. If the damaged man lost a limb or was maimed for
life, he would be cared for at state or community expense for the rest
of his life. If a man was permanently precluded by his wounds from
making a living, was killed in battle or on a campaign, his family was
also cared for, once again, by the state or the community.68
The Swiss were a pious people. While on military service,
priests looked after their spiritual needs. The priests were always present to say mass and to administer other sacred rights. Before battle,
the confederates often knelt in prayer and took mass whenever possible. Frequently, the priests assured them that God and the Holy Virgin would protect them and give them victory. Before the troops arose
from their knees, their officers would throw a handful of dirt on them
as a reminder that the Swiss return victors or die in the effort. Often
there was no other choice for the troops because they knew that retreat
and surrender were usually unthinkable.69

Military Rules
There were six circumstances under which the Swiss could be
called to fight. When a technical state of war existed, when there was
Frey, Kriegstaten, 491.
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 171.
69
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 239 and 424.
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reason to fear an attack by an enemy, when fighting had occurred, when
there was an agreement to help a foreigner, when hired as mercenaries,
and when it was necessary to watch fortresses or to man watch posts.
The Swiss Militia, always prepared for war, were able to meet all calls
to arms promptly. On this, war preparedness depended much of the
confederate success in resisting invasion.70
After the Battle of Sempach in 1386, the Federal Diet issued
a general order defining acceptable Swiss military conduct. This Sempacher Letter of 1393 set down rules by which the confederates made
war throughout the fifteenth century and beyond. Other suggestions
and orders were given at various times, but the Sempacher Letter remained the guiding principle. In this directive, flight was strictly forbidden. If anyone fled or called for the army to retire, the troopers next
to him were obliged to kill the offender on the spot. Men were often
placed at the rear of the army to cut down anyone attempting to flee.
Special protection was always given to women, children, and churches.
No prisoner could be taken while fighting continued, because it was
much easier to kill a man than to hold him, and the encumbrance of
captives meant that the successful pursuit of a defeated enemy was less
likely.71
There were also numerous rules governing the sharing of booty
and the amount of plunder which could be brought home. Pillaging was
only permissible with the consent of the leaders, and such practice was
totally forbidden during battle. Booty was declared common property
and was to be distributed as the leaders directed. Punishments were
prescribed for the fighter who brought home too much loot or did not
correctly share it with the other men. Laws against combatants returning with too many spoils came from the fear that foreign influences
were corrupting the people and ruining morality.72

Elgger, Kriegswesen, 42; and Häne, “Kriegsbereitschaft,” 33.
Sempacher Brief in Frey, Kriegstaten, 125-7; and Elgger, Kriegswesen, 214-16.
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The Swiss were also forbidden to be under the employ of certain states and peoples to prevent them from fighting against other
confederates or supporting states or causes unfriendly to the Confederation. Against the advice of their leaders in the year 1500, Swiss
mercenaries were employed by both Luigi Sforza, Duke of Milan, and
Louis XII, King of France. When the two armies met, the confederates
under Sforza refused to fight their countrymen and returned home.73
Cowards and traitors were both despised. Deserters were supposed to be sentenced to death, but there are no known examples of
formal executions of tried offenders. Often their names were on record
to shame them for generations to come. Traitors, especially those who
served the much-feared Habsburgs, were the most hated of all men.
Great value was placed on the virtues of keeping promises and in being
loyal. Often when the Swiss were hired to fight for other states, they
considered themselves allies as well as mercenaries. They considered
such loyalties as part of their responsibilities to their employers, but
not at the expense of fighting other confederates.74

THE SWISS AT WAR
Brutality and the Treatment of Prisoners
Eminent modern scholars including Charles Oman and Hans
Delbrück have called the Swiss very brutal soldiers who always killed
their prisoners.75 Such blanket assertions are overly simplistic, misleading, and untrue, and the question of Swiss brutality remains one
of he most misunderstood topics on how the confederates made war.
The topic has many aspects, but it focuses on how the Swiss treated
people and property when a battle was not in progress. Much of the
misunderstanding comes from general order from the Swiss Federal
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 78-9; and Robert Laffont, The Ancient Art of Warfare 2
vols. (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1966) 1: 460.
74
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 236-7.
75
Oman, Art of War, 2: 253-4; and Delbrück, Kriegskunst, 3: 688.
73

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10

90

et al.: Full Issue

November 2020 SAHS Review

88

Diet on March 11, 1499, when it called for all the citizens of the various cantons to take an oath that when they went to war no prisoners
were to be taken but all killed “as our pious ancestors have always been
accustomed” to doing.76 This order was clearly meant to urge the Swiss
to fight hard, but it was largely ignored during the Swabian War.
The Swiss could indeed be brutal as was demonstrated forcefully by the slaughters following the Battle of Calven in 1499 and activities at other times. For example, a group of confederates stabbed to
death two “handsome” boys, brothers named Wasman in Habsheim in
Alsace, claiming that the children were notoriously misbehaved.77 A
Swiss raiding party was calling for the surrender of a town during the
Swabian War of 1499 when, from the town’s walls, a Jew shot three
confederate troopers dead including a Master of Artillery and his son.
The town soon surrendered, and the Jewish marksman was captured.
The victorious Swiss gave the town no punishment, but they decided
to do something to the Jew. Three suggestions were given regarding his
fate. One man wanted him tortured and killed, another wanted him cast
into perpetual prison, and a third wanted the captive spared to teach
him how to shoot so well. The suggestion to torture and kill the man
was taken. After being hung by his feet for two days, the unfortunate
man began to beg saying he had been converted to Christianity. He was
then beheaded, and the Swiss said he died as a good Christian.78
On the other hand, the Swiss could be generous and even
merciful to their enemies. A raiding party captured the village of Guttendingen in 1499 and was preparing to burn it when a plea from the
poor women, widows, and orphans of the town reached the confederate leaders, and they spared the village.79 On another occasion, a Swiss
contingent on a raid came to the town of Torenbüren and demanded
Vincent, Switzerland, 54.
“Freiburger Chronik des Schwabenkrieges” in Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des
Schwabenkrieges, 603.
78
Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 100-2.
79
“Freiburger Chronik des Schwabenkrieges” in Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des
Schwabankrieges, 573-4.
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2,200 gulden as a ransom for 160 prisoners who had recently been
taken. If they were not promptly paid, the confederates threatened to
burn the forest at Bregenz. The Swiss received the money but were so
moved by the plight of the poor people in the area that they returned
800 gulden coins, a large sum of money.80 Such stories were numerous. The most common acts of generosity shown by the Swiss were the
releasing of captured persons unharmed and the returning of cattle and
foodstuffs to the needy.
The Swiss frequently took prisoners of war during successful
raids. Often the confederates took prisoners when their adversaries
were surprised in the castles and towns, but more often they simply
surrendered to the Swiss. The confederates would spare a garrison if
it surrendered, but if it offered resistance and the Swiss succeeded in
taking the castle or fortress, then the all the defenders could be killed.
Usually, in negotiating the surrender of a town or castle, the Swiss
would offer a simple ultimatum, surrender or die. Faced with such a
choice, the garrison usually capitulated. On one occasion, the leader
of a garrison put the question of surrender to a vote of the twenty-five
defenders of the castle. Twenty-one voted to surrender, and only four
wanted to fight, so the castle capitulated.81
There were three basic types of prisoners defined by social
class taken in the Swabian War. These were prisoners of the nobility,
army, and peasantry. The Swiss commonly released the peasantry and
other low-class persons after only a brief captivity if they would swear
never again to make war on the confederates. The Swiss considered
enemy prisoners from the lower classes to be troublesome if they were
to be held in confinement until the end of the war, and they were often
released to save money. Those prisoners were divided up among the
contingents that captured them. Captives were usually sent to areas
away from the borders for safekeeping. These men were often treated
Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 372.
Heinrich Hug, Villinger Chronik von 1495 bis 1533 (Tübingen: Literarischer
Verein Stuttgart, 1883), 8-9.
80
81
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well and given good food and housing. The treatment of prisoners must
have been good because there were only two reported deaths in captivity during the entire Swabian War.82
The Swiss gave the nobility special treatment because they
were held for ransom, and care was taken to assure that they did not
escape. The captives from the upper classes were well treated and spent
much of their time writing letters for the required sums of money and
in awaiting the delivery of these payments. Young girls carried the
money and messages, and they were allowed to travel freely between
the armies. In 1499, a doctor from Basel helped three captive nobleman’s sons escape from Swiss confinement. The boys successfully escaped, but the doctor was captured and killed.83
The late Middle Ages was a period of brutal warfare when soldiers of all nations showed little respect for the lives of others and for
their private property. The Swiss military was indeed a creature of its
age and should be regarded as such. Yet, it is incorrect to brand the
Swiss as showing excessive brutality or cruelty either to people or to
their property.

Weaknesses in the Swiss Military
There were many weaknesses in the Swiss military at the end
of the fifteenth century that contributed to its decline as a dominant infantry in the coming decades. Warfare became more complex, foreign
infantries were greatly improved, artillery became a greater factor in
combat, and the Swiss themselves suffered from a weakening of discipline, morale, and integrity.
82
Burgermeister und Rat zur Chur an Hauptleute, Fähnrich Räte von Chur,
Jetzt im Feld, February 16, 1499, in C. and F. Jecklin, Der Anteil Graubündens am
Schwabenkrieg (Davos: E. Ricter’sche Buchdruckerei, 1899), 108-9. This study
presents an excellent account of the battle of Calven, but it also includes almost every known source on the battle in an appendix in the back. See also, Brennwald,
Schweizerchronik, 2: 434 and 438; and Otto Feger, “Probleme der Kriegsgefangenschaft im Schwabenkrieg,” Zeitschrift für Schweizerishche Geschichte 30 (1950): 597.
83
Feger, “Kriegsgefangenschaft,” 600-1; and Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 87-96.
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By the beginning of the sixteenth century, other armies had
developed into forces with artillery, disciplined infantries, and tactically flexible cavalries. They also began to more ingeniously prepare
positions for defense with trenches and other obstacles. All of these
developments introduced new factors into the complexity of warfare.
Armies had greater opportunities to employ new methods of fighting
rather than the simple cavalry attack that was so common on many battlefields in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Rather than adapting
more flexibility to be effective in battle, the Swiss still clung to their
old tactics of advancing in squares, which soon proved to be outmoded.
True, the confederates showed some adaptability in the Swabian War,
but following that conflict, the Swiss turned back to traditional ways of
fighting rather than changing to meet the times.
The first foreign infantry to challenge the Swiss seriously
was the Swabian Landsknechte (servant of the land) who were German mercenaries or Swabian infantrymen. Those two infantries met
in a number of engagements, first in the Swabian War and other occasions in the early sixteenth century, the most notable of which was
the Battle of Bicocca in 1522. The engagements in the Swabian War
were bitter fights that were fiercely contested, and, as at the Battle of
Dornach in 1499, it was not certain if the Swiss were superior to the
German mercenaries. Beginning in 1500, the most effective infantry
to be used against the Swiss was the Spanish infantry of Consalvo de
Cordova which had adopted many of the tactics of the ancient Romans
in the wars in Northern Italy. Using sword and shield, the Spanish were
able to ward off the Swiss pikes in numerous engagements. Having no
shield to ward off the slashing and thrusting Spanish, the disadvantaged confederates were forced to discard their longer weapons to use
their swords.84
Artillery and the hand cannon or harquebus had become important factors in combat, and these two weapons continually killed
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more and more men in battle.85 The Swiss pike square was the easiest
possible infantry formation at which to aim cannons, and the invention
of burning and exploding bombs or cannon balls made artillery-fire all
the more effective. The tactics that Heini Wolleb used at the Battle of
Franstanz in 1499 of falling down before enemy fire to make smaller
targets was unheard of after the Swabian War, meaning that the Swiss
would frequently stand to face enemy fire. This was a costly mistake
because falling to the ground was the best way to reduce casualties
under heavy fire, and the great Swiss bravery was often misplaced.
Starting in the early sixteenth century, such courage proved to be more
costly than effective.86
The largest single factor in the Swiss decline was the lack of
discipline and unity in battle. This was caused, to a great extent, by a
major change taking place in Swiss society early in the sixteenth century. More and more, mercenary service had become a major source
of wealth in the Confederation, and large sums of money came in the
form of bribes and payments. Corruption at all levels became a fact,
and often payoffs to state and civic officials were the major inducement
to many official actions. This malfeasance went from the leaders who
received bribes to the rank-and-file who got payments for military service. The once-proud Swiss military became greedy and lost the sense
of duty which was more common in earlier times.87
The problem of corruption was not alleviated even when the
Swiss defeats during the first twenty-five years of the sixteenth century made soldiers harder to procure. This difficulty in getting troops
occurred because the casualties diminished the available manpower,
and young men were not as eager to enlist when greater dangers were
involved. Yet because of the difficulty in obtaining soldiers, the fees
for their services went up, perpetuating a high level of corruption for
decades to come.88
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The Confederation became plagued with difficulties. Agriculture became neglected by the most vigorous section of the population,
and morals became increasingly lax. The change appears to have been
most rapid after 1480 because at this time laws regulating standards of
behavior became more frequent. By 1503, Swiss conduct and character
had become objects of scorn for both citizen and foreigner alike. As in
most instances of legislated morality, these statutes regulating conduct
proved difficult to enforce, especially when the government officials
who passed these laws were notably corrupt themselves.89
This decline in ethical conduct affected every facet of the military. Leaders became unwilling to lead unless they received more pay
than the other troops, and soldiers themselves began to lack discipline
and unity in battle. Those men no longer made such great efforts, and
their great effectiveness wavered.90 The Battle of Novara in 1513 was
the last victory won by the Swiss using their traditional tactics. At the
Battle of Marignano in 1515, the confederates attacking columns disobeyed orders and failed to advance on the enemy’s flank. Instead,
they moved head on against the fortified enemy position. As a result,
the Swiss were slaughtered and faced their first major defeat on the
battlefield in more than a half century. At the Battle of Bicocca in 1522,
the confederates made no pretense of a flank attack and moved directly
on the trenches manned by the Lansdknechte. As a result, the Swiss
suffered a major defeat which gave the German mercenaries revenge
against the confederates for numerous actions in the Swabian War.
After the Battle of Bicocca, the confederates toppled from their
position as the most formidable soldiers of the age. Surprisingly, much
of the Swiss reputation survived their great defeats. Although their tactics were clearly outmoded and the confederates themselves held their
military in derision, they were still among the most sought-after soldiers in Europe. France, ever respectful of the Swiss military, always
fielded a large contingent of Swiss mercenaries within their armies
through the mid-sixteenth century. Clearly, many European states had
89
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been so respectful of the Swiss military that its failures were put aside,
and the belief in Swiss abilities persisted long after their effectiveness
in battle was put in question.

BACKGROUND AND CAUSES
OF THE SWABIAN WAR
After the Swiss Confederation was first formed late in the thirteenth century, this coalition was immediately at odds with the Austrian Habsburg family who wanted to increase their authority over those
areas from which the Swiss were continually gaining new states and
allies. During the fourteenth century and the early years of the fifteenth
centuries, the Habsburgs fought many wars with the members of the
Confederation over conflicting interests and disputed lands. The Swiss
were successful in all of those conflicts. The Habsburgs long remembered the humiliation of repeatedly being defeated by the Swiss peasants, and the confederates continually feared that Austrian power was
a menace that had never been entirely removed.91
For most of the fifteenth century, a member of the Habsburg
family also served as the Holy Roman Emperor. The Habsburg, Frederick III, was Emperor from 1439 to 1493, and the confederate mistrust
of the Austrian ruling family naturally became synonymous with the
policies of the German Empire. By 1499, Swiss participation in imperial affairs had been voluntary for generations. The origins of Swiss
independence can be traced as far back as the Charter of Liberty or
Freibrief issued by Frederick II to Schwyz in 1240. That was two years
before the sealing of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden into their first
known pact, and generations before closer alliances were created later
in the century.92 The Swiss states had infrequently participated in the
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 197.
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affairs of the German Empire, but by the end of the fifteenth century,
all the members of the Confederation except Bern had largely severed
their participation in the Empire and had stopped attending the Imperial Diet or legislative body.
Most of the members of the Confederation were on good terms
with France late in the fifteenth century, but again Bern was the exception. Bern was the most territorially ambitious canton, and it was
covetous of the French-speaking areas immediately to its west. It had
gained authority of a small number of these areas after the Burgundian
Wars 1474-1477 and wished to acquire more. Bern saw France as its
chief opponent in obtaining these areas, and it considered he Empire,
France’s rival, as a chief potential ally in forwarding its ambitions. As
a result, Bern continued participation in the affairs of the Empire, while
the other Swiss states did little.
By the end of the fifteenth century, the Habsburgs were beset
with problems. The Turks frequently ravaged Habsburg lands, a feud
continued between the Habsburgs and the Hungarian monarchy, and
Bavaria was becoming increasingly hostile to the Empire and to the
ruling family of Austria. Clearly, the solutions to these problems could
most readily be achieved through the application of military force. But
the Habsburgs did not control a good military capable of overcoming
the all difficulties facing them. The ruling family recognized that the
excellent Swiss military could aid them a great deal in these struggles.
The family further believed that the confederates would be most effective when employed against the Turks, and for this purpose, they made
attempts to gain Swiss friendship and support.93
An accord with the confederates appeared to be a good idea for
the Habsburgs, but such an attempt was very unlikely to succeed. The
aging Frederick III was a major hindrance to any such effort because he
was openly disdainful of the Confederation, and his contempt for the
confederates was often interpreted by them as a manifestation of a continuing policy of hostility. Although there had not been a war between
93
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the Habsburgs and Swiss since the middle of the fifteenth century, the
confederates’ hatred for the ruling house of Austria continued. This
animosity ran so deep that anyone who displayed the emblem of the
Habsburgs (Imperial Eagle) within the Confederation did so at the peril
of his life.
Nonetheless, Sigismund Habsburg, Frederick’s brother,
achieved a brief success in getting Swiss support. In 1474, Sigismund
sought an alliance with the Swiss. Because the Confederation was at
war with Burgundy at the time, the defensive pact proposed by Sigismund was desirable to them. The Eternal Direction of 1474 was
designed to assure mutual aid against any threat to the Confederation
or to the Habsburgs, whether that menace came form external enemies
or disloyal areas within the German Empire. Yet the agreement did not
last long, because the final defeat of Burgundy in 1477 removed the immediate threat to Swiss security, and Frederick himself, in his constant
contempt for the confederates, refused to negotiate a renewal of the
pact.94
Problems continued to beset the German Empire and the
Habsburg family in the 1480s. Since 1477, the Emperor Frederick
III had been at war with Hungary, and the war went badly for the
German Emperor. His forces were driven out of some Austrian areas,
and the Hungarians captured Vienna in 1483. Frederick never saw
the city again. The ravages by the Turks were a continuing menace,
and the Bavarians were threatening Habsburg power in south Germany. Sigismund Habsburg, Archduke of Austria and Frederick’s
distant cousin, tried to take the Tirol in the western part of Austria,
away from the Emperor’s control in 1487.95 Some decisive action
needed to be taken to strengthen the royal family’s interests, and
it was Maximilian, Frederick’s son, and heir, who most effectively
tried to help the situation.
94
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Maximilian (1459-1519) was a young, energetic leader in the
1480s—years before he acceded to his father’s throne. His position
within the Empire became increasingly important as he matured because of the aging of Frederick, who had been a powerful ruler, became
more incompetent with age. To help alleviate the ruling family’s problems, Maximilian began a program to reorganize the Empire’s army in
the mid 1480s. He recognized that the Swiss infantry’s organization
and tactics could be copied, and starting in 1485, he went to the Swabian areas of the Empire and began to organize the manpower along
confederate lines.96
The heir to the Austrian throne recognized that a military force
based on a peasant infantry was potentially loyal to a central monarch
and could be more useful than the noble cavalry because the men from
the lower classes could be better controlled. Maximilian also realized
that, as the Swiss had proven, a good infantry could be very effective in battle. Naturally, the most valuable persons needed to help train
the Swabians were the confederates themselves. An obscure knight,
Konrad Gächuf of Kesswil, was the most instrumental person in hiring Swiss mercenaries to teach the Swabains confederate organization,
tactics, and the wielding of weapons.97
Starting in 1486 when Gächuf’s Swiss began their instruction,
the Swabian infantry began to prove its abilities on the battlefields
of Europe. These Swabian infantry, Landsknechte, had a deep hatred
for the Swiss who shared the Swabian southern border. This hostility stemmed from raids and petty intermittent warfare between those
two peoples which had occurred for many generations. The Swabian
infantry with high morale and confidence obtained from their victories on the battlefields of Europe, soon showed their contempt for the
Swiss and became anxious to test their abilities against their former
teachers.98
Dürr, “Politik,” 466; and Frey, Kriegstaten, 335.
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To assure the use of the Swabain infantry and to form a power
base capable of aiding the Habsburgs and their problems, Maximilian
and Frederick formed the Swabian League in February 1488, consisting of local knights and cities. The Swabian League, with the Swabian
infantry as its chief military contingent, was successful in retaining
Bavaria and in defeating Sigismund to keep the Tirol.99
The existence of the powerful Swabian League on their borders
made the Swiss suspicious of its intended purposes. Even though the
League was apparently aimed primarily at Bavaria, the confederates
feared that Frederick would one day be tempted to use it against them.
The south German nobility in the Swabian League did nothing to help
calm such fears. The German lords were extremely contemptuous of
the Confederation. As they watched their feudal rights melt away due
to the pressures of a discontented peasantry prone to violence, those
nobles became fearful that the existence of the free and often democratic Swiss Confederation on their borders was a serious social threat
because their peasants were seeking freedoms similar to those enjoyed
by the confederates. As a result, there was much talk among the German nobles of dividing up the Confederation, repressing Swiss freedoms, and establishing nobles over them.100
The confederates, long protective of their hard-won rights, hated any idea of having the nobility established in their lands and seeing
their freedoms abolished.101 The agitation from such talk and the mutual hatred between the Swiss and the Swabians nearly broke into war
in October 1488, but before there was any clash of arms, angers cooled,
and war was averted.102
The kings of France had long waged an unfriendly policy
against the German Empire, believing their best interests were served
in undermining the strength of the Empire. France’s policy included
Dürr, “Politik,” 470.
Christopher Hare, Maximilian the Dreamer: Holy Roman Emperor, 1459-1519
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retaining good terms with the confederates to assure the availability
of Swiss mercenaries, and to influence the Confederation to remain
on unfavorable terms with the Empire. The agents of the French king,
Charles VIII (1470-1498), were active in the Confederation distributing funds and anti-imperial propaganda. Charles further stirred up
Swiss feelings by employing confederate mercenaries from the Swiss
cantons which bordered Swabia, where the confederates were already
most antagonistic toward the Swabians. These mercenaries were used
against the Empire and the Swabian infantry on operations in Flanders.103
The French influence over the Confederation was demonstrated when three thousand Swiss mercenaries, on the service of the
Empire in Flanders, left Maximilian’s army and joined the French in
1486. This, and other similar actions in the following years, convinced
many German nobles and many Swabian infantrymen alike that the
Swiss were disloyal to the Empire and could not be trusted. With mutual Swiss and Swabian hatred intensifying, France enjoyed increasing
diplomatic success. In 1491, King Charles concluded a five-year peace
and neutrality pact with eight cantons of the Confederation as a gesture
of mutual friendship and support. Those Swiss Cantons were happy
to sign the agreement because the pact assured the continued flow of
French funds into their lands, and because it assured French support in
case of war.
Long before the death of his father on August 19, 1493, Maximilian had sought reforms that would unify and strengthen the Empire.104 That Habsburg leader sought more control over the German
Empire by instituting the Common Penny (Gemeiner Pfennig) or universal tax and by strengthening the Imperial Supreme Court. The Common Penny was designed to be paid by all the members of the Empire. Maximilian wanted to use the funds he received from this tax to
support a military that would protect the Empire and Habsburg lands
103
104
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from external enemies and to assure the loyalty of the various areas
within the Empire. The Supreme Court was designed to handle all of
the affairs within the Empire to guarantee justice and peace. Maximilian explained his reforms at the Diet at Worms in 1495. He promised
the various lands of the Empire a voice in the government if the Common Penny was paid, he spoke of re-establishing the indefinable old
boundaries of the Empire, and he fervently warned of the danger of
disunity.105
Despite Maximilian’s fervent plea for unity, the reforms were
not well received by the members of the Diet, and the Swiss believed
that the reforms simply did not apply to them. Most of the Swiss Cantons were not involved in imperial affairs for decades, and only representatives from Bern were present in 1495. The other Swiss states
were unwilling to consider these reforms as anything more than vain
rhetoric. They believed that the Common Penny was unnecessary for
them because they already had a fine military system, and the Supreme
Court of the Empire was in direct conflict with their developing system
of laws and courts call the Justice Awakening. In short, The Swiss Confederation was progressing towards is own distinct national character
and was sure to resent any attempt by the Empire to hamper or limit
that development.106 When Maximilian’s representatives visited the
Confederation to institute the Common Penny, they were politely yet
definitely turned away in most areas, and Zurich’s city council refused
even to see those emissaries.107
The Supreme Court soon handed down unfavorable judgments
over the lands controlled by the Swiss allies of Rottweil and Schaffhausen. The court said those two towns did not legally own certain territories, and those lands should be turned over to the Empire. Rottweil
and Schaffhausen, supported by the Confederation, refused to vacate
the disputed areas, thus choosing to ignore the judgment of the SuDürr, “Politik,” 481-2.
Dürr, “Politik,” 484-5.
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preme Court. Angered by Swiss defiance, Maximilian threatened to go
to war if the Swiss did not relent. The Confederation would not be bullied. Rather, it began to prepare for war. To make good on his threat,
Maximilian also began war preparations. Even though negotiations
continued, both sides were clearly disinterested in compromising.108
The Empire’s war preparations advanced slowly, but the Confederation was soon on a war footing. As a precautionary measure starting in 1490, Swiss cities began to store a year’s supply of grain and, in
1495, the confederates restricted grain experts from flowing out over
the St. Gotthard Pass. During the crisis of 1488 which nearly ended in
war, Swiss representatives had met in Zurich to assure unity of action
should the crisis result in an armed conflict with the Empire. At this
conference, Zurich, Bern, Luzern, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug,
Glarus, Fribourg, and Solothurn pledged mutual support in defense of
each other. Other areas of the Confederation, Apenzell, St. Gallen, and
Wallis were not represented, but the agreement clearly included them.
A decade later, as talk of war progressed, all of these areas were willing
to honor that pledge. Only Bern spoke of peace, but it clearly felt much
greater allegiance to the Confederation than to the Empire.109
As the Swiss Confederation and the German Empire moved
closer to war, another dispute became heated between members of the
Grey Leagues (Graubünden) and the Tirol. The Grey Leagues bordered
the Confederation on the east, and it consisted of areas around Chur
called the Rätier. The Grey Leagues was a small alliance of three tiny
states similar to the Swiss Confederation. The freedom-loving people
of the Rätier had formed an agreement in 1424 to ensure their independence from the Habsburgs, but by the end of the century, the threat
from the ruling family of Austria made this self-rule uncertain. The
Habsburgs controlled the Tirol, which bordered the Grey Leagues,
and the two areas became involved in boundary disputes because their
Frey, Kriegstaten, 338.
Häne, “Kriegsbereitschaft,” 20-22; Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 339; and
Frey, Kriegstaten, 339.
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boundaries had never been clearly defined. Free peasants, and those
owing allegiance to the Bishop of Tirol, lived in these disputed border
areas, often in the same communities. The Grey Leagues asked that
all these locations be made free, but the regency of the Tirol wanted
to hear nothing of those privileges. The leaders of the Tirol believed
it was preferable to go to war rather than give the disputed areas the
independence that would allow them to join the Grey League.110
The Habsburg authority in Innsbruck began to pressure the Grey
Leagues which realized that it did not have the strength to test the power
of Tirol alone, so that alliance turned to the Swiss Confederation for
help. The two coalitions had long enjoyed good relations. The similar
culture, society, and beliefs in freedom and independence shared by the
two alliances helped them form a bond of friendship to face the mounting threat from the Habsburgs. Much to the anger of the Habsburgs, the
Grey Leagues joined in a close agreement with the Confederation in
June 1497. Another two small pacts, the League of God’s House (Gotteshausbund), and the Ten Jurisdictions (Zehngerichtebund), near the
Grey Leagues, also felt endangered by Tirol and joined in a close alliance with the Confederation in 1498. Those areas proved to be valuable allies and fought with the Confederation in the Swabian War.111
The Swiss made some final attempts at negotiation by sending
emissaries to the Federal Diet asking to be free of the Common Penny
and the Supreme Court of the Empire. Their requests were rejected.112
While the emissaries watched, the angry Bertold, archbishop and Elector of Mainz (1484-1505), swore to establish a nobleman (Habsburg)
over the Swiss. He threatened to sign a document with a feather pen
that would place the Swiss under Church excommunication and the interdict, “mit der acht und dem bann.” One of the confederate emissaries
answered that others had tried to conquer them but had not succeeded.
Frey, Kriegstaten, 339-40; and Fritz Rieter, “Der Schwabenkrieg vor 450
Jahren,” Schweizer Monatshefte 29 (June 1949): 132.
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Those enemies were wielding halberds whom the Swiss could fear, but
they were not afraid of goose feathers used as pens to sign documents.113
The negotiations having failed, war almost became inevitable. All that
was needed were some minor incidents to start hostilities.
To weaken the Swiss position, the Empire attempted to strip the
Confederation of all the areas which owed them allegiance. Isprugg, an
independent town, was offered spiritual salvation to desert the Swiss
and join the Swabian League. The offer was for salvation, but the implication was clear that if Isprugg did not willingly desert the Confederation, it would face the Swabian League as an enemy. Isolated from
the Confederation and weak, Isprugg had no choice but comply. Mulhouse (Mülhausen), caught in a similar situation, also complied with
Habsburg demands. The city of Constance had long been friendly to the
Swiss, but because of Habsburg pressure, it turned to the Empire and
was also lost to the Swiss Confederation. That situation proved to be a
serious blow to the confederates because Constance became one of the
major garrison points of the imperial army during the Swabian War.114
In the winter of 1498-9, the situation had become one of watching and waiting for both sides as forces from both sides faced each
other. The Rhine River formed the boundary between Swiss and imperial lands in many places. The hatred and sense of rivalry between the
armies on both sides did not long remain dormant. The Swiss first made
war-like moves when they seized mountain passes in the Alps and Jura
mountains, but because they met no resistance, war did not start with
those actions.115 Late in January 1499, soldiers from the Tirol crossed
the Rhine River into the Grey Leagues with no known objective. They
were quickly confronted and driven back across the river. With this act,
the Grey Leagues were at war with the Tirol.116
The entire Swiss Confederation was not automatically at war
at that point, although the members would soon feel obligated to come
Brennwald, Schweizerchronik 2: 334; and Frey, Kriegstaten, 339.
Hans Ungelter an Esslingen, Feb. 1, 1499, in K. Klüpfel, ed. Urkunden zur Geschichte des Schwäbischen Bundes (1488-1533) (Stuttgart: literarischer Verein, 1846), 281.
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to the aid of its newly-acquired ally. However, a border incident soon
brought the entire Confederation into the conflict. The troops of the
Swabian League and the Swiss Confederation faced each other in an
uneasy peace along the Rhine River. Feeling the traditional hatred between the two peoples and bored by occupying static positions in the
cold, winter months, the two armies amused themselves by shouting
insults back and forth. At the castle of Gutenberg near Balzers in modern Liechtenstein, the Swabian infantry mocked the Swiss by composing unchristian songs that were insulting to the pious confederates. The
final antagonism came when the Swabian troops displayed a cow and
called to the Swiss to come over to act as the cow’s groom. Then to
complete the insult, the Swabians mooed like cows and calves. The
Swiss were infuriated at being accused of making love to animals. In
retaliation, the Swiss leader from Uri, Heini (Heinrich) Wolleb, took a
group of men across the Rhine River on February 6, 1499, and burned
a house and a stall. At this point, the war began in earnest.117
At the war’s outset, the forces on either side quickly lined up.
The Lower Union of cities on the Rhine fought for the Empire. Of
their number, only Basel, which had greater economic ties with the
Swiss Confederation, was able to remain neutral.118 The only other cities that managed to be neutral were Rottweil and Constance.119 The
Empire called for support from all its lands, but it was the Tirol and
the Swabian League that contributed most of the support. The Swiss
Confederation called upon its members and on its allies including the
Grey Leagues and France.120 Even though the five-year peace and neutrality pact between France and the Confederation had expired in 1496,
Louis XII, the new king of France, had pledged French aid in the event
of war. This assistance was supposed to be in the form of money and
artillery pieces. The funds reached the Confederation, but the cannons
were delayed in Burgundy, and they did not arrive until the war was
Frey, Kriegstaten, 342.
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over. Except for French money, the Swiss Confederation and the Grey
Leagues had to fight the war with minimal outside help.

THE SWABIAN WAR OF 1499
Strategy
The Swabian war, often called the Swiss War (Schweizerkrieg)
in Germany, was poorly planned by either side. Overall strategy consisted largely of border raids which entailed the destruction of villages
and castles and the taking of cattle and booty. The eminent historian of
Swiss military history, Hans Rudolf Kurz, has described the conflict as
war for war’s sake that also included a number of bitter battles in which
neither belligerent employed its entire army.121
The Empire had to wait many weeks before enough troops
gathered to take definitive action. The initial imperial strategic plan
was to assemble troops at various locations around castles, fortified
towns, and to construct defenses of various natures. From these bases,
the army was to resist confederate attacks and then to raid into Swiss
territories at the best opportunities. The command of those operations
was divided between Heinrich von Fürstenberg and his two brothers,
Wolfgang and Ulrich.122 In April 1499, Maximilian himself came to
South Germany to give the war more definitive direction. He decided
to fight against the Grey Leagues first. After two disastrous defeats at
the battle of Frastanz and Calven in April and May, and following a difficult and indecisive mountain campaign in June, Maximilain turned his
attention directly to the Swiss Confederation. When the Swiss defeated
Heinrich von Fürstenberg at the battle of Dornach in July, the fighting
quickly tapered off, and the belligerents signed a peace treaty at Basel
Kurz, Schweizerschlachten, 141.
“Kriegsplan des Schwäbischen Bundes gegen die Eidgenossenschaft,” January
20, 1499, in Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Schwabenkrieges, 3-4.
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on September 22, 1499.123
Major problems
beset Maximilian in waging the war. He had insufficient funds to pay his
troops, and contingents
of his army from various
parts of the Empire were
continually
squabbling
over petty matters, making a unified war effort
challenging. The Emperor
tried to bring some unity
and direction to his army
Emperor Maximilian I
and war effort by personby Albrecht Dürer
ally overseeing the making of war preparations. He arose before everyone else in the morning and worked well into the night. He spoke only about the war
and was continually figuring out how to get more funds while writing many letters in the process, but his finances were always inadequate.124
The Swiss overall strategy did not differ greatly from that of
the Empire. The confederates had garrisons at various castles and fortified towns and churches near their borders to meet the enemy when
possible and to use as staging areas to raid into enemy territory. Swiss
funds were often lacking to pay their troops, but numerous successful
excursions often provided enough booty to pay many soldiers. Major
offensives into enemy territory were impractical because two-thirds of
the Swiss border faced the Empire, and it took a great many men just
to watch those borders.125
Kurz, Schweizerschlachten, 144-5.
“Augustin Somenza an den Herzog von Mailand,” April 29, 1499, in Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Schwabenkrieges, 166-7.
125
Kurz, Schweizerschlachten, 141-2.
123
124

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

111

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 56 [2020], No. 3, Art. 10

The Swiss in the Swabian War of 1499

109

The Swiss Confederation did not enjoy political solidarity, and
it did not go to war with the backing of every canton. Basel was not
yet a member of the Confederation, and it had long been friendly with
the alliance, but it did not provide any help beyond feeding groups of
Swiss soldiers on several occasions.126 The largest detriment to a unified war effort was Bern’s indifference. Bern had not wanted war with
the Empire, and it gave reluctant support to the war effort. The cantons
of Bern and Zurich were the largest in population at that time, but Bern
was the most powerful state militarily in the Confederation, and its
halfhearted war effort meant that the Swiss were fighting at a disadvantage. When Bern’s troops march out of the city early in February
1499, the people lining the streets made fun of the fact that so few men
marched out behind the city’s banners.127
Superior strategy was not the main factor that made the Swiss
effort more successful than that of the Empire. The confederates owed
their success to the militia and to war-preparedness, to their better information about troop movements, and to their great courage and determination. Before the war had begun, confederate scouts were already
reconnoitering the Empire’s troop movements and dispositions. These
men moved rapidly on horseback over the countryside gathering and
delivering timely information.128 Swiss determination also showed itself
in numerous fights and in many battles and skirmishes. Even their German adversaries were impressed with the confederate fighting ability.
One example of Swiss determination was demonstrated shortly
after the Battle of Schwaderloh which took place on April 11, 1499.
A young knight, Gözens von Berlichingen, accompanied an imperial
raid. The German party made a night attack on the village of Taingen (modern Thayngen) east of Schaffhausen. The confederates were
caught coming out of their church, apparently uninformed that the Germans were present. The Swiss resisted as best they could, but their
Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 107-8.
“Wilhelm Felga an Freiburg,” February 12, 1499, Aktenstücke zur Geschichte
des Schwabenkrieges, 42-44.
128
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 331.
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situation was precarious. The Germans soon called upon them to surrender, but the Swiss called back stating that “They would rather die as
pious confederates” than be captured. The German infantry and cavalry
opened fire on the Swiss who returned fire. One Swiss marksman shot
and wounded one German soldier, but the bullet went through him,
killing the man behind him.
Outnumbered the Swiss ran to the church tower, which was
subsequently set on fire when the Germans exploded powder behind
it. The only known Swiss survivor was a small boy who toddled away
from the arms of a man who had jumped from the burning tower, killing himself but saving the boy. The Germans waited in vain for the other confederates to come out of the tower and surrender, but none came.
Their only possible fate was to be burned alive. By all appearances, the
Swiss perished as free men rather than flee the burning tower.129 Such
courage and determination, shown in many incidents during the war,
gave the Swiss an advantage in many skirmishes and battles.

Devastation and the Tragedy of War
The war was confined mostly to the border areas, and raids and
brief expeditions were constant factors in the conflict. Many valleys
and regions along the Rhine River were raided several times, devastating these areas. Burned villages and starving people, driven from their
homes as refugees or hostages, were common in both Swiss and German areas. At times, certain areas suffered fighting night and day.130
The nature of the war was so violent that it soon followed its own
logic, and successful attacks on the enemy often invited retaliation
to avenge the pain and devastation already afflicted on each other.131
129
Gözens von Berlichingen, Lebens Beschreibung (Nürnberg: Adam Jonathan
Fellsecker, 1731), 40-2.
130
“Hauptleute, Venner etc. im Feld [Werdenberg] an Zürich,” March 28, 1499,
Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Schwabenkrieges, 109-10.
131
“Hans Ungelter an Esslingen,” February 10, 1499, in Urkunden zur Geschichte
des Schwäbischen Bundes, 284.
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Fighting often occurred at so many places simultaneously that the
action became difficult to follow. The actual fighting lasted only six
months and one historian, Christopher Hare, has estimated that two
hundred villages were burned and twenty thousand people were killed
in the conflict.132
The war caused many problems with the Black Death, wolves,
and starvation. The Plague was a menace whenever bodies were left
to the vermin, and it took its toll on many unfortunate victims.133 Another problem was wolves. In many areas, the war’s dead went unburied. This situation was due to the fact that no one wanted to bury
enemy dead. The area around Constance was notably bad because the
opposing armies remained near each other, and fighting was frequent.
The bodies were then left to be devoured by birds, rats, and wolves.
The wolves so gorged themselves on human flesh that they developed
a taste for it and reportedly began to wander far and wide attacking
adults and small children. To control the situation in the Empire, orders
were given to kill all wolves on sight.134
Malnutrition and starvation took an unknown number of
lives. Wilibald Pirckheimer, the
famous humanist from Nuremberg,
was a participant in the war, and he
campaigned with imperial forces
against the Grey Leagues in June
and wrote one of the most disturbing descriptions of the devastation
of the war:
Willibald Pirckheimer, 1503
by Albrecht Dürer

Hare, Maximilian, 102.
“Landeshauptmann an der Etsch und Räte zu Meran an Statthalter und Regenten in Innsbruck,” Der Anteil Graubündens, 183-4.
134
Martin Crussi, Schwäbischer Chronik, 2 vols. trans. Johann Jacob (Frankfurt:
Metzler und Erhart, 1733) 2: 152.
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“In a large mountain valley whose villages were burnt
and deserted, we met two old women driving about forty
little boys and girls like a flock of sheep. All were starved to
the most extreme emaciation and, except that they moved,
not unlike corpses, so that it was horrible to see. I asked the
old women where they were leading their miserable herd.
Hardly had they replied when we came to a meadow. They
turned in and falling on their knees began to eat grass like
cattle, except that they picked it first with their hands instead
of biting it from the roots. They had already learned the varieties of the herbage, and knew what was bitter or insipid,
what sweeter or more pleasant to the taste. I was horrified at
so dreadful a sight, and stood for a long time like one who
cannot trust his senses.
“Then the woman asked: ‘Do you see why this wretched
crowd is led here? Well would it have been if none of them
had been born . . . their fathers have fallen by the sword,
their mothers have died of starvation, their property has been
carried off as booty, their houses burnt; we two wretches,
tottering with age, are left to lead this miserable herd like
beasts to pasture, and so far as we can, keep them alive on
grass. We hope that a short time will relieve them and us
from our miseries. They were twice as many, but in a brief
time they were reduced to this number, since daily some die
of want and hunger, far happier in a quick death than in longer life.’ When I had seen and heard these things I could not
restrain my tears, pitying pitiable human lot, and detesting,
as every true man ought, the fury of war.”135

In great need of manpower, the Swiss at times resorted to making troops out of women and boys. Late in May 1499, the Germans entered an area near Stockach, Germany, and found a Swiss pike square
facing them. Expecting the normally aggressive confederates to attack,
the Germans held their ground. When the Swiss did not move, the imperial forces maneuvered to the higher ground near their adversaries
135
Wilibald Pirckheimer as cited and translated by Paul van Dyke, Renascence
Portraits (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1905), 318-9. Van Dyke quotes Pirckheimer, Schweizerkrieg, 110.
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and engaged their enemies. The confederates were clearly outclassed.
They lost the fight, and many were captured. Among these prisoners,
who were starving, were many women and youths dressed as men.136
Young women were often allowed to pass freely between the
armies. These “girls” (Mädchen) kept a channel of communication
open between the antagonists and carried letters negotiating the terms
of release for prisoners. In July of 1499, a letter for Maximilian was
brought to Constance by an “immature” Swiss girl. Wilibald Pirckheimer, the German humanist, was present to witness the scene when
the Emperor’s men tried to intimidate the child into giving information
on the Swiss army facing the city as she awaited a reply.
One man asked the girl what the Swiss were doing. She answered, “Don’t you see they are awaiting your attack?” Then she was
asked how many men they had. To which she replied, “Just enough to
repel your advance.” She also said that the men in Constance could
have counted the Swiss in a recent battle before the city gates if flight
had not blinded their eyes. She was then asked whether the Swiss had
enough to eat, to which she simply responded, “How are they able to
live if they do not eat or drink?” One of the men then tried to frighten
the girl by threatening to decapitate her. When the girl saw this, she
said, “Truly you are a hero that you threaten a young girl with death.
When you have such a great desire to draw a sword, why don’t you
throw yourself on the enemy positions? There you will meet a man
who will answer your courage. But it is easier to confront an unarmed
and innocent girl than put yourself before an armed enemy who knows
how to conduct himself not with words but with deeds.” Pirckheimer
said he was delighted with the girl’s answers as well as her courage and
frankness.137
A great deal of the war’s ferocity came from the great bitterness between the combatants. On the borders of the Grey Leagues, both
136
“Ulrich Strauss zu Ueberlingen an Nördlingen,” May 30, 1499, Urkunden zur
Geschichte des Schwäbischen Bundes, 341.
137
Pirckheimer, Schweizerkrieg, 294.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10

116

et al.: Full Issue
114

November 2020 SAHS Review

the Swiss and Tirolese peasants clashed every day to burn and kill. Despair set in among the Tirolese peasantry because of the great destruction, and they feared that the judgment of God was upon them.138 Even
through the ravages of a brutal war, many Swiss maintained a belief
that God was with them. A raiding party of Germans burned a church
in a Swiss town. The church was burned entirely to the ground, but the
Holy Eucharist remained completely untouched and unharmed. Many
confederates took this as a good omen that helped them take courage in
difficult times.139
The entire war was needless and futile. The conflict could have
been avoided, and it solved little. But the military operations were tragic for the peasants both in the Empire and the Confederation who paid
a very high price for the war in privations and suffering.

The Battles
No analysis of the Swiss military would be complete without
a discussion of how the confederates used their army in war. The best
way to do this would be to describe the Swiss military in battle. In
the Swabian War, there were a number of large engagements, but four
battles deserve close attention: Schwaderloh, Frastanz, Calven, and
Dornach.

Schwaderloh (Triboltingen), April 11, 1499
By early April 1499, Maximilian had assembled an impressive
army around Constance, these forces coming primarily from Swabia,
Austria, and Bavaria. Many of these men had assembled in retaliation
for recent Swiss, most notably a campaign in the Hegau Valley east of
Schaffhausen. In the last days of March, the confederates ravaged the
138
“Hans Ungelter an Esslingen,” February 22, 1499, in Urkunden zur Geschichte
des Schwäbischen Bundes, 293-4.
139
Etterlin, Kronica, 236.
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The Battle of Schwaderloh
by Johann Stumpf

Hegau burning the castles of Allisberg, Ranndeck, Roseneck, Frydingen, Stutzlingen, Hamburg, Stouffenn, and Rietheim and destroying
their nearby villages.140
Facing the German forces at Constance was a series of confederate garrisons protecting the Thurgau which were manned mostly by
men from the region, but they also included detachments from other
Swiss areas. The village of Ermatingen was garrisoned by four hundred men from Bern and Fribourg. These forces engaged in skirmishes
almost daily with detachments from Constance, and the village of Ow
was subject to frequent bombardment from the cannon positioned in
the city. To return fire, Luzern sent two large cannons early in April.
This threat of artillery in Ermatingen prompted Wolfgang von Fürstenberg to lead a major attack on the village to capture the two weapons.141
140
141

Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 57 and 63.
Anshelm, Berner-Chronik 2: 164; and Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 64.
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The Swiss Plundering the Hegau Valley in 1499
by Evert van Muyden

Early in the morning of April 11, 1499, Fürstenberg moved
his men by boat on the Rhine River and overland to strike the Swiss
garrison at dawn when these men were rousing from slumber. The
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020
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leader of the Bernese, Hans Kuttler, and the commander of the men
from Fribourg, Jacky Henni, were close friends, and they were talking
early in the morning before the rest of the men had risen. An alarm
sounded, and the two leaders went to see what was happening only to
find the imperial forces attacking the village from the rear. The Swiss
tried to organize some resistance, but the enemy advance was too quick
and heavy for the confederates to get into formation. Some were cut
down trying to dress or grab their weapons, and the Master of Artillery
(Büchsenmeister), Rüdolf Hass from Luzern, was stabbed to death.
Some of the men from Ermatingen rushed to help the garrison, but the
Swabians began shouting, “Flee, all is lost, alas dear confederates!” At
that moment, the Swiss ran away leaving seventy-three dead, most of
whom were killed while still in bed.142
The imperial forces soon took Ermatingen, Triboltingen, and
Mannenbach. Rushed with success, a Swabian leader, Burckhart von
Randeck, a noted Swiss-hater, called for the destruction of the Swiss
villages and swore to destroy many enemy areas that day. The Swabians fell out for plunder, and the men from the Hegau began to take
their revenge on the confederates. In Ermatingen some people fled
to a church for refuge, but the building was burned and thirty-seven
people were killed in it. Many others, including women and children, were killed and the possessions of even small children and sick
people were taken. Women, children, and the elderly were abused
in various ways, and women and young girls were raped. The three
villages were held for three hours before their destruction was complete. On leaving, the imperial forces filled the houses with straw
and set them on fire. Loaded with plunder, the Swabians began to
trek back to Constance.143
The Swiss garrison fled until they felt safe and then reorganized themselves into good order. For the two leaders, the defeat was
142
“Luzern an Freiburg,” April 13, 1499, in Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Schwabenkrieges, 135-5; Anshelm, Berner-Chronik 2: 163-4; and Lenz, Schwabenkrieg. 64.
143
Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 66-7.
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hard to bear. In their shame and misery, they cried they had lost their
manliness. Eager to avenge themselves, they called for the militia to
be assembled. Bells rang and fires were lit as signals for the men to
assemble at the church in Schwaderloh. The militia soon arrived, and
the situation was explained to them in emotional speeches in which
the men were warned that they were in danger of losing face for all
time. With the contingents from Bern and Fribourg, the total forces
numbered about fifteen hundred. They were all placed into good order
under the command of Kuttler and Henni and then marched through
a forest on the way to Ermatingen. The Swiss remained in formation
despite the thick trees when they received word that their enemies were
withdrawing with their booty. Their leaders decided to attack immediately. The Swiss knelt in prayer, arose, and advanced from the forest to
meet the imperial forces near Triboltingen.144
The Swabians left two cannons to protect their rear when they
retreated, but these artillery pieces were poorly aimed. When the Swiss
came out of the forest, the weapons shot too high. The cannons were
soon taken, but their smoke momentarily obscured the field of battle.
Neither force could see the other as the Swiss continued their advance
past the cannons to fall upon the Swabians. The imperial infantry was
in two groups and were only interested in escape. The Swiss shouted
their battle cry, a Swabian flag carrier broke in flight, and the rest of
the infantry followed offering no resistance. Only the knights turned to
meet the attacking Swiss, but the cavalry’s stand was unsuccessful, and
the horsemen soon joined the flight.145
The Bernese and men from Fribourg then began to take their
revenge for the morning’s skirmish. One source reported that at this
juncture the action became too confusing to record accurately. The
Swabians dropped their plunder, weapons, and flags and fled overland
and to their boats. The vessels soon became so full that they sank,
Anshelm, Berner-Chronik 2: 165-6; and Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 68.
“Georg von Emershofen an Nördlingen,” April 14, 1499, in Urkunden zur Geschichte des Schwäbischen Bundes, 315-17.
144
145
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Women and priests retrieve the dead bodies of Swabian soldiers just
outside the city gates of Constance after the Battle of Schwaderloh
by Diebold Schilling (Luzern)

drowning many men. Others also died in the Rhine trying to swim
over the river, and many fled all that day and the next night. The Swiss
pursued, killing any enemy they could overtake, and hunting down
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10
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and dispatching those they found hiding in the forests.146
The confederates reported thirteen hundred Swabian dead on
the field and eighty more bodies fished out of the Rhine River. The
Swiss admitted to a loss of twenty men in the battle, including one old
man. Soon after the engagement, priests and women, many of them
wives of the missing, came to look among the dead for their loved
ones. The captured enemy leaders were treated well, and those not
held for ransom were soon sent to Constance after a prisoner exchange
had been arranged. Some of the imperial dead were buried in the field
where they had fallen, but most of them were left to rot where they lay
and to be devoured by birds and wild animals.147
The remarkable feature of this battle was the fact that the members of the militia had no idea they would participate in a major engagement when they awoke that morning. They started the day as they
would any other, but within hours they had formed themselves into an
army complete with weapons, armor, leaders, and battle formations
capable of immediate and effective campaigning. It was no wonder that
it was very challenging to attack Swiss territories at this time because
an effective military organization was always on hand on a moment’s
notice.

The Battle of Franstanz, April 20, 1499
The next major engagement, the battle of Frastanz, was the
result of the Swiss and the forces from the Grey Leagues trying to
remove an important base of operations from the men of Tirol. The
Austrians had constructed fortifications across a mountain pass near
Frastanz just north of modern Liechtenstein. From behind these walls
of wood and stone, the Habsburg forces launched raiding expeditions
“Freiburger Chronik des Schwabenkrieges” in Aktensücke zur Geshichte des
Schwabenkrieges, 587.
147
“Graf Wolfgang von Fürstenberg an Herzog Ulrich zu Wirtemberg,” April 15,
1499, in Aktensücke zur Geshichte des Schwabenkrieges, 140; Anshelm, Berner-Chronik 2: 168-9; Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 69, 73-4; and Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 402.
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The Battle of Frastanz. The red line shows the route of the Swiss and
the green line shows the Habsburg troops.
into areas controlled by the Swiss and their close allies, the men of the
Grey Leagues. When the allied army was unable to draw the Tirolese
from their defenses for a decisive engagement, their leaders decided
that their positions would have to be stormed.148
The army facing the Habsburg forces in the area was largely
composed of men from the Grey Leagues, but there were also numerous small contingents from other Swiss states. In February 1499, Heini
(Heinrich) Wolleb and fifty men from Uri arrived to help. Wolleb was
a man of considerable military skill and determination. He knew how
to exact discipline from his troops, and he expected a great deal from
them. That leader from Uri led the first Swiss raid of the war in retaliation for Swabian insults on February 6, 1499. He also executed an
all-night march on Ragatz (modern Bad Ragaz), and he stood a force
Kurz, Schweizerschlachten, 152-3. See also, “Die Schlacht bei Franstanz
1499,” Rheticus: Vierteljahresschrift der Rheticus-Gesellschaft Jahrgang 21 (1999)
Heft 2: [93]-198.
148
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of thirty Swiss in order all
night in bitter cold which
almost froze some of the
men death.149
Ulrich von Hohensax led the entire Swiss and
Grey Leagues forces in the
area, but Wolleb planned
the battle. He considered
a simple frontal attack on
the enemy positions to be
too dangerous. The leader
from Uri believed that coordinated attacks by two
forces, one on the flank of
the enemy and one frontally
Heini Wolleb by Johann Stumpf
against the fortifications,
had the best chance of success. To accomplish this, the force making the flank attack would have to climb the steep and high Royaberg
Mountain and then descend on the Tirolese left flank. Wolleb was given
the command of this flaking column of the two-thousand men, while
Hohensax led the larger group to march directly on the Habsburg position from lower ground.150
Early on the morning of April 20, 1499, Wolleb assembled his
column and began to scale the Royaberg Mountain some thirty-five
hundred feet above where they started their climb. The men in the column stayed so close together in the ascent that there was a danger of
their falling on each other’s weapons. After a great effort, they approached the crest of the small mountain. They assembled themselves
“[Angriff der Eidgenossen bei Triesen]” in “Freiburger Chronik des Schwabenkrieges” in Aktensücke zur Geshichte des Schwabenkrieges, 566-7; and “Hauptmann, Fähnrich und Räte von Uri, jetzt im Feld, an die Hauptleute der II Bünde in
Churwalchen,” February 15, 1499, in Der Anteil Graubündens, 105-6.
150
Anshelm, Berner-Chronik 2: 169-70.
149
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in good order and knelt in payer before continuing their advance because they knew they were shortly going into battle.151
The Tirolese had recognized the possibility that the Swiss and
their allies might attempt a flanking march over the mountain and had,
therefore, placed two contingents of troops on the crest of the Royaberg. One of these forces consisted of three hundred men wielding the
harquebus and another group of fifteen hundred men was nearby. The
Swiss column engaged the smaller unit first. When Wolleb saw that
the Tirolese men with their hand cannons were about to unleash a volley, he ordered his men to duck, and to fall onto their hands and knees
as the shots went harmlessly overhead. The column then got up and
chase these adversaries off the mountain. Within a short distance, those
troops then engaged the other force of fifteen hundred men. After a
fierce contest lasting about fifteen minutes, the Tirolese broke ranks
and fled in haste down the mountain to their defenses, leaving many
dead in the process.152
Initially, the Tirolese at the defenses had no clear idea of what
was happening on the slopes above them. They could hear the din of
battle, but the resolution of the fighting was unclear until they saw their
forces running down the mountain fleeing from their adversaries. The
imperial forces were divided into two groups of infantry and one of
cavalry, and they shifted their strength to receive the pending attack on
their flank. Meanwhile, Wolleb placed his men in proper order before
marching down the mountain. After offering another prayer, the troops
began their descent.153
While Wolleb’s force began marching on the Tirolese flank,
Ulrich von Hohensax was moving his main force to attack the enemy fortifications frontally. The troops led by Wolleb and Hohensax
either met and combined their power to attack the imperial positions,
Anshelm, Berner-Chronik 2: 169-70.
Anshelm, Berner-Chronik 2: 170. “Hauptmann Schürpf etc. an Luzern,” April
20, 1499, in Aktensücke zur Geshichte des Schwabenkrieges, 147-9.
153
“Freiburger Chronik des Schwabenkrieges” in Aktensücke zur Geshichte des
Schwabenkrieges, 590-2.
151
152
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or they assaulted the defenses separately. In either case, Wolleb was
instrumental in the final attack. Wolleb’s column advanced towards the
hastily-prepared flank positions of the Tirolese. Once again, they fired
their harquebuses in unison. The opposing forces were so close to each
other that the Swiss and men from the Grey Leagues could see and hear
the Tirolese receiving orders to fire. Wolleb then ordered his men again
to fall on the ground to avoid the enemy shots, while the volley boomed
harmlessly overhead. The smoke from the shots obscured the field of
battle, and the Austrians had every reason to believe that their adversaries had suffered heavy casualties from the first fusillade. The Tirolese
musketeers reloaded their weapons and prepared to fire again. Wolleb
then called to his anxious men to remain on the ground, ordering them
to wait until their enemies fired a second time before attacking.
After the Tirolese fired another volley, Wolleb called to his
troops again, this time telling them to follow him and attack with all
their might. The men wielding harquebuses in the column stood up and
shot their weapons, and the entire force advanced. Wolleb, conspicuous at the head of the advancing forces, was felled by a musket ball
before he could reach the enemy positions. Shot in the throat, he died
instantly.154 According to the contemporary humanist, Willibald Pirckheimer, Wolleb’s death was especially heroic, and he died in an identical manner as Arnold von Winkelried’s supposed demise at the battle
of Sempach in 1386. The Uri leader grasped the pikes of the enemy and
fell upon them making a breech in the enemy lines, which allowed his
men to rush through the opening giving them a big advantage as the
fighting progressed.155
The Swiss and their allies pressed its attack without Wolleb,
and the Austrian front was broken in the afternoon, placing the entire
Tirolese army into flight, and the confederates began killing their ene154
Anshelm, Berner-Chronik 2: 171; Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 404; and
“Freiburger Chronik des Schwabenkrieges” in Aktensücke zur Geshichte des Schwabenkrieges, 591.
155
Wilibald Pirckheimer’s Schweizerkrieg, Karl Rück ed. (München: Akademie,
1895), 86.
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mies as they fled. Unfortunately for the Austrians, they had the Ill River
at their back, and it flowed along their only line of retreat. There were
no bridges on this section of the Ill, and the fleeing troops were forced
to swim the river or be slaughtered on its banks. Many swam across
the river to safety, but many others, encumbered by armor and heavy
clothing, drowned in the attempt. So many died in the river that their
bodies reportedly clogged the Ill beneath the bridge at Feldkirch.156
After the battle, the Swiss and men from the Grey Leagues
captured many enemy wounded and treated their injuries. The victors
remained on the field of battle for five days, destroying the fortifications and burying the large numbers of enemy dead. The Austrian army
had consisted of 10,000 to 14,000 men, and about three hundred were
dead on the battlefield. An unknown number had drowned. The Swiss
captured four fags along with twelve artillery pieces and five hundred
harquebuses. Reportedly, the Swiss and their allies suffered only 8 or
10 casualties. The victors took two prominent men from Feldkirch and
held them for ransom to get some reimbursement for the costly raids
from the fortifications near Frastanz into the Rhine Valley.157
More than any other person, the credit for the victory at Frastanz must have been Heini Wolleb. He planned and executed the battle
to perfection. He faced a series of difficult problems which he was able
to solve, thanks to a good plan and personal leadership, which included
a brilliant tactical innovation. Twice, he avoided potentially heavy casualties by ordering his men to fall to the ground, a maneuver which
took great discipline to execute and still to retain the force’s tactical
formation. Wolleb was without doubt a leader of considerable ability,
and the greatest tragedy for the Swiss at Frastanz was the death of the
leader from Uri. The confederate leaders, faced with similar problems
at the Battle of Calven a month later, accepted Wolleb’s strategic battle
Anshelm, Berner-Chronik 2: 171-2; and Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 114.
Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 406-7; “Heinrich [Ammann] Hauptmann der
Bündner an Cur” April 20, 1499 in Aktensücke zur Geshichte des Schwabenkrieges,
149; “Zürich an Hauptleute, etc. der Eidgenossen im Feld,” April 21, 1499, in Aktensücke zur Geshichte des Schwabenkrieges, 152; and Etterlin, Kronica, 241.
156
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plan of marching over a mountain to attack their enemy’s flank but not
his tactical execution, and this oversight cost them dearly. If someone
of Wolleb’s leadership ability and tactical genius had been available
to give acceptance to the ideal of falling down before enemy fire, the
great casualties at Calven and at numerous engagements in the following century might have been avoided.

The Battle of Calven: Movements of the Swiss in Red

The Battle of Calven, May 22, 1499
The victory at the Battle of Frastanz proved to be inconclusive
as far as raids in the nearby areas were concerned, since the Austrians
still held other fortified mountain locations from which they could
launch more raids. The frequency of these incursions increased. The
Austrians had built another base of operations made of earth, wood,
and stone that stretched across a narrow meadow at the mountain
pass of Calven. The imperial forces raided over large distances, while
the residents of the Grey Leagues in the area fought ineffectively
against them. Those people soon called upon their Swiss allies to take
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some definitive action, and confederate forces soon assembled in the
area.158
The Swiss and their allies from the Grey Leagues prepared
carefully for the coming action by practicing tactics together. When
word came that the imperial forces were soon to receive reinforcements, the confederates decided to attack the Austrians before the new
troops could arrive. The Swiss forces were comprised of contingents
from the central and eastern cantons, yet the largest contingent in the
army were the men from the Grey Leagues. The total force numbered
about eight thousand men.159
The imperial army was divided into three main groups, two of
infantry and one of cavalry. The largest group of foot soldiers stood at
the fortifications ready to defend its position against any enemy attack,
while the smaller group of infantry stood farther back to be used as a
reserve. The cavalry was placed still more distant in the rear behind the
village of Laatsch to be used when needed. The entire army numbered
twelve thousand men who were well suppled and armed with numerous
artillery pieces, and those Austrians would prove to be very formidable
opponents.160
The Swiss leaders planned a coordinated effort consisting of a
flanking march and a heavy attack on the enemy fortifications similar
to the battle plan at Frastanz. The flanking column was composed of
between 2,000 and 3,000 men under the combined leadership of Wilhelm von Ringk and Niclaus von Lumbrins. Their route would take
hours to complete, so they left in the night to be in position to fight
the next morning. Such a nighttime advance was more likely to go unnoticed because the garrison at the enemy fortress at Rotund could observe their progress only in the daylight. Shortly after midnight on May
22, 1499, the flanking column began its thirty-six hundred feet ascent
C. and F. Jecklin, Der Anteil Graubündens am Schwabenkrieg (Davos: E.
Ricter’sche Buchdruckerei, 1899), 61-3.
159
Kurz, Schweizerschlachten, 160; and “Chronik von Johann Stumpf,” in Der
Anteil Graubündens, 34 in the appendix.
160
Kurz, Schweizerschlachten, 160-1.
158
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of the mountain. The march was difficult in the darkness and covered
roughly ten miles through rugged and thickly forested terrain.161
After the flaking column had completed its march, men placed
a white flag on a hill, and they also set a building on fire to signal the
main force to attack the enemy fortifications. The flanking column met
an Austrian column who attempted to keep it from crossing the Marengbrücke (Mareng Bridge). The imperial forces held their ground in the
face of repeated attacks by the Swiss and men of the Grey Leagues.
Both Ringk and Lumbrins were killed while leading their men, but
the contest continued without them, and casualties mounted. The fight
continued for hours with the Swiss unable to dislodge or defeat their
adversaries, while suffering two hundred dead and wounded. The confederates and their allies were slowly being worn down, and their condition became dangerous. This fight lasted five hours and disaster was
avoided only because the Austrian cavalry did not participate in the
contest. During the entire battle, the cavalry was the single force that
could have saved the battle for the Tirolese, but it stood at a distance
for some unknown reason.162
The main force of the Swiss and their allies saw the smoke
from the signal fires but hesitated to attack. Under the influence of
the leader from Schwyz, Dietrich Freuler, they decide to delay their
advance, so the flanking column could draw more Austrian troops from
the fortifications, but they did not know about the precarious situation
of the other forces until a runner arrived telling them it was in danger.
Under the command of Benedikt Fontana and Hartwig Capauls, the
main Swiss and allied force was divided into three pike squares. These
formations had to march for an hour and a half to reach the enemy defenses.163
From the outset of their approach against the enemy defenses,
the Swiss and men from the Grey Leagues suffered a great deal from
Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 121; and Rieter, “Schwabenkrieg,” 141-2.
Kurz, Schweizerschlacten, 163; Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 420; and
Rieter, “Schwabenkrieg,” 142.
163
Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 420; and Rieter, “Schwabenkrieg,” 143.
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enemy fire. Muskets and cannons both took a heavy toll on the confederates. The artillery pieces knocked great holes in the advancing
formations, and a single shot killed seven men including four brothers. The confederates moved along the defenses seeking a weak point
where they might break through. Time after time, they attacked the
fortifications only to be thrown back with heavy losses. In the heat of
battle, the Austrians expended ammunition stores at a rapid rate, and
the Austrians were forced to grab stones from the ground to continue to
fire. Dietrich Freuler did not do his duty, but in the heat and confusion
of battle, he ran from the field leaving the scene as a coward. Benedikt
Fontana led his men bravely and was killed in the attack.164
The death of the popular Fontana helped turn the tide of the
battle. Inspired by the thought of avenging their fallen leader, the Swiss
staged a final heavy assault. Attacking over the bodies of their fallen
comrades, and under heavy fire, the confederates and their allies were
finally able to force a hole in the enemy lines. The Austrians did not
flee at first but bravely held their ground until the confederates poured
through in large numbers. Further resistance was hopeless, and the
imperial forces began to break and run. Soon the whole army was in
flight.165
The force, that had so long kept the Swiss flanking column at
bay, also fled. The Swiss and their allies pursued the Austrians killing any of them whom they could overtake. The confederates gave no
quarter, and no prisoners were taken. Many men fled to the Marengbrücke, and a huge mass of men became jammed on the bridge which
collapsed under their weight, dropping many into the stream below.
The Swiss and men from the Grey Leagues pursued the Austrians for
the rest of the day, hunting men down in the forests and killing them
whenever possible. The slaughter of the fleeing men gave the imperial
forces their worst casualties of the battle. Reportedly, 4,000 Austrians
and 2,000 Swiss and men from the Grey Leagues were killed that day,
164
165

Jecklin, Der Anteil Graubündens, 72; and Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 117 and 122.
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making Calven the most costly battle of the war.166
The Swiss and their allies were infuriated because of their
heavy casualties, and they took revenge on the people in the area because they were Austrians and loyal to the Empire. The confederates
took seven villages and burned them to the ground, not sparing a single
house. The Swiss troopers, with a number of priests, plundered the area
taking or destroying everything of value, then they went on a killing
rampage. They killed every man over twelve years of age, and they
also cut the bodies of thirty-three wealthy men from Meran to pieces.
The Austrian losses in the battle, and presumably also in the following
slaughter, was so extensive that 944 widows were much later reported
in the Vingstgöw and among these were 150 in Meran. The sound of
crying and wailing filled the whole area as children wept for their fathers and women for their husbands. The Swiss and their allies buried
their dead in two mass graves but let the enemy dead rot where they
had fallen. The confederates did not long remain in the area, choosing
to withdraw when the imperial reinforcements approached.167
The areas bordering the Grey Leagues and the Tirol experienced considerable military activity in the weeks following the Battle
of Calven, but no major engagements took place in the region. Maximilian himself led an expedition in the area in late May and early June.
The Swiss did not meet him in battle, but they burned everything before him as he approached, and skirmished with the Emperor’s foraging parties. His army was soon starving and was forced to withdraw.
Maximilian then turned the focus of the war farther west.168
Calven was based on a sound battle plan, but it faltered in execution because the attacking columns which were supposed to strike
the enemy frontally and on the flank, failed to coordinate their efforts.
166
Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 421; Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 123; and Rieter,
“Schwabenkrieg,” 143.
167
Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 422; “Ursprung,” Der Anteil Graubündens,
49, written near 1640; Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 123; and “Willibald Pirckheimers Schweizerkrieg Deutsche Uebersetzung” in Der Anteil Graubündens, 25.
168
Rieter, “Schwabenkrieg,” 144.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

133

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 56 [2020], No. 3, Art. 10

The Swiss in the Swabian War of 1499

131

The delay in the main column attacking the Austrians allowed them
to meet the two threats one after the other, and heavy casualties were
the price of this procrastination. The largest mystery surrounding
the battle was the nonparticipation of the Austrian cavalry. At critical junctions in the action, heavy attacks by the knights could have
altered the outcome of the battle especially in view of the fact that
the Swiss and their allies won a narrow victory as it was. The famous
distrust of the upper-class knights and the peasant infantry may have
been a factor, and the nobility might have just let the peasantry fend
for themselves.
The flanking column of the Swiss and men from the Grey
Leagues must be admired for their endurance. Carrying heavy weapons, the troops climbed thirty-six hundred feet, marched ten miles in
6 or 7 hours and soon after fought a battle for five hours. This column
was composed of the most vigorous men available, but their physical
performance was certainly admirable. From this and other examples,
it was easy to understand why the Swiss troops were so prized and respected during this age.

The Battle of Dornach, July 22, 1499
By July 1499, the war was going badly for the Empire. The
Swiss had been successful in defeating the imperial forces in every
important engagement of the war, and the Empire’s operations in the
mountains of Tirol and the Grey Leagues had floundered. Yet Maximilian could still be optimistic about the war’s outcome. He had assembled large armies around Constance and in the Sundgau Valley near
Basel. Most of the troops in those areas had not seen any major action,
and many were still anxious to punish the Swiss and seek revenge for
the confederate raids. Yet any significant operations would have to take
place soon because funds were nearly exhausted, the troops were complaining of a lack of pay, and some were deserting to go home. A single
key victory could secure enough booty to keep the armies intact, and
such a success would doubtlessly strengthen Maximilian’s war effort
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol56/iss3/10
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Contemporary illustration of the Battle of Dornach 1499. The Swiss
Forces are in the center.
and might even convince the Swiss to come to favorable terms with the
Empire.169
Maximilian’s plan was to make a demonstration in one area
to divert attention and then to stage a significant strike in the other
simultaneously. The largest Swiss force concentrations were around
Constance, watching the Empire’s troop movements very closely. A
large advance in that area would attract a good deal of attention, but a
demonstration of force from Constance should not risk battle because
a defeat might break up or even destroy the imperial army. The main
169
Eugen Tatarinoff’s Die Beteiligung Solothurn am Schwabenkriege bis zur
Schlacht bei Dornach 22. July 1499 (Solothurn: A. Luety, 1899) presents an excellent
account of the Battle of Dornach. It also includes a large appendix of correspondence
between Solothurn and its military leaders. See also “Gedenkschrift 500 Jahre Schlacht
bei Dornach 1499-1999,” Jahrbuch für Solothurnische Geschichte 72 (1999): 5-[392].
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The Swiss fight the Swabian Landsknechte
by Hans Holbein the Younger

attack would take place farther west, and Maximilian ordered Heinrich
von Fürstenberg to advance from the Sundgau to take the strategic castle of Dorneck in the Birs Valley near Basel. Dorneck was a strategic
focal point for a large area of the Swiss Confederation. From there, an
army could march west to the Jura mountain passes, southwest to Bern,
south to Solothurn, or east to Olten, and from Olten, down the Aara
Valley to the Zurich area.170
In May and June 1499, Fürstenberg assembled his army in the
Sundgau of south Alsace. It numbered between 10,000 and 15,000
men, but these troops varied much in quality. Many were simple conscripts who had little interest in the campaign or its outcome. Others
were the superb Landsknechte from the Gelderland, numbering over
2,000 men who were very able and experienced German mercenaries. The infantry was armed in a similar fashion as were the Swiss
with long pikes and other shorter weapons much like the halberd. The
army had many large artillery pieces for sieges and smaller cannons
170

Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 136.
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to be used against the enemy infantry in battle. The cavalry consisted
of eleven hundred of the feared and respected Welsch Guard (French
guard) from Burgundy. However, due to lack of pay, these knights were
poorly motivated and proved to be largely ineffective in battle because
its members were more interested in taking booty than in the conflict.171
Fürstenberg could have marched on Dorneck early in July and
met little resistance, but he decided to await the arrival of more horses,
thus allowing the Swiss more time to react to his threat and prepare a
better defense. Solothurn purchased the castle of Dorneck in 1490, and
the city recognized the strategic value of the fortress and manned the
position throughout the war. Benedikt Hugi led the small garrison of
slightly more than twenty men, and their commander was concerned
about his ability to protect the castle in case of attack. He wrote to Solothurn frequently for more men and support. The city finally reacted
on July 9, 1499, and sent masons to repair the castle and artillery pieces
to strengthen the fortress, but these preparations were unfinished when
the enemy army arrived.172
Solothurn sent its mayor, Niklaus Conrad, and fifteen hundred
men to Gempen, a village about four miles from Dorneck, to watch the
area and harass the imperial forces should they advance. A Swiss army
of six thousand men was watching the enemy forces at Constance, but
the demonstration from that fortress was unimpressive, so Solothurn
was able to convince them that the greatest danger was at Dorneck.
When the confederates at Constance heard that Fürstenberg’s army was
approaching the castle near Basel, most of them marched to Gempen
as rapidly as possible. For the first time in the war, Bern, angered by
Swabian raids, sent a large contingent of three thousand men to help
Solothurn. On July 20, 1499, the Swiss contingents began to reach
Gempen.173
171
“Anonyme Chronik des Schwabenkrieges” in Basler Chroniken, 7 vols.
(Leipzig: Hirzel, 1872-1915) 6: 11; Anshelm, Berner-Chronik, 2: 218; Tatarinoff,
Beteiligung, 166-7; and Reiter, “Schwabenkrieg,” 146.
172
Anton Haffner, Chronica (Solothurn: Zepfel, 1849), 58-9; Elgger, Kriegswesen, 388; Anshelm, Berner-Chronik, 2: 192; and Rieter, “Schwabenkrieg,” 145.
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Anshelm, Berner-Chronik, 2: 218, 224-5.
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The imperial army started to arrive near Dorneck early on July
22, 1499, and those troops began to prepare a siege according to all the
accepted practices of the age. The nearby villages, including Dornach,
had already been destroyed during a raid in March, so the armed forces
could not plunder the area. July 22 was St. Mary Magdalene’s day,
and the army took advantage of the holiday. The men played games,
danced, and sang in the fields between the villages of Dornach and
Arlesheim. Only the artillerymen were busy because they had to dig
into the ground to lay the largest siege cannons on the correct trajectory
to hit the castle while absorbing the recoil of the weapons at the same
time. Smaller artillery pieces were placed around the castle to shoot in
various directions in case of an enemy advance. Those devices were
also placed on the road between Dornach and Gempen to ward off any
possible Swiss attack by that route. This was the only real precaution
taken against the possibility of a surprise attack. Fürstenberg’s men
failed to place lookouts and to send scouts to reconnoiter the area. A
man from Basel came to warn the troops that Swiss forces were nearby,
but his timely caution was ignored.174
Niklaus Conrad could see the entire imperial army from the
Schartenfluh hill, and he realized that a surprise attack in sufficient
strength could be successful, but all available manpower would be
needed to be present to make such an effort. Additional Swiss forces
started to arrive in the morning, but they were tired, hungry, and wet
with sweat from their long marches. By the early afternoon, they numbered over five thousand excellent troops. Among them were 3,000
Bernese troops and another 400 from Zurich. The men from Solothurn
shared food and wine with these men, and they were given some time
to rest. 175
The only groups that were still on the march were 600 men
from Luzern and 400 from Zug. The Swiss war council decided to go
into battle without these additional men because if the attack was long
174
175
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Skulls of Men killed at the Battle of Dornach in the Ossuary at the
Battle Monument
delayed there would be little chance of concluding the battle before
nightfall, but they hoped that the expected contingents would arrive in
time to aid in the outcome of the battle. This time the confederates advanced in two pike squares, a vanguard (Vorhut) and a main formation
(Gewalthaufen) believing that the men from Luzern and Zug would
comprise the rear guard (Nachhut) when they arrived. To avoid detection, the men marched through the forest instead of using the road. The
Swiss started their advance mid afternoon.176
Niklaus Conrad was the commander of the vanguard, comprised mostly of men from Solothurn. When this formation advanced
out of the forest, it divided into two groups. The smaller one turned to
capture some small artillery pieces, while the larger one, led by Conrad, went straight for the large siege cannons, which they were successful in taking. Heinrich von Fürstenberg heard the noise and came
to see what was happening. He got too close to the Swiss who dragged
176
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him from his horse and killed him. At the very outset of the battle, the
imperial army was deprived of its commander, but much of his army
continued the contest without him. Conrad’s group pushed on westward right through the center of the Swabian camp. These men were
surprised, thrown into great confusion, and many, including the Welsch
Guard, fled across the Birs stream.
Conrad and his men had show great initiative, but that vanguard was too small to keep the imperial army long in confusion. The
Swabian Army began to form up in battle formations, and the Welsch
Guard returned from across the Birs to attack Conrad’s forces. The
Swiss vanguard was soon hard pressed and was forced to fall back
towards the forest. This contingent was only spared from slaughter by
the skillful use of the pike and musket.177
The smaller part of the vanguard was able to take the enemy
cannons, but it soon met stiff resistance as well. These men had to fight
desperately to keep from being overwhelmed, but they took heavy casualties in doing so. This group was saved from annihilation when the
Swiss main formation (Gewalthaufen) of 3,000 men from Bern broke
clear of the forest. The main force had advanced as rapidly as possible
through the forest, but the dense undergrowth had slowed its progress.
By the time it entered the field of battle, both sections of the vanguard
were in grave danger, and the German mercenaries (Landsknechte),
were forming into a large pike square. The smaller groups in the vanguard fell back to join the main formation, and these combined forces
then marched to meet the German infantry.178
At that point, the battle became one of German foot soldiers
against the Swiss infantry because the Swabian cavalry, and some of
the Welsch Guard, withdrew from the fight. Many of them were raiding far away, and the four hundred remaining were more interested in
robbing the dead than in actually participating in the fighting. The artillery was also no factor in the battle even after the Swabian cannoneers
177
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returned after being chased off the field. They were unable to use their
artillery pieces effectively because their larger weapons were aimed
high to hit Dorneck and were unable to train them on the Swiss. The
confederates were also forced to leave their cannons behind because
they could not bring them through the forest to the battlefield.
The German mercenaries and the Swiss fought it out on the
fields between Dornach and Arlesheim. The contest was costly and a
prominence on the field of battle became know as “Blood Hill.” For
hours the two armies fought, the outnumbered Swiss making up in ferocity what they lacked in manpower. No doubt, each side engaged by
thrusting forward with their pikes, while the men with halberds looked
for any opening to rush forward and engage the enemy at close quarters. The troops with muskets also fired into the ranks of the opposition
bringing noise, smoke, and casualties inflicted a distance to the battle.
Both armies pushed back and forth against each other as the fighting
swayed over the fields. Whenever one force made and advance into
the other, there would be a rally by the opposition, and the front would
again become stable. Neither side was able to break the other’s ranks
successfully, the battle continued to rage fiercely, and the men on both
sides became increasingly exhausted. The battle appeared to be a stalemate if nothing changed.179
As nightfall was approaching, the battle was finally decided by
the timely arrival of Swiss reinforcements from Luzern and Zug. These
troops entered the field of battle near Arlesheim, shouting and blowing
horns, as they rushed to join the Swiss main mass. With these fresh reinforcements, the confederates staged their final attack. The weight of
the advance of the reinvigorated Swiss was too much for the exhausted
German mercenaries to bear, and they broke and fled. The confederates, furious after their costly and difficult victory, pursued their enemies as they attempted to flee across the Birs stream. The Swiss killed
everyone of their adversaries when they could be apprehended, and in
the ensuing darkness and confusion, the confederates fell upon men in
179
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their own army, killing each other. When all of the men in the imperial army had fled across the Birs and total darkness had fallen, further
pursuit became impossible. The exhausted Swiss laid down where they
were and slept.180
The contest between the Swiss and the German mercenaries
was bitter, and experienced soldiers testified to the ferocity of the battle. Some 3,000 German mercenaries and 500 Swiss died in the battle.
The confederates were buried, but their adversaries were left to rot.
Imperial emissaries sought to retrieve the bodies of the fallen noblemen, but the Swiss replied that the nobles would have to remain with
the peasants. Only the body of Heinrich von Fürstenberg was taken
from the field to the church at Arlesheim.181
The Swiss showed a great deal of concern for their wounded
and for the families of the dead. The wounded were taken to nearby
towns where they were cared for until fully recuperated. By common
consent of the troops, all the booty taken in the battle was divided
among the wounded and the widows and orphans of the dead.182
After the battle, the Swiss had an excellent opportunity to
march into Alsace or the Swabian lands, but the army showed no interest in such advances. They remained for six days on the battlefield and
then returned home. Skirmishes took place in the area for days, but
the fighting soon died down. When Maximilian heard the news of the
Swiss victory, he ceased his military activities, which had become little
more than an artillery exchange between armies around Constance.183
After the Battle of Dornach, the war effort by the Empire nearly collapsed because continued fighting was considered to be fruitless.
The Swiss also showed little interest in further battles and raids, and
military activity dropped off until early in August, when there was
hardly any fighting at all. On September 22, 1499, the Peace of Basel
Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 451.
“Hauptleute etc. der Stadt Bern im Feld an Bern,” July 24, 1499, in Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Schwabenkrieges, 389-90; and Tatarinoff, Beteiligung, 183.
182
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 172-3.
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was signed. According to the agreement, Maximilian recognized no
further authority to tax or to put courts over the states of Swiss Confederation.184

CONCLUSION
The Swabian War was one of Maximilian’s failures in his attempt to unify the German Empire under the control of the Habsburgs.
While the conflict did not spell the end of his efforts, it was a major setback. Militarily, the war was very significant. In it, Europe witnessed
the first clashes between two genuine tactical infantries since the era
of Ancient Rome. Infantries were not to replace cavalries entirely for
centuries, but the era of cavalries supported by weak and ineffective
foot soldiers was over.
Despite the victorious outcomes of the major engagements in
the Swabian War, the confederates had been unable to show an overwhelming superiority over their enemies. Both the battles of Calven
and Dornach had been costly and closely-contested affairs which left
open the question of the continuing dominance of the Swiss. In the war,
the Swabian Landsknechte proved themselves to be a very formidable
force, but the Swiss remained undefeated and still at the height of their
prestige. The resolution of the contest between the Swiss and the German mercenaries for domination was not final in the Swabian War and
would not be decided until the severe Swiss defeat at the Battle of Bicocca in 1522.
The Swiss Confederation fought the Swabian War with ten
official members. Because the Confederation had shown itself to be
viable and able to protect its interests, other states joined, and it soon
had thirteen members. Yet, the most important result of the Swabian
War for Swiss history could not be visualized at the time. This conflict
was to represent the last major attempt by a foreign power to invade
the Confederation for nearly three centuries. A major reason for this
184
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situation was the respect in which the Swiss military was held. Time
and again, it had shown its superiority over virtually all forces sent to
meet it over the previous two centuries. This impressive feat meant that
the confederates could work out their own destiny free from the domination of foreign powers. The Swiss national development owed much
to the military, but this advance would have been impossible without
the significant social developments which made that martial institution
possible.
					~ Albert Winkler
				
Brigham Young University
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May, Gregory, Jefferson’s Treasure: How Albert Gallatin Saved the
New Nation from Debt (Washington, D.C.: Regnery History, 2018.
Pages xxxii, 307. $34.99, ISBN 978-1-62157-645-7).
On the south side of the United States Treasury Building located
in Washington, D.C. is a prominently placed statue of the likeness of
Alexander Hamilton, the nation’s first Treasury Secretary. Other than
scholars of American history and economics, few onlookers would
have recognized the man from the statue until Lin-Manuel Miranda’s
critically acclaimed Broadway stage production Hamilton: An American
Musical (2015) resurrected the Secretary’s public historical legacy.
While entertaining to many, the overdramatized version of this
slice of America’s past is hardly a reliable historical source. Yet, pop
culture often reignites public interest in nearly forgotten topics and
inspires a renewal of scholarship among eager academics endeavoring
to broaden historical understanding among the masses.
One such inspiration is Gregory May’s Jefferson’s Treasure:
How Albert Gallatin Saved the New Nation from Debt, an in-depth
biography of Thomas Jefferson’s Treasury Secretary and Hamilton’s
political counterpart whose statue shares an equally prominent spot on
the opposite side of the U.S. Treasury Building.
While May’s work was probably underway prior to the 2015
premier of the Tony Award winning production, the musical no doubt
created a new audience of history explorers eager to uncover more
about Hamilton and his contemporaries. May’s impeccable timing in
publication, as well as his engaging and fluid writing style, provide
history buffs a perspective on an even lesser known founding father
of American economic policy. May’s mix of intrigue, war, political
irony, and nuggets from Gallatin’s personal life keep the non-academic
reader’s attention while not burdening the narrative with overcomplicated historical interpretation.
142
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May does not ignore his fellow academics, however. He uses an
exhaustive list of primary sources in his nearly 200 pages of end notes
to clearly place Gallatin and his fiscal policies in the greater political
context of his time. The author’s impeccable research culminates into
a great work of historical scholarship that delves not only into the
life of this one man, but into the inherent turmoil of a young nation
whose leaders did not all agree on how to govern—a nation built on
compromise that left many disillusioned.
May uses Gallatin’s evolving beliefs on republicanism
as a vehicle for a broader discussion on the different ideas of what
government meant to Americans at the time. May demonstrates
Gallatin’s evolution from the Genevan aristocratic brand of his youth
to the American ideal of popular sovereignty. Yet, even within the
American system, Gallatin found himself maneuvering between the
idea of local popular governance of his adopted region of western
Pennsylvania and a more national brand that represented the people
as a whole as he moved onto the national political stage. In addition,
May introduces a fascinating argument that demonstrates the rift in
Pennsylvania politics not only between Federalists and Republicans,
but within state Republicans themselves as regional interests within the
state vied for political attention.
While Gallatin may have shifted his understanding of
republicanism depending on the arena, May is clear that Gallatin’s
core principles never wavered. May describes Albert Gallatin as a
pragmatic statesman that favored frugality and simplicity over party
loyalty, ideals that he adopted in both his public and private life. His
succinct arguments and meticulous explanations of fiscal policy made
him a leader of the Jeffersonian opposition to Hamilton’s plan. May
adequately compares the stark differences between Hamilton’s funding
and assumption plan to Gallatin’s debt elimination and reduction in
federal spending, especially military spending.
The author’s treatment of Gallatin’s statesmanship seems a
bit one-sided for the first few chapters. However, by chapter seven,
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May’s seeming adulation for Gallatin’s political and financial prowess
is balanced by his critique of the Secretary’s overzealous frugality and
his opposition to party patronage which, at times, put him at odds with
Jefferson and members of both political parties.
Overall, May depicts Gallatin as a solid republican who
believed in a national government small enough to protect the liberty of
the people but big enough to provide the nation with economic stability
and peace. He identifies Gallatin as the personification of the political
juxtaposition of the early American Republic.
Jefferson’s Treasure is a worthwhile read for American
political history buffs and an excellent study of the Early Republic
and Jeffersonian eras for both the political and economic historian.
Scholars of Pennsylvania history would also find much of May’s book
rewarding.
			~ Stacy Gooden, Georgia Military College
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Meeder, Sven, The Irish Scholarly Presence at St. Gall—Networks of
Knowledge in the Early Middle Ages (London: Bloomsbury Academic,
2018. xii, 187pp. £31.30).
Founded in 720 C.E., the Monastery at St. Gall is located in the
modern Swiss city of Saint Gallus. The complex is built on the grave of
its namesake and is home to wide array of texts written by Irish scholars,
or reflective of Irish learning during the “Carolingian renaissance.” How
these works by Gaelic-Irish scholars arrived at St. Gall is the primary
concern of Sven Meeder’s intellectual history of Hiberno-Latin texts.
Meeder challenges a number of rigid perceptions about the presence
of, and esteem for, Irish scholarly works in medieval Europe. Meeder
argues that Irish manuscripts arrived at St. Gall—and Carolingian
Europe writ large—in an indirect and piecemeal fashion. This combats
assumptions that works were brought to the continent directly, where
Ireland and St. Gall were bridgepoints, or points of departure and entry.
As such, it becomes possible to posit that Irish texts arrived at St. Gall
by way of a significantly more complex journey—a journey that allowed
for external forces to influence and shape the perceptions of Irish scholars
at St. Gall. Geographic constructions of these networks of exchange tend
to be straight lines, implying a direct, unfettered connection between the
points of origin and departure. Such a perspective can lead to incorrect
assumptions about the nature of these transregional exchanges, implying
that texts were fixed and unsullied by contemporary attitudes or regional
distinctions. Meeder refers to this as a ‘horizontal’ rather than top-down
model for understanding the nature of interaction amongst various
centers of learning in Carolingian Europe. Put another way, the HibernoLatin texts at St. Gall are more reflective of regional interaction and the
exchange of ideas among scholars than of any orthodoxy.
The Irish presence at St. Gall was not the result of direct contact
between Ireland and the Monastery. Rather, the works discussed throughout
came to St. Gall in a piecemeal fashion as evidenced by the way in which
Irish works were ‘trapped’ by monks at St. Gall, indicating that Irish texts
came to the Monastery by way of already-extant networks of exchange.
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The bulk of Meeder’s work comprises chapters that are dedicated
to the study of a selection of texts that originated in Ireland. The first of
these concern hagiographies of Irish saints Columbanus and Gallus that
are held in the Monastery’s library. Surprisingly, some of the works tend
to present Columbanus and Gallus as outsiders (peregrinus) of indistinct
origin, thereby presenting them as men of god with indistinct origin and
works that do discuss Ireland present it as a far-flung place ‘at the end of
the world.’ (31)
The relative absence of the Irish context in these works speak to the
emphasis on sanctity over regional origin. Meeder examines the presence
of Irishmen at the Monastery, noting that there was no direct clerical
connection and permanent Irish presence at St. Gall. For example, Meeder
discusses the visitation to St. Gall by noted Irish bishop Marcus and his
nephew Monegal (renamed Marcellus) on their way back from Rome. In
this regard, the Irish intellectual presence at St. Gall was represented by
a more cosmopolitan scholar informed by larger networks of continental
learning where Irish scholars, among others, “facilitated the transmission
of continental texts.” (53)
Relatedly, Irish texts came to St. Gall due to these networks of
exchanged and were kept in the collections for their utility and not a
reverence for their Irishness. Nonetheless, there occurred at St. Gall a
certain reverence for texts that originated in Ireland. The first of which
was De Duodeim Abusiuis Saeculi—a treatise on the 12 main faults of the
world—long associated with Irish thinking. However, as Meeder notes,
this work came to St. Gall by way of Cyprus and bears the hallmarks
of Irish thinking filtered through continental writers. Collectio canonum
Hibernensis, a canonical collection from the mid-ninth century is most
identifiable as Irish in origin, and though there is evidence in the text
of some influence from scholars at the monastery at Riechenau, the
Hibernensis was revered as a work of Irish origin. If the Irish “saved”
civilization, it was a collaborative effort of continental scholars operating
within the networks of interaction present in Carolingian Europe.
~ Ken Shonk, University of Wisconsin - LaCrosse
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Pierroz, Philippe, Quand des Valaisan colonisaient le Wisconsin
(Martigny-Combe, Switzerland), March 2020.
For much of the history of the United States, the role of the Swiss
immigrants has been reduced to that of a bit player. The traditional
history books usually follow immigration patterns along linguistic
lines, and the Swiss immigrants did not follow these linguistic lines.
Therefore, the Swiss Romand, the Swiss Germans, and Swiss Italians
often get labeled as either French, Germans, or Italians when they
arrived in the United States.
Over the past twenty years, there has been a concerted effort to
separate the Swiss from the traditional linguistic groupings, and see them
for who they are. The majority of the published works focused on the
early Swiss-Germans in South Carolina or North Carolina, the mid-west
settlements around St. Louis or even the Swiss Italians in California.
Wisconsin, with New Glarus as the core, has been the obvious focus
of excellent historical scholarship. But in that same region, the Frenchspeaking Swiss immigrants in Wisconsin have largely been forgotten.
Quand des Valaisans colonisaient le Wisconsin by Philippe Peroz
succeeds in bringing these French-speaking Swiss to the forefront.
This work sprung out of genealogical research, but it is not a
typical family history book. Pierroz managed to avoid the trappings
of that genre, and skillfully located the immigration of Swiss from
Canton Valais into the larger historical perspective. Not only is the book
exceptionally researched, but it is very readable with pictures, graphs,
maps, and charts on almost every page. The amount of work needed to
create all of this additional information greatly enhanced the work.
The book starts with its’ first part where Peroz traces the Valasians
from their former homes to Wisconsin. Using personal letters, maps,
deeds, passenger manifests, emigration announcements, and political
cartoons, just to name a few, this portion of the work moved along
quickly and set the stage for the rest of the book.
Part two, focused on the life of these immigrants and their
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descendants in Wisconsin. Page 36 shows a map where the majority of
the Valasians settled, mostly in the eastern part of the state along Lake
Michigan and along both shores of Green Bay. This map, which labels
the locations of where each family settled in which Wisconsin county
is a major asset to the book. One interesting thing to note, according
to the map, there were Valasians who settled in Green County, home
of the Glarners who settled New Glarus and the surrounding towns.
This further shows the disparate nature of Swiss immigration. When
a nation, held together by a single language, had settlers immigrate to
the United States, they would often group together. These groups of
Swiss immigrats, appear to have had limited contact. For someone who
researches Swiss History, this is understandable. In Switzerland, the
Cantons were more important to the individuals than the Confederation
as a whole. Further study about the interactions between the Swiss of
different languages in Wisconsin would prove useful.
The next portion of the book covered occupations of the settlers,
the role of the Valasians in the Civil War especially their participation
in the famous Iron Brigade from Wisconsin. Peroz touched on the
interactions with the Valasians and the various Native American groups
in Wisconsin and how those relationships developed.
Part three, contained a selection of important people in the
Valasians immigrant community. Most prominent among those selected
was François Augustin Deléglise, a town founder, Civil War soldier and
POW, eventual State Legislator. His role in the success and integration
of the colonists into Wisconsin is very important.
Part four is a lengthy and incredibly documented family history.
Although the internet has enabled this type of research to become
easier, these records, exceptionally organized, make the book worth
its price. Despite the intensive documentation, charts and primary
sources used, Peroz managed to keep this section readable. Many
life sketches are included, for example on page 182. August Jerome
is no longer just a name, the image of him with a baseball team
that he played on with him identified, brought him alive. Multiple
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appendices, dealing with locations, names, births and emigration
dates round out the work.
Quand des Valaisans colonisaient le Wisconsin is a solid addition
to any person interested in Swiss-American History, the history of early
Wisconsin, or the history of Fifth Switzerland. The drawback is that it
is only available in the French language for the time being. As a result
of that, the scope might be limited in the United States, but a future
translation into English could correct that.
~ Robert Sherwood, Georgia Military College
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Check out our website at:
www.swiss-american-historical-society.org
Name: ________________________________________________________
Address: _____________________________________________________
City: _______________________________________________________
Phone: _______________________________________________________
Email: _______________________________________________________
Dues for U.S. members:		
__ Individual $50.00 per year
__ Institution $75.00 per year
__ Student $25.00 per year
__ Life Membership $500.00

Dues for Overseas members:
__ Individual SFR 65.00
__ Institutions SFR 100.00
__ Life Member SFR 650.00

For U.S. members, make check payable to SAHS and mail check and form to:
Ernest Thurston Membership Secretary
65 Town Mountain Road
Asheville, NC 28804
Email: Eswisst@gmail.com (mail to: EswissT@gmail.com)
For Overseas members, please contact:
Kurt Morf, Treasurer, Swiss Chapter, at: kurtmorf@aol.com

Membership in the Swiss American Historical Society is open to all.
Each year, members receive three copies of the Swiss American Historical Society Review, a personal copy of each book newly published by the
Society, and an invitation to attend the Society’s national meeting held
consecutively in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia.
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